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Abstract 
This study sought to examine the economic structure of the Philippine health care 
system, in the light of recent legislative initiatives in the country and global managed 
market reforms. In the context of a market-orientated system in the Philippines, the 
study modelled the interaction of health care agents in three markets: regulations, 
fmancing or insurance and health services. The bulk of the research examined the 
nature of exchange in the health services market, using neo-classical economics. Theories 
in industrial organization and public choice served as organizing frameworks for 
explaining other market elements. The srudy' s methodology used primary and 
secondary data analysis, as well as fmdings of other research, to bring together a 
coherent picture of the market structure of health care in the Philippines. 
The analysis of the regulatory market showed that the rent-seeking nature of 
Philippine social, political and medical instirutions has weakened regulatory strucrures in 
health care. Compared to its Asian neighbours, the relative position of the country in the 
60s in terms of major health indicators, has been eroded. Limited resources and 
allocative inefficiencies have affected the government's ability to fulfil its constitutional 
mandate to ensure minimum levels of care, especially for the poor. 
The performance of the market was examined in terms of health policy objectives 
of efficiency and equity in the fmancing of health care. Private sources, with households 
forming the bulk, comprised 64 percent of health care expenditures. The position of 
concentration curves drawn to illustrate the equity of household fmancing, showed 
inequities in health and health expenditures. The largely fee-for-service system operating 
in the health insurance market had caused risks to be borne largely by consumers and 
funders. Low coverage of the population and weak utilization rates, may have 
encouraged some providers to behave opportunistically. An examination of the prospects 
for an alternative system of compulsory health insurance, illustrated through a project 
with health maintenance organizations indicated the problems of contracting. 
Estimates of health service market conditions on the demand-side, from an out-
patient provider choice model, showed low price and time cost elasticities, with the poor 
being more responsive than the rich. Simulations showed that the introduction of user 
fees in public services were likely to drive demand towards private care in urban areas, 
and out of the market in rural areas. The welfare effect estimates showed that if public 
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hospitals were to charge one-half the price of private doctors, the welfare loss would be 
about 10 percent of household budget of the lowest income group. The amounts needed 
to compensate losers from the policy change can be transformed into contributions for 
risk -sharing schemes. 
From the supply-side, the distribution of facilities, productive resources and 
technology were shown to have wide variations across regions and types of facilities. 
The srudy cited research that showed that total cost strucrures in hospital flilllS were 
largely determined by the volume of services rendered. Moreover, variable costs were 
shown, by other research, to be neither influenced by scale nor by the scope of 
operations. 
The analysis of the market structure, based on a modified Hirschman-Herfmdahl 
measure, showed that no hospital-flilllS had a dominant share of the market. Regression 
results, from the same research on total cost functions, showed that hospital outputs were 
unresponsive to actual competition. Price competition appeared to be swamped by non-
price competition. An examination of pricing behaviour showed widespread cost-price 
mark-ups, reflecting the 'market power' of providers. The co-existence of competitive 
and monopolistic tendencies in the health care market, combined with weak and/or 
distortive incentive structures, suggests that the tenets of contestability analysis were not 
fulfilled. 
The last chapter showed the limitations of the analysis in providing conclusive 
evidence on the behavioural underpinnings of the health care market in the Philippines. 
Conceptual and methodological difficulties, arising from data and measurement problems, 
imply that the results are at best exploratory; and that further work can use the issues 
raised as starting points. For health policy reforms in the Philippines, recent legislative 
initiatives could improve health sector performance from a three-pronged approach: 
enhancing access, agency and co-ordination. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 The Context, Aim and Objecthes 
There have been dramatic developments in the health sector in the Philippines 
from the late eighties onwards. The first significant legislation was the 1988 Generics 
Law 1 which required generic labelling and prescribing. This affected the pri\'ate 
health industry, i.e. the drug companies and professional groups. the most. The second 
piece of legislation involved the decentralization of the control, financing and 
accountability of government health facilities and sen· ices to local governments2• 
More recently, before the May elections, a National Health Insur~nce Act3 was passed 
which sought to bring together the separate administration of funds for the compulsory 
health insurance programme into one body. These developments are changing. and are 
likely to change still further. the way the health sector is organized in the country. 
These initiatives did not come about from some pre-determined blueprint for 
change; but were introduced piecemeal in a somewhat ad hoc manner. The inclusion 
of the health sector in the Local Government Code was unexpected, as it appears to 
have been generated solely from Congress with minimal Department of Health 
participation. Even up to the present, bills are being introduced to attempt to revert 
to the system of central and integrated administration and financial control. The 
Generics Act was undertaken in a more deliberate and co-ordinated manner than the 
1The Generics Act of 1988: Republic Act (R.A.) 6675: Approved September 13, 1988: 
84 Official Gazette (O.G.) 5588 No. 38 (September 19, 1988). 
~The Local Gnvernment Code of 1991: R.A. 7160; Approved October 10. 1991. 
'National Health Insurance Act of 1995: R.A. 7875; ApproveJ February 14. 1995. 91 
O.G 22t)9 No. 16 (April 17. ll/95). 
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Decentralization Law. The new government. which replaced a period of authoritarian 
rule, had to take an initiative that reflected its populist concerns. The Department l'f 
Health organized task forces to generate information and popular support for the 
legislation; this was important given that organized medicine and multinational drug 
companies were opposed to it. The National Health Insurance Act benefitted from 
some research4 • But the law itself just involved organizational changes to combine the 
two funders of medical insurance, and the guidelines for its implementation have not 
been drawn up. There appears to be no clear commitment on the source of funds for 
the programme. 
These policy developments taking place in the Philippines beg for more than 
a single-pronged, problem-focused approach, for they challenge the underlying structure 
of health delivery and financing, and ultimately, the practice of medicine in the 
country. They point to the changing role of government in the health sector. They 
raise questions on the future of the market-driven system which characterizes the 
Philippine health environment. Without a coherent understanding of the market and 
non-market forces that shape, and are likely to guide, these changes, the legislative 
initiatives referred to above may end up as a mere reformist attempt to attract votes 
without recognizing the opportunities they offer for structural reform. 
Considerations of strategic reforms should start with an understanding of the 
underlying structure of the health care system in the country. This study aims to 
provide such an analysis. It is an economic study of the health care market that is 
intended to contribute towards the better grounding of political decisions in an 
4 Research were conducted under the Health Finance Development Project. spon-.,l )red 
by thl' llniteJ States' Agency for Intt.:rnational Development (LlSAID). 
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economic framework. The piecemeal manner in which the bills have been introduced 
suggests that their implementation will not create the impact that they should. 
This study is not an evaluation of the legislation referred to above. Rather it 
is an analysis of the structure of the health care market to determine the conditions 
likely to affect the implementation and outcome of legislation and to assist in the 
reorganization of the health system in a rational manner. Specifically, the 
investigations are directed towards answering the following research questions: 1) How 
is the health system organized? What is the nature of the regulatory framework? 2) 
How does the system of health financing perform in terms of efficiency and equity? 
3) What are the factors that affect demand for health care? What. for example, are the 
effects on demand of changes of prices for out-patient care? 4) What are the 
underlying supply conditions, particularly the technology and costs structure of 
production of hospital services: and. 5) What is the market structure for health care? 
To what extent is it price and non-price competition operating? The work concludes 
with a discussion of the study· s implications for policy developments directed at 
managing the market in health care: and, indicates further work that needs to be 
undertaken in the light of the issues underlying the market structure of health care in 
the country. 
1.2 Significance 
The example presented in the Philippines. with its market orientation in health 
care. can inform policy debates in both developed and developing countries trying to 
proximate the competitive ideal. Health care refom1s taking place in many countries 
are directed at introducing market mechanisms and incentives into public systems 
(Saltman and van Otter. 1992; LeGrand and Bartlett. 199~). The trend in reforms in 
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developed countries finds parallels in deYeloping countries in the various policies that 
introduce market elements like pricing, through the introduction of user fees to 
previously free systems and greater public-private interaction through contracting 
(McPake, 1993: Bennett, 1994). The analyses undertaken in the study can provide 
policy with simulations on the effects of user fees: as well as information on the 
responsiveness of costs and outputs of hospital services to prices and other market 
conditions. 
The market structure analysis undertaken in this study offers a uruque 
perspective as it explores aspects of recent theoretical developments in economics. 
contestability analysis, in particular: and, elements of transaction costs and public 
choice analyses, to examine their usefulness in illuminating health sector analysis, 
particularly in a developing country. The tenets of recent theoretical developments in 
economics can be used to explore health policy concerns that arise from interactions 
among health care agents. in the context of incentive problems posed by the 
'commodity' health care. 
1.3 The Theoretical Framework of the Study 
This section sets out the theoretical framework of the study of the economic 
structure of health care in a pluralistic system. The first section identifies the 
boundaries of economic analysis. The second part exan1ines the underlying objectives 
of a health care system. The third part analyzes the nature of the 'commodity' health 
care. 
.,., 
--
1.3.1 Economic Boundaries 
Health care comprises the set of activities which can bring about better health 
by specifically directed activities. The pursuit of health involves the use of resources. 
The domain of economics is analysing the ways that the resources used in health care 
can yield the most efficient and equitable outcome given their costs. The resourc~s 
expended on health care are resources lost to other activities. The realm of economics 
as a discipline is precisely to inform on this process of choice. 
The behaviour of interest in economics is one of optimization. The analvsis 
starts from the perspective that preference patterns. given the feasibility constraints of 
agents, can be mapped and yield beha\'iour that can be consistent with maximization. 
For consumers, optimization means choosing the quantity of goods and services that 
yields most satisfaction within given price and income constraints. For firms. 
deciding on the type and quantity of outputs that will yield the desired profits entails 
taking into consideration the cost of inputs. These atomistic agents, starting-off from 
a self-interested perspective. come together to form the market. and without influence 
on price, bring about a state of equilibrium in which the costs of every additional good 
produced is equal to the price at which the good can be sold. Neo-classical economic 
theory predicts that this competitive equilibrium is optimal and efficient when there is 
no other way by which resources can be allocated which can make everyone better off: 
Pareto Optimality. Howe\'er, market conditions may dictate that only one or few firms 
can be an efficient configuration in the market. in which case, it has been suggested. 
,_ 
that the same efficient outcomes can be achieved by the mere threat that a potential 
entrant many pos~ on the market when that entry can be accomplished without sunk 
costs (BaumoL et al., 1982). This contestability hypothesis expands the 'sway of the 
invisible hand' in the market. 
Equilibrium exchange is assumed to take place within the context of the gin~n 
initial endowments of ownership of assets and skills. Should the initial distribution of 
purchasing power result in inequities in exchange, restoring equity is made possible 
with the compensation of the less well-off by the better off and /or the state by the 
instituting mechanisms for such transfers. The competitive model views the role of the 
state as external; and for policy purposes, may consider the role of the state limited to 
cases where the market 'fails', such as under monopoly conditions; where there are 
common access resources involved; when consumption of goods are non-rival; and. 
where exclusion is difficult (as in the case of public goods). 
But the state or government may not necessarily be an impartial entity, affecting 
the allocation of resources towards some ultimate social goals. Governments are also 
comprised of individuals pursuing their own optimizing objectives. Public choice 
models focus upon resource allocation processes arising from self-interested behaviour 
of politicians. bureaucrats and self-interested groups. The choice of one programme or 
allocation mode may be based on politicans' seeking to maximize re-election chances 
(Downs. 1957); bureaucrats· trying to maximize the stature of the office (Niskanen. 
1975); public workers' seeking to maintain blissful tenure by sticking to routines 
(Wolf, 1979). The various mechanisms these individuals in government may devise, 
within state allocative processes, to pursue their own selfish interests imply that 
government allocation can be just as inefficient as the market it sought to replact:. 
suggesting 'govenm1ent failure'. 
Other forms of allocation, outside of markets and governments have been ~" ' 
shown to achieve efficient outcomes. The optimizing behaviour. or its corollary of 
minimizing costs, has also been applied to the analysis of decisions to form firms or 
to take the allocation process out of the market: to internalize it within firms (Coase. 
1937). The objective function pursued is the 'minimization of transaction costs 
(Williamson, 1985), with the latter defined as the costs of running the system. Other 
forms of collective action operating with formal and informal mechanisms. fall within 
the purview of analysis of transaction cost minimizing behaviour. The concern with 
transaction costs stem from the recognition that the central problem of economic 
organizations are rooted in the behavioural attributes of economic agents. Human 
knowledge has boundaries (bounded rationality) and that self-interest maybe more 
ruthlessly pursued without principle or conscience (opportunism). Recognition of such 
behaviour suggests that information gathering, monitoring and enforcement costs are 
now embedded in contractual arrangements. It is these costs that determine whether 
one arrangement is more efficient than the other. 
The economic framework for the analysis of the nature of health care 
interactions can, therefore. provide some coherence to decisions involving choice. 
The allocation problem in health care, however, may pose analytical difficulties arising 
from the attributes of the 'commodity' health care. Conceptual and behavioural 
elements alter the nature of market signals. These attributes are discussed next . 
.., .. 
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1.3.2 On the ~ature of the 'Commodity' Health Care 
There are three attributes which are important in understanding the nature of 
health care as an economic good. They are not unique to health care. but the extent 
of their influence on health care markets separates it from other types of markets. 
These are: a) uncertainty; b) externalities; and, c) as\mmetric information. These 
attributes create conditions and provide incentives for certain behavioural and 
institutional responses which shape the health care market. 
Uncertainty. Uncertainty in health care markets arises from two sources. 
Uncertainties describe the 'state· of prevailing conditions. and uncertainties relating to 
the decision-making by economic agents. For the consumer. the uncertainty over the 
randomness of the sickness event is most basic. The participation of consumers in the 
health services market is. for the most part, determined by their experience of sickness 
which triggers the medical need for health care. Consumers also face the uncertainty 
that arises in relation to the diagnosis and outcomes or effects of treatment. Despite 
(or inspite of) the special training and knowledge. professionals may take advantage of 
uncertainties to justify recommendations for more diagnostic examinations and other 
therapies. thereby, raising prices. 
Uncertainty involves an assessment of the risk of an event occuring at some 
future time. In addition to risks associated with existing conditions or known risk 
factors, the attitude to\\'ards risk enters as an independent factor relating to people's 
reactions to risky situations, and is to be found in many markets. The expected 
financial loss attendant to seeking care may drive consumers to reach through to the 
insurance market. either directly or through the gl)\·ernment or their employers to 
secure themselves against this il'Ss. Insurance covers uncertainty by pooling risks acru-.s 
26 
population groups. Insurance provides the opportunity to pool risks within a band: 
where the probability (p) of event s occuring falls between one anj zero (1 > p > 0). 
Risk averse individuals, for whom p = 1. are likely to take up insurance cover. But 
no firm will provide insurance given this 'certitude'. On the other hand, no demand 
will be forthcoming when p = 0. 
In addition to attitudes towards risk, the problem of the market for insurance 
at all levels is also determined by the ability to pay. The poor, who may include many 
who are prone to sickness or are already sick. may not insure because they lack funds. 
The de-selection of those who cannot afford insurance but who may benefit from it 
often serve to motivate governments to provide the insurance. 
Health care interactions are fraught with uncertainties ansmg from the 
asymmetries in the structure of information (Williamson. 1985). Voluntary insurance 
schemes, for example, are confronted by two problems. The first is adverse selection. 
The problem of adverse selection arises when individuals know their own personal 
risks better than the insurer and those at higher risk seek cover. They will be adversely 
selected into schemes which would cause premiums to be higher than the community 
risk rating. further forcing out those at less risk or those too poor to pay. The practice 
of cream-skinuning through higher premmms. exclusionary clauses on existing 
diseases. market segmentation, etc., are mechanisms to deter high risk individuals 
from the joining the risk pool and so restrict coverage to the more healthy and most 
likely. wealthier population. 
A second problem. known as moral hazard, arises when insurance allows the 
consumer to face a marginal cost at the point of care which is less than the true 
marginal social cost of provision, leading to higher utilization. Providers. on the 
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other hand, may, as a result of the perception that the patient does not bear the full 
cost, increase utilization of secondary services more than necessary. This point is 
discussed further in terms of information asymmetry. 
But the welfare loss arising from these practices may be high for a society and 
often explain why insurance markets may not be fully developed m some systems. 
making for an incomplete market for health care (Arrow, 1963). 
Asymmetric Information. Asymmetry of information is an important element 
in health care markets not only because of the uncertainty of health needs but also 
because of the specialized nature of knowledge and the differences in the objective 
functions of the agents with regards to information disclosure. While patients seek to 
inform the doctor as much as possible about what ails him. doctors may not have 
similar incentives to disclose what they know, either because of uncertainties over 
diagnosis or outcomes as earlier cited. or it may be as Phelps (1992) aptly describes: 
... Professional duty, ethics. and personal responsibility make the doctor want 
to be open and honest. Conflicting with this. however, the simple profit motive 
can lead the doctor into different choices. Put most simply. if so desired, the 
doctor might be able to deceive the patient, and make more money doing 
so ... the patient could have no way of telling when this was happening (if at all). 
(p.6) 
The consequences of information asymmetry vary. At one extreme, the costs 
of wrong information can be life threatening. At the other end. one can "shop around" 
until one gets the satisfactory information. However, the possibility of obtaining it is 
limited by the acuteness of conditions and by the difficulty of weighing one provider's 
opinion against another (Culyer. 1991). For the insurance market. the consequences 
of information asynm1etry. the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. may 
acumnt for a breakd0\\'11 of the market in insurance (Arrow. 1963). 
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The extent to which ways are devised to solve the problem may result in 
market outcomes which are not competitive. It is a striking attribute of serYices in 
general to develop into personal relationships built on the nexus of trust. In health 
care, the likelihood that a repeat transaction will be made enhances consumer loyalt: 
to a provider. This personalistic relationship is likely to enhance provider power in 
terms of rate-setting, and utilization of secondary services in the health services market. 
Asymmetric information underpins the licensing of professionals by government. 
In addition, professional groups evolve codes of ethics to prevent abuse (Arrow. 1963). 
The benefits of the delegation of some of the functions of government to ensure ethical 
behaviour to professional groups has to be balanced against the costs of collusive 
behaviour. 
Information asymmetry influencing provider behaviour leads to a moral hazard 
problem. Moral hazard arises from the provider-side of health care markets when the 
manner of paying providers by third party payers leads to more services being ordered 
than necessary. Fee-for-service payments, for example. have been shown not to 
encourage cost minimization by providers, but instead, encouraged greater use of 
services by providers (WHO, 1992). This type of behaviour is explained by the 
transactions cost theory in terms of human attributes of bounded rationality and 
opportunism. Bounded rationality refers to behaviour which is 'intendedly rational. 
but only limitedly so· (Simon, cited in Williamson, 1985). Large numbers of 
transactors prevent efficient monitoring and enhance opportunities to claim payment 
from the insurance agency for sen·ices not rendered or fraudulently rendered. Such 
beha,·iour fits the notion of opportunism. It is characterized as "self-interest with 
guile·: associated with "incomplete or distorted disclosure of information. and to 
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calculated efforts to mislead. distort. disguise or othenrise confuse" (\\'illiamson. 1985. 
p. 51). This clearly creates conditions of inefficiencies and high transaction costs. 
The process of transforming health care into health, and the oYer-all health care 
interactions are complex. The attributes of the 'commodity' health care make health 
care different from other goods traded in the market. The complexities arising from 
uncertainties, information asymmetries and inter-personal valuations engender incentive 
problems (e.g. moral hazard and adverse selection) which affect the ability of the 
economic arrangements in health care to achieve health care objectiYes. 
Externality. When consumption or production of commodities by one person 
affect another, without that person or firm choosing to be so involved, externalities 
are said to exist. Health campaigns like immunization or vector control activities create 
positive externalities and benefit society as a whole. Failure to take shots or be 
examined for possible infectious diseases create negative externalities as the disease is 
likely to spread to the wider population. While seeking health care may yield benefits 
internal to the person, the benefits accrue to society as well from having healthy 
citizens. The extent to which individuals do seek care depends on whether the 
incremental costs of doing so are less than the perceived potential gains. Optimal 
outcomes are realized when the incremental costs are equated with the incremental 
benefits. Govenm1ent involvement in health care often arises because markets may 
not yield efficient outcomes because of externalities. One· s personal valuation of costs 
and benefits may not coincide with societal valuation of costs and benefits. 
However. not every instance of externality need trigger government 
intervention. Parties affected can get together and some compensation process can be 
agreed on. The Coase Theorem states that "bargaining can achieve an efficient 
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allocation of resources whatever the initial assignment of property rights" (Gravelle and 
Rees, 1992). However, in instances where property rights are not defined, or the 
legal framework is not clear, or when the benefits are available for everyone to enjoy, 
then internalization of externalities may not be made and under or over provision may 
result. The latter is said to be common in health care where capacities and use of 
advanced techniques reflect on reputation, an important element of the medical 
profession's objective function (Evans, 1984). 
1.3.3 On the Nature of Health Care Objectives 
The ultimate objective of a health care system is "to advance and protect the 
health ofpeople"(Roemer, 1991; p. 32). Advancing health means combatting disease, 
increasing life expectancy and improving the over-all quality of life. Other elements 
in the social system may affect health but health services are the main direct 
mechanisms through which health care objectives are pursued. 
Efficiency. The welfare economics criteria for evaluating resource allocation 
has been identified earlier as Pareto efficiency. Under this criteria, efficiency in 
resource allocation is said to occur when no individual can be made better off without 
at least one other becoming worse off. Production and consumption takes place at the 
point at which technology and society's feasibility constraints dictate. When a 
combination of other goods and inputs can make possible a higher level of attainment 
on society's production possibility frontier, not achieving such level means inefficiency 
in the strict economic sense. For society as whole, where no reallocation is possible, 
the marginal social benefit equals the marginal social cost. Operationally, this entails 
the fulfillment of the following criteria (Barr, 1993; pp. 73 -75): 
1. Consumption Efficiency - Two individuals' marginal valuation of one 
commodity. vis-a-vis another commodity. are the same. 
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2. Production Efficiency - Factor proportions are so combined to obtain 
maximum output from given inputs. 
3. Efficiency in Product Mix - The input supply and input use yields an 
optimal bundle at which the ratio of marginal production costs and the ratio of 
marginal valuation of consumption are equalised, given existing production 
technology and consumer taste; 
4. Administrative Efficiency - Possible gains in output are possible by 
sacrificing another output without incurring additional costs. Also popularly 
known as X-efficiency where eliminating waste or managerial slack can yield 
higher outcomes without increasing costs. 
Where initially the allocation is not efficient, in the sense that someone is made 
worse off in the process of another being made better off, a potential for optimality 
exists by providing compensation from gainers to losers. A consumer's 'willingness 
to pay' can serve as basis for compensation: for gainers how much they would be 
willing to pay to have the change. and for losers how much they would be willing to 
pay not to have the change. In cases of costless redistribution. where the amount that 
gainers gain exceed that which the losers lose, then the potential for compensation to 
achieve optimality exists. This is known as the Hicks-Kaldor Criterion. (Cullis and 
Jones. 1992: p.40). The Hicks-Kaldor compensation test does not involve interpersonal 
value comparisons. i.e.. whether one utility gain can be worth more than one utility 
loss (Gravelle and Rees, 1992). The individual makes the judgement through the 
amounts they are willing to pay or be paid to be made as well-off after the change as 
before it. The Scitovsky paradox showed that, given costless redistribution. the 
Hicks-Kaldor test can yield more than one preferable outcome. It can include a 
reversal back to the status quo. the crux of the Scitovsky paradox, such a shift can be 
achieved by non-costless redistribution alone. and thus a proviso is needed to the Hicks-
Kaldor test. to preclude such a change (Scitovsk·-y. 196-+). 
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In cases where property rights may be ill-defined. the go\·ernment comes in t('l 
undertake the compensation process through transfers5 . The government's role in a 
competitive market is to effect the redistribution process. and intervene in cases where 
individuals may not know what is in their best interest (merit goods argument). In 
instances where the market may fail because of externalities. information problems and 
incomplete markets (e.g. absence of market for risk), the nature of government 
intervention can be assessed and compared to outcomes that would have risen had they 
been left to the market. 
Equity. The concern for equity in pluralistic health care systems stems from 
the idea that the market system merely reflects the distribution of assets and purchasing 
power, and that the poor are likely to obtain and use resources differently from the 
rich. The outcome of market transactions for each group will therefore differ. As Le 
Grand (1991) aptly comments: 
... The fact that people will almost inevitably come to the market with different 
amount of resources from which to generate income will generate inequality in 
income; this in turn will generate inequalities in the consumption of all 
commodities and a failure to meet a minimum standard of consumption of 
some. What is more disputable is whether the inequities thereby generated will 
be greater than any created by government intervention (p.438). 
Assessments of health care deliYery and financing are based on the notion that 
health care is delivered on the basis of 'need' and financed according to 'ability to pay· 
(Wagstaff, et al., 1993). Commitment to enhancing 'access' suggests a concept of 
equality anchored on a 'rights-based' principle; i.e. access to health care is a matter of 
right. 
~This is basically a Pi~l)U\'ian \·iew. Coase ( 1960) argues the case where in the ab..,ence 
of transaction and bargaining costs. an agreed allocation l'lf resL1urces can b~ Pareto optimal 
independent r,f the prior assignment l)f property righb (cf Mueller. 1989; p 28) 
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In practice, equity is defined in terms of vertical and horizontal equity. 
Vertical equity in health care implies that those with greater need should receive more 
services than those with less needs. Horizontal equity. on the other hand. implies that 
persons with the same need receive the same services. The difficulties that arise when 
measuring the quantity of service use, quality of treatment and health need. su£!gests 
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that equity objectives should be contextualised in terms of a country's social objectives. 
as well as the availability of data. 
The allocation decisions undertaken, with market and non-market elements 
prevailing, e.g. state, firms and other collective actions, take on contracting and 
bargaining features. The question of distribution of benefits, the sharing of the gains 
and costs of transactions, can be viewed as outcomes of this bargaining process. 
The equity problem appears to boil down to a question of balancing the various 
interests in the transactions: a question of the appropriate design mechanisms to 
capture the interests of groups disadvantaged by the bargaining process. This study 
discusses the problems of efficiency and equity in health care in the context of the 
interaction amongst agents in the health sector. 
1.4 Conceptual Frantework 
1.4.1 Entpirical Questions Arising from the Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical discussion and the issues arising from the applicability of 
economic concepts to health care raise several questions for this empirical investigation 
of the health market in the Philippines. 
First. how do the dynamics of state and other non-market elements influence 
health care organization and outcomes? How do interactions among agents determine 
the costs of market interactions. and ultimately the structure of the markd? 
Second, to what extent does the system of financing health care in the country 
determine the efficiency and equity of market operation? 
Third, to what extent are the conditions of demand and supply 
for health care services determined by market forces? What does the behaviour of 
prices and outputs tell us about the market structure? 
These questions suggest that the health care system in the Philippines can best 
be viewed in terms. of the interaction of agents in response to incentive problems 
generated by information asymmetries, uncertainties and externalities in health care. 
The dynamics of interactions in health services, health insurance and regulations are 
captured in the context of the organizing boundaries of markets. To the extent that 
these interactions are guided by behavioural rules envisioned by theory, these market 
interactions comprise institutional arrangements in health care. 
1.4.2 Agents and Markets in Health Care 
The health care system is defined in Roemer (1991) as the "combination of 
resources, organization, financing and management that culminate in the delivery of 
health services to the population" (p.3). A focus on the underlying economic structure 
of the system entails an analysis that stems from an understanding of the behaviour of 
economic agents in the allocation of resources. The process of exchange occuring 
among agents forms the market. Resource allocation in health care then has a market 
in the sense that there is an interaction among agents, an exchange occurs and a cost 
and benefit calculation can be made. A markets-based perspective permits the 
examination of the outcomes of health care transactions in the context of the relative 
positions of agents. The degree of pluralism in Philippine health care markets reflects 
on the varying degrees of involvement of a) government; b) third-party payers; and 
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c) providers. Three types of markets e\·olve on the basis of the relative influence l'f 
these parties. 
Health Services Market. The goods or medical services market is where 
health care exchange occurs, reflected largely in the interaction of pro\·iders and 
consumers. There are other interactions as well, especially in the interaction among 
other personnel and real resources in the production of health services. If services or 
goods are received from providers upon direct payments from consumers, which is the 
system in the Philippines, then this exchange comes close to the textbook understanding 
of markets. The basis of exchange is the price of the service or good; and the 
consumer behaves according to his or her estimation of the benefits to be purchased. 
against the price (costs); a calculus which is "the sine qua non of a well-functioning 
market"(Reinhardt, 1990; p.l06). 
The standard theory of competition provides benchmarks in which to analyze 
allocations in the health services market. Hence, a major part of this study looks into 
the elements and structure of the health services market. The extent to which 
consumers behave according to the predictions of theory is made in the study of 
demand for outpatient care in Chapter 4. The model is specified in such a way that 
captures differences in responsiveness across income groups; and simulates for effects 
of pricing in government services. Unlike other markets though, consumers enter the 
health services market under less propitious conditions of illness and hence may not 
exercise fully-informed behaviour as he or she would in regular markets, even if he or 
she bears the full cost of care (Reinhardt. 1990). This puts providers in a dommam 
position in the market (Evans. 1989). 
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Whether providers, in this case hospitals, behave according to norms of the 
market of minimizing costs, is the subject of Chapter 5, which explains the shape of 
cost functions and examines the responsiveness of output to economic variables in the 
health care market in the Philippines. 
Regulatory Market. As regulations are the means through which the 
government exercises control over the agents; the effects of these regulatiom can alter 
the balance of costs and benefits in the sector. The 'regulatory market' therefore 
reflects the interaction among agents in the context of the government's regulatory 
functions. In the context of a pluralistic economy, the government's role is to balance 
the interplay of forces in the market. It reaches to other agents to secure its goal of 
assuring and protecting the health of citizens. The capability of government to enter 
into commitments with other sectors, including the delegation of regulatory functions 
to the professionals themselves, is determined in part by the socio-political framework. 
The government's ability to serve as a balancing force in a pluralistic economy is 
affected by the extent to which provider groups may influence the regulatory process. 
The strength of government involvement in health care is reflected in the 
extensive role it plays in the provision or delivery of health services, their financing, 
and in regulation. Most developed economies in Europe have the state as the main 
fonder and provider of health services (OECD, 1992) In some countries, like that in 
the United States of America and the Philippines, government involvement is balanced 
by strong private sectors involved in the provision and financing of health services. 
Governn1ent licensure of professionals is common to all countries. Other areas of 
government involvement include: policy-setting, regulations, research and training. 
The extent of governn1ent involvement in health care in the Philippines is discussed in 
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Chapter 2, in the context of the development of social and political institutions in the 
country, and its implications for the regulatory framework and health service 
provision. 
Insurance Market. Third-party payers in health care are insurance companies 
which provide coverage against financial losses that may be incurred in the event of 
illness. Coverage is based upon premium payments from consumers or contributions 
from government. Insurance maybe compulsory, that is, established based on state 
edict, or maybe voluntary and private. Health systems are distinguished by the e\tent 
to which insurance is provided by the state or privately sourced by consumers. often 
with their employers. In Britain, the national health insurance system provides for 
comprehensive care for alL with funding generated mainly from taxes. In Gem1any. 
insurance is provided by various sickness funds organized along occupational groups. 
In the Philippines. health insurance is privately sought while the employed are also 
provided with compulsory cover. financed out of payroll taxes. Third-party financing 
is the least-developed of the health sector markets in the Philippines. As such. its 
influence on consumer behaviour is hard to capture in empirical research because of 
small numbers of participants. 
Aside from the transactions flowing between insurance systems and patients 
through premium payments. the insurance market is of interest because of the way 
insurers transact with providers. It is this transaction that is more influential in 
determining the market structure, as provider payment mechanisms from large funds 
may alter provider behaviour. 
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1.4.3 Limits of the Approach 
The framework is not meant to be encompassing and comprehensive. There are 
certain public health concerns that may not easily fit into the framework, fL~r example 
merit concerns and control of infectious diseases in emergency situations. There are 
areas or conditions for which no market may exist as the basic infrastructure may not 
be available. But the conditions under which these circumstances occur can be 
amenable to analysis, especially in the context of a system of incentives which give rise 
to certain arrangements in some situations while not in others. 
Neither does the study hope to 'test' a hypothesis about market structure. 
estimating from hypothesized objective functions, first-order conditions and developing 
a set of predictions. To the extent that hypothesis-testing is developed in standard neo-
classical analysis, the chapters on demand and supply utilizes such approach. The 
analysis on market structure in Chapter 6, draws on the results of demand and supply 
analysis to examine the contestability of the market structure. For the most part, the 
discussion on market structure refers to hospital services; while the analysis on 
demand is for out-patient services. Other information and research works are culled, 
to build on the analysis of supply and demand to examine the nature of the health care 
market in the Philippines. Insights from the various theoretical apparatus described 
above in Section 1.3 are drawn upon to serve as organizing frameworks in the 
discussion in the respective chapters. 
1.5 Organization of the Study 
Following the economic framework. the organization of the study is illustrated 
... 
in Figure 1. 1. The regulatory and self-regulatory framework in the health sector is 
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Figure 1.1 
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examined in the context of socio-economic and institutional developments in the 
Philippines and the implications for the efficiency and equity of public sector provision 
in health care are examined in Chapter 2. 
The equity and efficiency of the health sector is assessed in terms of the patterns 
of health financing; examining financing of health services by households against 
needs; and, assessments of institutional financing are presented also in Chapter 3. 
A critical element to defining the nature of the market is the underlying 
behavioural response of demand and supply to market-based incentives. The choice 
of out-patient provider and the impact of pricing in the government sector are 
explained; and price and income elasticities of demand are estimated to detem1ine the 
responsiveness of demand to changes in prices in the government sector; and 
willingness to pay for government services. are estimated in Chapter 4. 
The conditions of the supply-side are discussed in Chapter 5. The distribution 
of productive resources in the health sector in the Philippines highlights the conditions 
of technology in the sector. The study then reports on the results of studies on out-
patient clinics from the perspective of a physician-firm, Cobb-Douglas production 
function estimates of hospital services, and estimates of the economies of scale and 
scope of these services. 
The economic structure of health care markets is examined in Chapter 6. The 
basic tenets of contestability are discussed. The nature of competition or non-
competition is examined in terms of market shares of hospital services. the 
determinants of hospital outputs. as well the behaviour of prices in the health care 
market. Based on the empirical evidence provided. the extent to which the market 
structure in the Philippines can be described as a contestable market is as..,essed. 
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Chapter 7 discusses the finding in the light of the limitations of the analysis. 
and the implications of the findings for research and policy are considered. 
1.6 An Overview of the Methodology and Data Sets Csed 
This dissertation brings together the relevant findings of recent studies on the 
Philippine health care system to highlight the issues raised in linking market structure 
analysis to the dynamics of agents' behaviour and policy-setting in the country. 
Much of the descriptive analysis is sourced from secondary. published and 
unpublished, sources. The national data sets used are the 1990 Family Income and 
Expenditures Survey (FIES), the 1987 National Health Survey (NHS) which is a rider 
to the Integrated Survey of Household (ISH). All data sets are collected and processed 
by the National Statistics Office (NSO). The matching of these data sets to yield the 
equity measures shown here is the first time that such task has been attempted in the 
country. A description of these data sets is made in Appendix 1 . 
This study follows an eclectic approach. It combines both descriptive and 
quantitative analysis. using primary and secondary data. The empirical investigations 
proceed with estimates of demand side parameters using econometric techniques. 
Supply-side analysis uses and re-interprets the results of econometric exercises done by 
other authors to highlight issues addressed in the framework of this study. The chapter 
on market structure provides a springboard for exploring industrial organization 
perspectives in an inductive manner. given the empirical evidence provided. Detailed 
methodological aspects and other conceptual issues are discussed in the relevant 
chapters. 
The broad scope covered by the study. as opposed to a problem-focused study 
orientation. was dictated in part by avai!Jbility of infom1ation and by the urgent need 
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of bringing this information together for policy 0 The information \\as gathered as 
part of the activities undertaken during the fieldwork portion of the dissertation 
research. Much of the analysis using secondary census data and the survey data 
analyzed in portions of this study rode on a research programme known as the PI OS-
DOH Project, for the Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS)- Department 
of Health (DOH). The former is a quasi- government think-tank conducting economic 
studies on contract from various branches of government and other funding agencies 0 
The objective of the research project was to gather baseline information for the design 
of an alternative financing scheme for the country. This author served as principal 
investigator for the demand study involving a survey on households. The demand and 
supply portions of the study rely on primary survey data collected under the auspices 
of this PI OS-DOH Project. A description of these data sets are found in the respective 
chapters and in Appendix 2. 
At about the same time. the United States' Agency for International 
Development (USAID) was also funding a three-year project for the Philippine 
government to specifically examine health policy and institutional issues in the 
Philippine Medical Care System, the compulsory health insurance programme. This 
author served as one of the co-authors of the background papers on national health 
accounts (Solon, et al.. 1990). health insurance (Gamboa. et al.. 1993) and the private 
medical care sector (Griffin. et al.. 1994) 0 Tables from these reports that are used in 
this study are indicated accordingly 0 
43 
Chapter Two 
Socio-Economic Performance, Institutions, 
Implications for the RegulatoiJ· Framework and 
Public Provision in the Health Sector 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the regulatory framework and public provision in the 
health sector from the perspective of socio-economic and institutional developments in 
the country. The rate and structure of the economic growth pursued reflects on the 
health sector not only in terms of the availability of resources for the health sector but 
also the manner in which the health sector is organized. 
This chapter is divided up into four parts. The first part presents a picture of 
the trends in socio-economic developments in the country. The second part examines 
the dynamics of the Philippine political economy in terms of the nature of the political. 
social and economic organization in the country. The third part discusses the regulatory 
framework. including self-regulation by the health profession. The fourth part 
illustrates the implications for organization and budget allocations in the public health 
system. 
To the extent that data is available, a comparison with trends in other countries 
is made. It must. however, be noted that cross-country comparisons, particularly in 
terms of longitudinal changes in income distribution, poverty. and other social 
indicators. necessarily suffer from a lack of comparability of the different sources of 
data and methodologies used. At best they should be taken as portraying a general 
trend and that further clarification should be made with in-depth anahsis of each 
countr\'. 
2.1 A Background of the Economic Development of the Philippines 
2.1.1 Socio-Economic and Health DeYelopment Trends 
The Philippines is a nation of some 7,000 islands straddling the southeast region 
of Asia (Figure 2.1 for map). Unlike its neighbours who have experienced rapid and 
sustainable growth for the past decades, the Philippines' economic performance has 
been uneven. Table 2.1 shows a comparison of the Philippines with other Asian 
countries. In terms of GNP per capita, it ranks bottom of the group. While other 
countries grew in real terms between from 5.7 to 8.0 percent in the past three decades, 
the growth rate of Gl\P in the Philippines was only 3.1 percent, to rank bottom of the 
list in terms of growth rate. But as can be gleaned from the table. per capita incomes 
in 1962 in the Philippines was higher than in Indonesia. South Korea and Thailand, but 
the eighties saw South Korea and Thailand having per capita incomes which were 4.3 
and 1.4 times, respectively, higher than in the Philippines. 
This difference in economic performance is also reflected in health status 
indicators: where the comparative picture remains the same (Table 2.2). Life 
expectancy in the 60s was highest in the Philippines. But recent estimates showed that 
its performance surpasses only Indonesia while the other countries have experienced 
rapid gains in years of life. The rate of change in improvements in infant mortality 
rates has also been slow. Griffin (1991) observed that if the Philippines had followed 
the same trajectory path from the 1960s. as countries with similar economic ranking, 
life expectancy in absolute years would haYe been about 69 years by 1989 instead of 
64. 
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Table 2.1 
Developmem Indicators for Philippines and Selected Countries in Asia 
Country Gross National Product Growth Rate, 1962-1986 (pe~ cent per year) 
per capita (1986 US $) 
1962 
Philippines 495 
Indonesia 190 
Korea (S.) 330 
Malaysia 820 
Singapore 1500 
Thailand 345 
Note: 
Data for Indonesia refer to years 1965-86. 
Sources: 
1986 
540 
490 
2345 
1730 
6765 
760 
GNP Population 
3.1 2.7 
6.9 2.3 
10.1 1.9 
5.7 2.6 
8.0 1.7 
5.9 2.6 
Gross national product: GNP at current prices converted to US dollars 
GNP Per Capita 
0.4 
4.6 
8.2 
3.1 
6.3 
3.3 
using period-average exchange rates and to 1986 dollars using wholesale price index, 
all as reported in International Monetary Fund (1989) 
Indonesia's GNP from World Bank (1988; p.222) 
Population: 1962 populations from UNESCAP(1965. p.228); 
1986 populations from Asian Development Bank (1988). 
Adapted from Boyce, 1993; p.3 
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Table 2.2 
Changes in Health Status Indicators, 
Comparison of Asian Economies 
Indonesia Republic of Malaysia 
Korea 
1 Life Expectancy 
at Birth 
1960 46 53 
1970 49 61 
1980 56 68 
1990 59 72 
Ave. Rate of Change/a 8.8% 10.8% 
2 Infant Mortality /b 
1960 128 62 
1970 114 47 
1980 95 30 
1990 74 16 
Ave. Rate of Change/a -16.6% -35.7o/o 
a/ average for each ten-year rate of change 
b/ per thousand live births 
58 
63 
68 
71 
7.0o/o 
55 
42 
28 
15 
-34.5o/o 
Philippine Thailand 
59 52 
58 60 
62 64 
64 68 
2.8% 9.4°o 
72 88 
64 55 
51 44 
41 27 
-17.0~~ -32.0% 
Ref. World Bank Tables; World Development Report 1993 for recent estimates 
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The progress in the reduction in infant mortality rates had been slow compJrcd 
to Thailand, which started out with high infant mortality rates per thousand compared 
to the Philippines in the 1960s. While Thailand experienced a 32 percent average rate 
of reduction in infant mortality rates during the past four decades. the Philippines· 
reduction in infant mortality rates was just slightly half that figure at an annual average 
of 17 percent. The relatively slow rise in output and incomes may be attributed to th~ 
higher growth rate of population which was the highest among Asian countries. as 
shown in table 2.1. The GNP-population imbalance resulted in a per capita growth rate 
of less than one percent. In terms of the demographic profile of the country. the 
1980s may have been a peak for crude birth rates (see Table 2.3). The logic of the 
population momentum implies that the Philippines will be a 'young' nation for 
sometime. Recent estimates. from the 1993 National Demographic Survey (NDS). 
showed that 56.8 percent of the population are in the economically active age of 15 to 
64 years. Only about four percent are in the 65 years plus age group. This leaves 
nearly 40 percent in the age group 15 years and below (NSO, 1993). 
Population distribution figures show that the Philippines is an urbanized country. 
moving from being predominantly rural (with only 31.8 percent urban) in 1970 to 
nearly half (48.6 percent) of the population being urban-based in just two decades. 
Table 2.3. 
Leading ·causes of infant mortality and over-all morbidity reflect the nature of 
epidemiological change in the country; which is peculiar to middle-income earning 
economies (Frenk. 1989). Pneumonia. diarrhoea and respiratory conditions rank high 
as causes of infant mortality (Table 2.4). These health problems relate to conditions 
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Table 2.3 
Basic Demographic Information 
Population, 1990 /a 60,703,000 
Crude Birth Rates /b %Change 
1980 37.3 
1990 28.8 -20o/o 
Crude Death Rates Age-Stnd rd ize 
1970 9.7 10.2 
1980 8.5 8.5 
1990 7.4 7.5 
Age Distribution of Population /c 
Less than 15 years old 39.3 
15-64 years old 56.8 
65 years and older 3.9 
Median Age 20.1 
o/o of Population Urban /b 
1970 31.8 
1980 37.3 
1990 48.6 
Population Density 1990 202 persons/sq.km. 
a/ Philippine Statistical Yearbook, 1993 
b/ Fleiger, 1994 
c INat1onal Demographic Survey, 1993 
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Table 2.4 
Infant Mortality, Ten Leading Causes 
Rate Per 1,000 Live Births 
(1981-1985) (1985 - 1989) 1990 
Average Average 
1. Pneumonia 10.2 8.7 5.8 
2. Respiratory 
Conditions 5.5 4.3 3.7 
3. Diarrhoea 3.6 2.1 1.1 
4. Congenital 
Anomalies 1.9 1.5 1.3 
5. Avitaminoses 1.7 1.3 0.7 
6. Measles 1.3 1.1 0.4 
7. Birth Injury & 
Difficult Labor 1.1 0.9 0.7 
8. Acute Bronchitis 0.7 0.5 0.3 
9. Septicemia 0.6 0.7 0.9 
1 0. Meningitis 0.5 0.4 0.3 
Source: Philippine Statistical Yearbook. 1 989 1 993 
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of living and health service capacity. Morbidity causes (Table 2.5). on the other hand. 
are dominated by bronchitis and diarrhoea, again problems related to conditions of 
living. A rise in accidents, malignant neoplasms and diseases of the heart is also 
discernable. The health conditions in the country reflect the co-existence of 
widespread poverty with 'islands of wealth'. Health services, therefore. haYe to 
respond to problems related to socio-economic conditions. through basic public health 
activities, and at the same time, deal with a growing demands for personal, technology-
intensive care for chronic diseases (E\'ans, 1982). 
2.1.2 The Pattern of Gro\\1h Pursued 
Differences in growth strategy and other factors may partly explain the pattern 
of these health and socio-economic trends (Boyce. 1993). For example, while the 
Asian countries cited pursued export-led growth, for most of the sixties and early 
seventies, the Philippines clung to import substitution policies of the 50s. One aspect 
of the economic growth process that stands out for the Philippines is that much of its 
growth in the 70s was pursued through external borrowings. From a debt of US S 
360 million ($1.1 billion in 1986 prices). the country's external debt rose to $28.3 
billion: making the Philippines one of the heaviest indebted country in the world. In 
tem1s of debt-to-GNP ratio, the Philippines had the highest at .90 (Boyce, 1993). The 
strategy of external borrowing was vigorously pursued by the autocratic regime which 
controlled the country from 1972 to 1986. The external flows supported programmes 
and monopolies closely associated with the ruling family. The world economic 
downturn in the 80s and the political turmoil following the assassination of a leading 
opposition politician. saw foreign loans dwindling and with them. political support ft)r 
the regime (Hutchison. 199~). The democratic regime that folll~\\ ed. including the 
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Table 2.5 
Morbidity, Ten Leading Causes 
Rate Per 1 00,000 Population 
(1981-1985) (1985-1989) 1990 
Average Average 
1 . Bronchitis 798.5 1215.0 1580.3 
2. Diarrhea 764.8 1080.0 1520.7 
3. Influenza 616.9 938.0 878.0 
4. Pneumonias 289.1 353.0 380.3 
5. Tuberculosis 244.2 301.1 246.1 
6. Malaria 141.9 211.6 118.7 
7. Accidents 168.1 201.5 215.5 
8. Measles 94.2 119.8 69.2 
9. Malignant 
Neoplasms 48.4 49.2 54.3 
1 0. Diseases of 
the Heart 130.6 140.5 160.7 
Source: Philippine Statistical Yearbook, 1989/ 1993 
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present administration, still operated under an International Monetary Fund (I\iF) 
programme which indicated that external borrowings remained in place. HoweYer. 
structural adjustment programmes have been instituted to enhance debt repayment. 
These programmes, relying on tight monetary and fiscal policies to control prices, 
have caused concerns especially in terms of heightening poverty and inequality in the 
country. Figure 2.2 shows how debt servicing gets at least a 30 percent share of the 
national budget, bigger than the combined shares of other sectors, such as social 
services, including health. Income inequality in the Philippines is considered to be 
one of the highest in the world. Table 2.6 shows that improvements in shares of 
income going to the poorest 30 percent have barely moved: they have only a 10 
percent share of income. Although wide fluctuations have been felt by the richest 10 
percent, they still control nearly half of the country's income. It is this trend in income 
inequality which has created the general impression that the Philippines mirrors the 
growth path of Latin American countries rather than that of East Asian countries 
(Boyce. 1993: citing World Bank, 1985). 
Table 2. 7 shows that in terms of government-defined poverty threshold, the 
proportion of the population who are considered poor has remained at around 40 
percent. despite slight improvements. The declining trend in urban wage rates. with 
1985 rates only a third of rates in 1965, in real terms, indicates the worsening 
economic conditions in the country. 
In terms of regional conditions, the inequality in incomes finds a parallel in the 
inequality of economic growth and performance across the 14 regions of the country 
(Table 2.8). ~lore than half of the population, or 55 percent. liYe in the Luzon 
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Table 2.6 
Trends in Real Income Distribution, 1961-1985 
(thousand pesos, 1978= 1 00) 
1961 1971 
(a) Total 
Richest 10% 42.9 56.7 
Poorest 30% 3.3 3.7 
Rich/Poor Ratio 13.1 15.2 
(b) Rural 
Richest 10% 22.3 39.6 
Poorest 30% 2.8 3.1 
Rich/Poor Ratio 7.9 12.7 
(c) Urban 
Rchest 10% 71.2 82.7 
Poorest 30% 4.5 6.4 
Rich/Poor Ratio 16.0 12.9 
1985 
46.1 
4.6 
10.1 
28.2 
3.8 
7.5 
67.9 
6.6 
10.3 
* Based on assumption of uniform income understatement across deciles and 
adjusted for effects of changes in relative price of food. 
FIES income distribution data from World Bank adjusted by prices using NEDA 
price index and food weights for price adjustments from NSO 
Source: Boyce, 1993, p.40 
Table 2.7 
Poverty Levels and Urban Wage Rates 
Sources: 
% of Families 
Below Gov't 
Threshold /a 
1985 44.2 
1988 40.2 
1991 40.7 
Urban Wage Rates (1986 = 1 00) /b 
1965 
1975 
1985 
Skilled Unksilled 
84.07 112.94 
57.27 68.31 
23.21 35.55 
a/ National Statistical Coordinating Board, 1994 
b/ Boyce 1993, p.28 
Table2.8 
Island Groups I Regions Population %Share of GROP /a %Share of GROP %of Families Labor Force Infant Mortality 
1990 Total 1992 GROP Per Capita Below Poverty Participation Rate /1000 
fOOO) Population (mil Peso) (In US$) lb Une, 1991 Rate live births 
1992 5-Year Ave. 
'85-'90) 
A. Luzon 
1. locos 3,551 5.9 29,265 2.2 317 49.4 52.8 47 
2. Cagayen Valkty 2,341 3.9 27,276 2.0 448 43.1 61.2 67 
3. Central Luzon 6,199 10.2 134,944 10.1 837 33.0 52.6 39 
4. Southern Tagalog 8,264 13.6 195,562 14.6 910 38.0 54.8 42 
5.Bicol 3,910 6.4 37,864 2.8 372 56.1 59.2 55 
B.Visayes 
6. Western Visayes 5,392 8.9 92,959 6.9 663 46.7 57.1 55 
7. Eastern Vlsayes 4,593 7.6 85,317 6.4 714 42.4 57.4 51 
8. Central Vluyes 3,055 5.0 34,383 2.6 433 40.7 58.3 43 
Vt 
-.J 
c. Mindeneo 
9. Nor1hem Mirld.-o 3,158 5.2 37,422 2.8 456 54.5 53 101 
1 0. Cemrel Mindanao 3,510 5.8 63,995 4.8 701 55.2 60.4 79 
11. Western Mindanao 4,459 7.4 90,374 6.7 780 47.5 59.5 86 
12. Southern Mindeneo 3,171 5.2 45,074 3.4 547 51.0 63.5 102 
Cordillera Region 1,146 1.9 23,403 1.7 785 37.6 60.4 63 
Metropolitan ~R 7,928 13.1 434,792 32.4 2,109 14.9 53.3 36 
Total. Ptli!lpp! 1et1 60,677 100.0 1,342,630 100.0 851 40.7 56.2 53 
aJ Gross Regional Oornedc Product 
bl 26 pesos to 1 us dolar 
......................... ~,., 
.._.,_-=a ........... ~ .... 
.... NIO. ~ ..... ~ ............ "*"'- .t •. tiM 
islands, 21 percent in the Visayas and 24 percent are found in Mindanao. In terms 
of income, the NCR and nearby regions 3 (Central Luzon) and 4 (Southern Tagalog). 
as premiere industrial areas, hold the bulk of the nation's income. They are 
advantaged in terms of location and have been primary recipients of infrastructure and 
development efforts in the past. Mindanao, on the other hand, holds the next highest 
share of income; situated as it is in an area almost free from typhoons which makes 
its agriculture a valuable source of employment and income for the country. However. 
a long history of civil and ethnic unrest in the Moslem areas, and government neglect, 
has held back its economic progress. Labour force participation rates in the non-
industrial regions were higher than the national average, reflecting a pattern of uneven 
development. Regional patterns in infant mortality rates also show the better off 
region, the National Capital Region, having infant mortality rates which are 2.8 times 
better than the worst off region in the country, Region 12 (Southern Mindanao). 
2.2 The Organization of Philippine Institutions and Dynamics 
The inequalities in health status and the economy in general, are somehow 
rooted in the patterns of trade and the concomitant ownership structures that were 
fostered in the colonial period and have endured to the present (De Dios, et.al., 
1993). This section provides a brief overview of Philippine institutions to serve as a 
backdrop to the analysis of the regulatory framework. 
Social Organization. The Philippines has undergone long periods of 
colonialism, first under Spain, for more than three centuries, then under the United 
States of America, for 45 years at the turn of the 20th century. Colonialism. 
particularly the twin influences of Catholicism (from Spain) and libertarian ideals from 
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the U.S., has engendered a social organization, wltich Kuitenbrouwer(19-:'9'1 aptly 
describes as follows: 
... The view grows that poverty is inevitable, that resignation to the will of God 
is a virtue, and that it is the task of the rich to have compassion and to help the 
poor whenever poverty becomes manifest. .. Welfare is entrusted to the chur-:h 
and to that organization that it inspires. Privatization of the social welfare 
function grew during the American period in wltich individual responsibility of 
the citizens was emphasized, in (natural) correspondence with the ideal of 
individual freedom and initiative. Thus. social welfare is increasingly 
perceived, not as a responsibility of the organized community as a whole, but 
as the task of private groups of citizens, whether religiously or otherwise 
inspired (p.2). 
The social orientation therefore, along with other aspects of Philippine life. is 
one of emphasis on private initiative: with heavy reliance on personalistic and kinship 
in social relations. This reflects on the strong pri\·ate sector orientation in the economy. 
The behaviour of this sector can be understood in the context of the political 
framework. 
Political Organization. The colonial trade in primary agricultural goods has 
encouraged ownership of large farms. which created an agrarian elite and a strong 
patronage system(ILO. 1976). The rigid class structure created, based on control of 
land, survived through the industrialization process as the political institutions and 
processes served elite interests well. U.S. democratic institutions, separating powers 
among three branches of government, are in place. The competition for control over 
the executive or presidential power and a bi-cameral legislature drawn from pro\ incial 
and national representatives, takes place through elections decided on simple majority 
or plurality votes. The judiciary is expected to provide the checks-and-balance~ 
function; although all appointments to the judicial positions are made by the PresiLknt. 
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The Philippines has undergone two major political changes in recent times. It 
was under martial law for 16 years, which saw executive and legislative powers vested 
m one-man. A strong executive served to create a small elite group which controlkJ 
large investments and external flows in major areas in agriculture and industry. 
The prominence of non-elite participation in a 'people's power revolution· that 
toppled the dictatorship heralded a new phase in Philippine life. The a\·ersion to a 
strong executive led to the decentralization of powers to the representatives' legislators 
and increased powers and resources, as well as responsibilities, to local goverrunents 
(de Guzman, 1988; cited in Hutchison. 1993) While legislative powers are effective 
in limiting executive prerogatives in the national budget and enhancing accountability 
of line agencies. they are far-reaching in terms of granting franchises. and blocking 
entry into new areas of investments. However. the new electoral democracy brought 
back the shifting alliances characteristic of a system where a patronage continues to 
prevail (Esfahani, 1994). New players did not eliminate the partisan and/or personal 
politics that permeate every government decision. It just served to intensify political 
brokering: making political processes highly "entrepreneurial". Elections, as the 
manner through which competitive politics are waged, serve as contests of personalities 
and influence, backed by money. 
Economic Organization. The modem economic growth process in the 
Philippines was· initiated by a free trade regime between the U.S. and the Philippines 
even after independence. This, however, served to create the first of the series of 
balance of payments crises, as exports outpaced imports, a phenomenon prevailing to 
the present. The main beneficiaries of this period were the agricultural landowners 
who enjoyed free access to the U.S. market. 
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This process was followed by an import substitution phase, a pattern similar 
to that in much of the developing world. Import substitution industrializati\_•n (lSI 1 was 
generally seen as a response to the declining terms of trade which ser\ed to impoverish 
much of the developing world relying on primary agricultural exports (Gillis. et al. 
1991). With import substitution policies, domestic industries were protected by high 
tariffs and quotas, and the imposition of import and exchange controls. The policy has 
nurtured a new class of domestic manufacturing elites and led to distortions in the 
economy arising from the maintenance of an overvalued currency. This has heightened 
the balance of payments problems and increased reliance on foreign debt (De Dies. 
1993). 
The economic pattern. under the prevailing political system. has engendered 
a unique feature of behaviour amongst Philippine elites, one which a foreign observer 
described as follows (Esfahani. 1994): 
Though there were no prohibitions against state ownership. economic assets 
remained largely private. Public ownership of an enterprise meant the total loss 
of the associated surplus once the ruling group was out of power. Turning an 
enterprise into the group members' private property. in contrast. could help 
maintain the group's control over the assets and at least part of the returns. 
Thus many foreign-owned enterprises were "Philippinized" but not nationalized. 
as similar enterprises in other developing countries had been. . .on occasions 
when enterprises of rival groups could be expropriated or when failing domestic 
firms fell into government hands, the ruling coalition arranged for its member~ 
to purchase the enterprises and secure them as their property ... to maintain 
control of political and economic rents, the Philippine elite have helped shape 
a political structure that has stunted the development of efficient institutions for 
market governance and resource mobilization" (p. 11-12). 
This lack of efficient institutions has been exposed under. both strong and 
weak, state regimes. Social inequalities distort the mechanisms for the articulatit)n of 
people· s interests. The fundamental characteristic of inequalities in incomes and 
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economic opportunities translates into inadequacies in the entitlement system fostered 
by inefficient institutions in the Philippines (De Dios, 1993). 
2.3 Implications for the Regulatory Framework in Health Care 
2.3.1 Characteristics of the Regulatory Structure in Health Care 
The Philippines has been described as one of the most politically advanced 
countries in the region because of its democratic traditions (Hutchison, 1993), effecting 
a resurgence again after nearly two decades of authoritarian rule. Under the 
Philippine system of institutions, described in section 2.2. the state allocative processes 
and regulatory framework are likely to reflect the disparities in Philippine life. The 
characteristics of the regulatory structure in the Philippines that impinge on the health 
sector are identified below. 
Multiple Sources of Power. Given the nature of social relations and 
inequities in Philippine society, the presence of democratic institutions like elections, 
do not guarantee that revealed preferences in the public arena reflect the majority's 
preferences. All laws of the land emanate from the legislature. The members of the 
legislature and the President of the Republic of the Philippines are voted by direct vote. 
Voting by representatives in the legislative chambers is an outcome of a mix of 
elements reflecting the multiplicity of power sources: political party. constituency. 
interest groups, vote trading, and personal aggrandizement (Hutchison. 1993). Public 
choice literature highlights how, given the varying intensity of preferences among these 
varying pressure groups and elements, voting behaviour will likely lead to a level of 
provision that may be higher than the efficient level (LeGrand, 1991). 
The executive can also determine outcomes through presidential \Cto. But thi.;. 
is rarely exercised. With weak ideological bases of Philippine party p<."'liti-:s. the 
extent to which the executive can be immune from pressures is determined by its 
personal control over the party. The legislature, on the other hand, has often uscct 
the judiciary to provide the final decision on legislations. even if they have reached the 
final signature of the President. The legislators themselves may often bring the matter 
to the Supreme Court after the law has been signed. This is a relatively new 
phenomena but one which has been used for the health laws cited earlier: i.e. the 
Generics Law and Decentralization. This serves to highlight the multiple sources of 
influence in Philippine society and indicates the weakness of regulatory institutions. 
Lack of Independence of the Bureaucracy. Regulatory functions for the 
health sector are overseen by bureaux within the sectoral departments. These bureaux 
are headed by appointed officials who report to the Secretary of the Department who 
is also an appointed official. The Secretary's appointment is subject to the approval 
of the bi-cameral body in the legislature known as the Committee on Appointments. 
Political appointments at the top serve to v.·eaken morale and independence in the 
bureaux. The consequence of this lack of independence is to heighten policy 
uncertainties and enforcement ambiguities. The leadership posts are subject to chan~e~ 
given shifting political alliances, executive discretion and congressional interference. 
This shifts the bulk of responsibilities for continuity, implementation and enforcement 
to the middle and lower levels of the hierarchy. 
Lack of ·control over Budgets and Personnel. The lack of independence is 
also heightened by congressional control of government budgets. Budgets of all 
government agencies are scrutinized and approved by the legislature. Tight and 
fluctuating budgets have affected bureaux efficiencies. providing further impetus for the 
legislature to control appropriations to the departments. The legislative control o\·er 
63 
budgets provide legislators with a uruque instrument of bureaucratic power; and 
bureaucratic energies become engaged in this bargaining. This power gives the 
representatives of the Congress undue influence on the manner in which regulawry 
agencies behave, creating tensions between the two bodies. 
The hiring and firing of public personnel are constrained by civil service rules. 
While such policies are good for staff morale because of the tenure they provide. they 
also breeds inefficiencies through the lack of a disciplining element. The problem of 
staffing is further complicated by government restrictions on hiring. Frequent changes 
at the top and freeze hiring below breeds inertia. Given the uncertainties in leadership, 
routine activities are resorted to. Enforcement capabilities are affected by resource 
constraints. Limited staffing and inadequate equipment limits effective monitoring and 
evaluation 
'Agency Creation'. One manifestation of the tension between legislature and 
the executive is the propensity by the legislature to create other bodies which take on 
similar functions to existing agencies. This is in addition to the tendencies of the 
legislators to mandate construction of new hospitals to serve their constituencies. 
Hospitals established by law cannot be closed except by another act of legislation. This 
constrains aiready limited public resources. 
The Philippine :Medical Care Commission (PMCC), the body which oversees 
the compulsory health insurance programme, was initially established by the legislature. 
separated from the Department of Health. Other quasi-government bodies (e.g. 
Philippine Tuberculosis Society), those with goverrunent funds but privately-managed. 
may be created with funds often taken out of the health budget. The picture 0f 
go\'ernment expansion is not really one toward a monolithic or le\'iathan state 
(Niskanen, 1968), but one of disintegration. Too many agencies. with functions 
overlapping, distract the main sectoral departments' attention. If it is seen to create 
some competition within the public sector, the pressure of limited resources transform 
bureaucratic energies towards 'turf-battles' rather than towards efficient performance. 
Biases of Mandatory Restrictions. Bias towards restricted entry is the most 
common foi1Il of regulation. It is best exemplified by the licensing rules that apply to 
the entry of professionals to medical practice and/or employment. These licenses 
function mainly as a form of entry restriction, rather than quality restriction, in the 
sense that they certify only to educational qualifications and thereby serve as a 
minimum standard. 
In so far as they specify tasks or restrict delegation and substitution, the 
specification of functions for each health professional, as embodied in the various laws, 
i.e. Nursing Act, Dental Act, etc .. also serve to preserve professional domains. This 
is similar to the legal reservation of tasks in the British National Health Service as 
described by Green (1985). That these rules are not immutable and are subject to the 
political process was demonstrated recently in the Philippines in the legislative tussle 
between optometrists and ophthalmologists regarding the grant of rights to optometrists 
to prescribe or apply medication to patients (Rodriguez, et al., 1994). The case 
highlights increasing competition among professionals. 
Minimtim requirements for certificates or licenses to operate health care 
facilities, i.e. hospitals, clinics, diagnostic centres, laboratory services, etc., specify 
quality standards. Minimum standards for facilities are specified in terms of numbers 
and staffing combinations, type of equipment and instruments based on appron:J 
services it can offer. as well as physical facilities. Hospital facilities are CJteg~)rill·J 
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as primary, secondary or tertiary on the basis of services offered. Primary hospitals. 
for example, can offer up to 25 beds and should have administrative. clinical and 
nursing services. The introduction of health care products and drugs are also subject 
to testing and regulations. Delays in processing of application (8 months to more than 
a year) are the subject of oft-repeated complaint (Rodriguez, et al.. 1994). These 
regulations increase the cost of entry to a market and subject the regulators to pressures 
in the form of bribes. 
2.3.3 Characteristics of Self-Regulation by Professionals 
Professional regulation is as much an activity of medical professional groups 
as they are an activity of government. The medical profession. as one of those subject 
to entry regulations, are also entrusted with regulatory responsibilities by the state 
(Evans, 1984: ArrO\\'. 1963). These responsibilities are intended to ensure and 
maintain quality. Quality-certifying groups are those which have College in their titles. 
Some professional groups call themselves ·societies· or ·associations·. The Philippine 
Medical Association (PMA) functions as a powerful lobby group akin to its American 
counterpart. All practising physicians are members of this group. In the Philippines, 
in addition to other regulations, self-regulation by providers have the following 
features. 
Accreditation of Medical Schools. Self-regulation begins at the entry level 
in medical schools. There were 27 medical schools in the country in 1991. 23 of which 
are private (Rodriguez. et., 1994). Medical schools in the country have an 
accreditation process which imposes quotas on freshmen enrolment among memher 
schools. School accreditation is a quality signal. The voluntary grouping of medical 
school administrators and owners is recognized by both DOH and Department of 
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Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). The relationship is symbiotic in the sense thJt 
medical schools can be closed upon the group's recommendation and that tuition fees 
for accredited schools are less subject to government fee controls. Educati\_•n in the 
Philippines is largely funded by family sources. State education is subsidized. Any 
restrictions on entry to medical schools and training result in lllgher costs of medical 
education. 
Certification of Professionals. The certification process is three-pronged. 
First, the Board or College designates a member to the Board of Examiners which 
conduct the professional exams. Second, specialty training programs are designed and 
approved. Places for specialty training are limited and restricted to teaching hospitals. 
Trainees are known as residents in these hospitals and are paid a salary or allowance. 
Third, further specialization or fellowship requires additional years of training, in a 
smaller number of hospitals, at the end of \vhich oral and written examinations are 
conducted. This pattern is similar to that in the United States as discussed in Phelps 
(1992). Repeat examinations may also be required and more and more specialties 
require continuing medical education (CME). These educational units are also required 
for license renewal. 
Restrictions on Conduct of Practice. Self-regulatory or professional rules 
influence the conduct of practice. Mandatory restrictions cited above have been 
imposed, often at the behest of the professional groups. Access to hospitals hinges on 
membership in collegial bodies. Self-regulation also defines the functions of personnel 
and impose strict restrictions on the substitutability of personnel functions. 
Profe~sionals are also restricted from advertising. 
67 
2.4. Implications for Government Senice Pro,ision 
The nature of the development of Philippine institutions and the regulatory 
framework engendered by these institutions, determine the orientation and organization 
of public health service delivery. The extent of this influence can help explain the 
pattern of health development, discussed in Section 2.1, in the country. Health service 
goals and the organization of the public health care system reflect the general 
orientation of Philippine society. Budgetary allocations. on the other hand, reflect the 
priorities of the public health sector. 
2.4.1 Health Sector Goals and Objectives 
The 1988 Constitution of the Philippines serves as the organizing framework 
of the laws of the land. With reference to health, the constitutional mandate for state 
institutions is: 
... to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health 
consciousness among them (Article II. Sec. 15. The Philippine Constitution). 
The sections on social justice and human rights also commit the goverrunent in 
the following manner: 
The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health 
development which shall endeavour to make essential goods, health and social 
services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority 
to the needs of women and children. The State shall endeavour to provide free 
medical care to paupers (Article XIII. Section 11); (emphasis mine). 
The emphasis on essential goods and services reflects a libertarian view of 
minimum provision consistent with the private nature of social and economic 
organization in the country. Health care needs beyond the minimum are assumed to 
be satisfied outside state provision. In addition, state services should be affordable: 
while free care is enjoined for the paupers or destitute people. Considerations pf costs 
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and affordability, even as it attempts to guarantee the basic right to health. reflects the 
recognition of the limits of state provision. 
The policy objectives of the present Department of Health are expressed in a 
policy document, Health in the Hands of the People (DOH, 1992). It contains a strong 
commitment to primary health care as a basic strategy, with emphasis on preventive 
and promotive health programmes. It calls for an integration and promotion of 
individual and collective responsibility for health, self-reliance, preventive actions, the 
status of women, environmental sanitation and workers' safety. To quote from tht:: 
handbook: 
For health to be in the hands of the people, the people must attain effective 
control over the decisions affecting their health. In this regard. people 
empowennent is an essential element of health improvements. The DOH shall 
seek to transfonn health care from its presently "doctor-centered" character to 
an increasingly "people-centered" orientation. Every individual shall be 
responsible for his health, and shall exercise the means for promoting and 
protecting health through participation in the community. organizations. 
institutions and government. This is people empowennent and popular 
participation in health (p.2). 
The emphasis on individual or community self-reliance highlights an orientation 
of weak state commitment. It implies that health seeking behaviour is largely 
considered a private matter and the responsibility for the delivery of health care fa11s 
on the private sector, which includes not only individuals but private finns. 
professionals, religious and other organized groups. 
2.4.2 The Organization of the Public Health Senice DeliYery 
The deli\·ery of basic health services has long been the traditional role of the 
Department of Health. It has an extensive network of health services operating in a 
pyramidal referral system (Figure 2.3). At the base are village!baran~~w ht:Jlth 
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Figure 2.3 
Public Health Services Hierarchy 
Speciality 
Hospitals 
Special/Medical 
Centers 
Regional Hospitals 
Provincial Hospitals ~ 
169 
District Hospitals 
Rural Health Units 
BarangayNillage Health Stations,__~ 
~ 1,423 
Source: County Hea~h Information Profile: WHO/WPRO!HN, , 988 
RHU/BHS, PhilippineStatistical Yearbook, 1993 
Specialrty Hosprtals, Lanuza and Manalo (1994) 
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stations(BHS), performing largely promotive and preventive functions throu;;:h 
midwives and volunteer paramedics. In 1992, there were some 11.423 BHS spread 
throughout the country. The frontline personnel are supervised by the Rural Health 
Nurse (RHN) at the rural health units (RHUs). the second tier of referral. RHUs can 
provide more curative care as the staff are supervised by a physician. There were 
approximately 2,385 RHUs in 1992. The BHS and RHUs comprise the public health 
field services. The ratio of these units to the population is one facility for every 4.400 
people. 
District and provincial hospitals providing secondary level care, having an 
average of 25-50 beds and 100 -150 beds, respectively, form the next referral tier. 
District hospitals may cover more than one municipality. And the head of the district 
hospital serves as the supervisor of the rural health units. 
More difficult cases are passed on to the regional hospitals of which there are 
12. These facilities have authorized bed capacities of approximately 200 - 500. From 
the regions, a small number of special/medical centres (250 beds or more) provide 
specialist care and are mostly found in the National Capital Region. Funding for these 
medical centres are directly appropriated from the health budget. At the apex of the 
public health system are the four specialty hospitals specializing in heart, kidney. lung 
and children's diseases. The four specialty hospitals are associated with the martial law 
regime. having· been set-up during their waning years. Efforts to privatize these 
hospitals have not taken-off. These hospitals are managed as a government corporatiL'll 
and run by Boards of Trustees, with the Department of Health appointing a 
representative to these boards. 
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While the referral system looks neat on paper, operationally. and in practice. 
people often by-pass the lower levels and proceed directly to hospitals for consultations. 
Table 2.9 shows the leading causes of discharges in government hospitals. There is 
very little difference in cases seen in primary hospitals and tertiary hospitals. This 
seems to reflect the inefficiency of the public health system through the failure of the 
referral system to function; as hospitals appear to be treating cases that can be seen 
at lower levels, assuming that severity levels are similar. This may be partly due to 
the shortage of resources at lower levels given the low budget allocations to field 
services. A similar observation was made for Kenya (~1wabu, 1989). ~1wabu. for 
example, noted that the over-crowding in hospital facilities was a result of the failure 
of the referral system as well as the underpricing of hospital services. 
The Decentralization Law of 1991 severs the DOH from control of health 
services below the regional levels. The extent of devolution in the country, which 
involved wholesale transfer of assets and facilities as well as budgetary allocations and 
administrative control, does not appear to be mirrored in other country experiences 
documented in Mills, et al. (1990). The transfer of district level facilities down to the 
primary care units to the local authorities have raised concerns strong enough to bring 
forward bills in Congress asking for an exemption of the health sector from devolution. 
The pressure comes from the two principal stakeholders: health workers and local 
authorities. Health workers are wont to be under local authorities; and local 
authorities find health sector demands. particularly wages. to be too high. Health 
workers are protected by the Magna Carta for Health \Vorkers. a legislation. which 
gi\'e benefits. among others, monetary allowances to health workers which are nN 
72 
......., 
w 
Table 2.9 
Leading Causes of Discharges, 1990 
Public Hospitals, By Levels 
Primary % Secondary 
1 . Acute Gastro-enteritis 31.8 1 . Acute Gastro-Enteritis 
2. Pneumonia 14.9 2. Deliveries 
3. Bronchitis 13.4 3. Bronchitis 
4. Amoebiasis 7.9 4. Pneumonia 
5. Malaria 7.4 5. Urinary Tract Infection 
6. Influenza 5.6 6. Malaria 
7. Measles 5.4 7. Tuberculosis 
8. Urinary Tract Infection 5.2 8. Obstetrics-Gyne Cases 
9. Deliveries 5.1 9. Upper Respiratory Tract lnf. 
10. Hypertension 3.4 1 0. Gastritis 
100 
Source·. DOH, HOMS 
Reference: E. Gorra, 1993. Background Paper, Strategic Planning Workshop for Hospitals 
% Tertiary % 
30.8 1 . Deliveries 40.2 
15.0 2. Acute Gastro-Enteritis 14.2 
12.3 3. Pneumonia 13.2 
11.9 4. Obstetrics-Gyne Case 7.9 
7.3 5. Kochs/Pulm. Tubercu 6.3 
5.6 6. Urinary Tract Infection 4.8 
4.7 7. Bronchitis 3.7 I 
4.2 8. Newborn 3.5 i 
4.2 9. Appendicitis 3.4 
4.1 10. Measles 2.7 
100 100 
allotted to other public servants. Local authority resources are also uneven such that 
some hospital budgets may exceed the local government's own operating budgets. 
2.4.3 Budgetary Allocations 
Viewed from the constitutional mandates, the justification for public 
involvement in the health sector is to address the health needs. particularly of 
disadvantaged groups. Budgetary allocations reflect the Department of Health· s 
priorities. Government allocations to the health sector are passed through and 
approved, along with the other expenses of government, in the legislature. Figure 2.4 
compares the pattern of regional public expenditures before the devolution with the 
infant mortality rates. The table ranks the regions. from the lowest per capita public 
expenditures (Region 12: Southern Mindanao) to the highest (NCR). The lowest per 
capita spending is 20 percent that of the NCR per capita spending. NCR allocations 
are nearly 3.0 times the average per capita public spending. The regions with the 
lowest per capita public spending are also those with the highest infant mortality rates. 
reflecting an inequitable pattern of resource allocation. 
Allocations between preventive/public health activities and curative/hospital-
based services reflect the health service delivery bias. Table 2.10 shows that an 
average of 66 percent of DOH allocations are taken-up by curative or hospital care. 
However, as we have shown above, the dichotomy between preventive and curative is 
tenuous when one examines the type of complaints that reach government hospitals in 
the country. 
Within the DOH. the allocation process is divided up into: Central 
Office/Office of the Secretary, regions, regulatory bodies. special hospitals. Table 2. II 
shows that 7) percent of DOH expenditures go to the regional or field offices; while 
a:~ 
() 
z 
Fig. 2.4: Per capita Health Budget 
Allocations Vs. Infant Mortality Rates 
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Table 2.10 
Health Budget Allocation, Department of Health 
(in 000 pesos, 1987 prices) 
Year Curative Preventive Administrative Training 
1986 2411862 887470 197302 41254 
1987 2917678 1087675 202820 35544 
1988 3529000 967902 332846 47467 
1989 3582087 1262788 1062230 55977 
1990 3629627 1108978 1068934 77283 
5-Average 3214051 1062963 572826 51505 
%Share 66 22 12 1 
(Ave.) 
Preventive - expenses for drugs/medicines,radiation, hazard/risks 
field health services, primary health care, etc. 
Curative - expenses for hospitals 
Source: Office of Management Services, Department of Health 
Ref.: Solon 0, et.al., 1991 
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Table 2.11 
Department of Health Expenditures 
By Major Services 
1988- 1991 Services 
(1988=1 00) in thousand Percent 
pesos Share 
Office of the Secretary 499,972 9.4 
Regional Health Offices 3,996,001 75.3 
Regulatory Bodies 30,848 0.6 
Special Hospttals (11) 652,282 12.3 
Specialty Hospitals (4) 128,887 2.4 
Total 5,307,989 100.0 
Office of Secretary - Central office expenses 
Regional Health Offices - includes all allocations to field offices 
Regulatory Bodies - Dangerous Drugs Board, Phil. Medical Care Commission 
Special Hospitals- i.e.medical centres; includes RITM 
Special Hospitals- Heart, Kidney, Lung, Children's 
Source: Lanuza and Manalo, 1994 
77 
the combined budget for NCR-based hospitals exceed the budget of the Central 'Office 
of the Secretary. The 11 special hospitals received about 60 million pesos each, while 
the each specialty hospitals had 32 million pesos. The imbalance might be due to the 
fact that the four specialty hospitals have other sources of income. particularly through 
renting out of parts of its buildings. These four hospitals are relatively new and as 
corporation, or trusts, they have official capacities to raise their own resources m 
addition to their allocations from government. 
The lowest percentage share (at less than one percent) of the expenses go to the 
regulatory bodies, the Dangerous Drugs Board and the Philippine ~kdical Care 
Commission (PMCC), the policy-making body for the compulsory insurance 
programme. And Lanuza and Manalo (1994) observed that while the shares of these 
bodies increased between 1988-1990, the 8.1 percent increase in expenditures was 
negated by an 8. 74 decline in 1990-1991. Within the DOH, the budget for the Bureau 
of Licensing and Regulation(BLR). the office handling hospitals has been reported to 
have been declining in real terms, from 3.4 million pesos in 1988 to 2.5 million pesos 
in 1991: a decline of about 25 percent. Expenses for personnel comprised 77 percent 
of the BLR budget (Rodriguez, et al., 1994). 
While the DOH traditional regulatory role, as per the functions of BLR, an: 
largely directed towards enforcement of standards in hospital facilities. there are also 
regulatory functions which reflect equity concerns. The DOH is also required to 
allocate some funds for the purchase of care in private hospitals in areas where there 
are no existing facilities. These regulations are enforced through subsidies. In the 
DOH budget. there are five mandated subsidy programmes which were mandated hy 
law: a) equipment suhsidy for payment of diagnostic services obtained by indi~cnt 
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patients from private facilities; b) bed subsidy for payment of indigent patient care in 
private facilities; c) stipends for rural health practice programme which fields out new 
graduates to underserved areas; d) aid to puericulture centres wruch are akin to first aid 
posts located in village balls; and e) aid to the Philippine Tuberculosis Society. a quasi-
government body established by legislation. The first two allocations are applicable 
only in areas with no public facilities. However, budget allocations to these 
programmes ranged from .0001 percent for equipment subsidy and .0009 percent for 
aid to puericulture centres in 1990 (Solon, et al. 1991). These programmes receive 
nearly fixed budgets which are not adjusted for inflation. 
Table 2.12 shows that although field or regional offices get the largest share of 
the DOH expenditures, most of these services are still likely to be dominated by 
curative services. This may be attributable to the fact that the delivery system has 
large fixed cost components in the form of facilities, and equipment. Given ci\'il 
service rules, government personnel may be considered as fixed or quasi-fixed inputs. 
Lanuza and Manalo (1994) delineated DOH expenditures and found out that on the 
whole, public health services or services with known large externalities, i.e. 
in1n1unization, health education and information, etc., only comprise 11.5 percent of 
DOH expenses. Non-facility based public health services are not capital intensi\'e and 
would therefore claim a smaller budget share. 
Moreover, the quality of public facilities have been decried. A World Bank 
study (199-+) reported that 18 percent of public hospitals are run-down and perennially 
face shortage of equipment, supplies and staff. 
79 
Table 2.12 
Department of Health Expenditures by 
Service Orientation 
Services 
(1988= 1 00) 
1988- 1991 
in thousand Percent 
pesos Share 
Personal Care Services /a 3,490,011 77.1 
Public Health Services /b 522,900 11.5 
Gen. Administrative Services I 236,229 5.2 
Unclassifiable 278,629 6.2 
Total /d 4,527,769 100.0 
a/PCS -services with zero or nil positive externality effects, i.e. treatment 
b/PHS -services with large externalities, i.e. imunization,including support services, 
vector control, information, education and training, research 
c/General Administrative Services -purely administrative expenditures of 
non-health facility based offices; i.e. central offices, 
regional administrative services, regulatory bodies 
d/Excludes expenses for medical centres and special hospitals 
Adapted from: Lanuza and Manalo, 1994 
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The pattern of public allocations for health services and regulations reflects the 
limited government capacity to fulfil its functions as mandated by the Philippine 
Constitution. Minimum state provision is characterised by operational inefficiencies 
in which the bulk of resources go the expensive curative facilities that deal with health 
needs that are preventable in nature. It is likely that the patients follow the flow of 
resources which result in inefficiencies since lower level facilities are cheaper than 
higher level care. The pattern of allocation also indicates that the DOH is more heavily 
involved in service delivery than with monitoring and other regulatory functions. The 
extent to which devolution will reform this imbalance in delivery and other functions 
remains to be seen. But the neglect of the government's oversight role, i.e. monitoring 
and regulatory, in the health care market is likely to engender private sector 
opportunism. 
2.5 Conclusions 
This background presentation on the Philippines and the regulatory framework 
of the health sector, highlights the nature of interaction among institutions and 
economic agents. The capture of institutions in the Philippines by powerful groups 
have fostered a weak regulatory agency in health care. Social, economic and political 
dynamics have served to enhanced the role of the private sector, including professional 
groups. in health care. The private orientation towards provision and financing of 
health care in Philippine society. therefore, raises concern regarding the access of 
those who cannot afford basic minimum care. 
Public sector delivery of sen· ices have put the DOH. as a provider of cart'. 
amidst a strong private sector it is supposed to regulate. \Vith the coexistence of public 
and pri\'ate facilities. comparisons are naturally made. Thus. its credibillty as a 
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regulator is affected by the quality of public services. Government regulations have 
an effect on the market structure in health care. The extent to which problems of weak 
state regulation are overcome by strong voluntary regulation, by the professional 
groups, can determine the nature of the market and its responsiveness tc' market 
signals. 
Limited resources, on the other hand, have increased pressure on government 
facilities to collect fees. The introduction of prices in the government sector requires 
information on the structure of health care demand. The extent to which different 
income groups will respond differently to user fees in government facilities determines 
the equity impact of such policies. 
Health sector outcomes in the Philippines are likely to be influenced by the 
nature of the development of its institutions and the behaviour of health care agents. 
An assessment of the performance of the health sector. particularly in terms of 
household and institutional financing of health care. is made in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Three 
The Conditions of the Financing of Health Care 
in the Philippines 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the different sources of financing health care in the 
country and assesses the efficiency and equity of the different financing sources. The 
chapter is divided into three parts. The first part presents the different sources of 
financing health care and compares the pattern of health care spending in other Asian 
countries with their performance in terms of some health indicators. The equity of the 
financing system is examined in the second part, in terms of the pattern of household 
health status and health care spending, illustrated through concentration curves. A 
descriptive analysis of the ability of the insurance sources of financing to provide 
wider coverage of the population, share the burden of financial risks due to illness, 
and influence the behaviour of providers and health service firms is examined in the 
third part of the chapter. 
The next sub-sections examine the issues that affect the performance of the 
health financing system, inorder to consider how health care financing affects the 
organization and structure of the health care market. This section ends with a 
discussion of the data used in the analysis 0 
3.1.1 A Review of the Issues 
The financing of health care forms the nexus of exchange among economtc 
'-' 
agents in the sector. The financing mechanism. in so far as money flows generate the 
services consumed and provided in the health sector. detem1ines the organization of 
care. as well as its efficien~..·y and equity 0 The financial arrangements define the 
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variations in health care systems and its outcomes (OECD, 1992). The dominance of 
state financing characterises the health sector in many Western European countries 
(OECD, 1992). In these economies, state financing and provision of care are often 
integrated in the delivery of certain services. such as in hospital care (Donaldson and 
Gerard, 1993). Mixed sources of finance characterise many Asian and Latin American 
economies (Griffin, 1991; WHO-PAHO. 1989). Private financing, through insurance 
funds, allows care to be obtained from state or private facilities. Or, as in the case 
of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) in the United States. private financing 
integrates with provision. The existence of other arrangements combining state 
financing with private provision, or private financing for state provision, highlights the 
importance of financing for the organization and provision of care. 
The incentives provided by the sources of finance for the organization of care 
anse from the payment mechanisms to providers of care. either as firms or as 
individuals (in the case of self-employed physicians). Direct payments from households 
comprise one of the most common forms of provider payment. It is found even in 
countries where there are official restrictions on private services (Newbrander and 
Parker, 1992). Estimates show that households spend between two and five percent 
of their incomes on health care (World Bank, 1989). Direct payments by households 
are thus dependent on ability to pay (OECD, 1992). A lack of paying capacity 
therefore implies that certain vulnerable groups will not receive care. Moreover, the 
absence of infom1ation on prices and quality of providers, as well as asymn1etries in 
knowledge between physicians and providers. is also expected to make direct 
consumer choices inefficient (OECD. Ibid.). This chapter combines household 
expenditure for health care with self-reported health need~ to examine the extent of 
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equity or inequity of household payments for health services. The efficiency of out-of-
pocket payments by household is examined, in terms of household expenditure on 
health care goods and services. 
Fee-for-service payments. on the other hand, made under the auspices of an 
insurance scheme, provide incentives for health care agents to increase the utilization 
of services and procedures covered in the insurance plan. Various reviews of insurance 
payments systems (WHO, 1991; Abel-Smith, 1992; Kutzin and Barnum. 1992; 
Barnum, et al., 1995) cite this form of paying providers as most inefficient and 
inequitable. The extent to which this is so in the Philippines. given that this is the 
prevailing form of paying providers by the largest institutional funder for health care. 
the compulsory insurance scheme or Medicare. is examined in the third part of this 
chapter. 
Moreover. the manner of reimbursing providers based on retrospective billing 
reflects the strength of the medical professions (Abel-Smith, 1992). Since the 
reimbursement system pays for services rendered at agreed rates, providers are assured 
of payments. Such payment system requires substantial investments in technology to 
generate system-side information and auditing of claims. Without such investments, 
the financing system creates an incentive for boundless opportunism (Ibid.). This issue 
is examined in the last section of this chapter. A case study on an alternative form of 
paying providers through the compulsory health insurance programme is presented to 
highlight the nature of costs and inefficiencies in the financing system. 
3.1.2 Data llsed 
The data used in this chapter are from official and published secondary sources. 
The way official data sources were organized to yield the equity estimates in the next 
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section is unique to the study. The first official source of data used was the !\"ational 
Health Survey (NHS) of 1987. The NHS 1987 was a rider to the 1987 third quarter 
Labor Force Survey -Integrated Survey of Households (LFS-ISH). The NHS provides 
information on reported morbidity and mortality levels in a population, practices. 
attitudes and use of various health and nutrition services. Only morbidity data from 
NHS was analyzed in this study. Morbidity data is matched with income or 
expenditures data provided in the Family Income and Expenditures Survey (FIES). The 
LFS-ISH Survey household control number at the regional level was matched with the 
FIES to track income and expenditures to the household surveyed for health conditions. 
A description of the matched data sets is shown in Appendix One. 
Other data sources include the information provided in Solon. et al ( 1992), the 
background papers for the Health Finance Development Project (HFDP) and selected 
results from studies conducted under the Philippine Institute for Development Studies -
Department of Health Project (PIDS-DOH). The Solon, et al. (1992) work consists 
of raw tables compiled to serve as a basis for a national health accounts. The appendix 
tables to the 1993 World Development Report were also used for comparative 
purposes. 
3.2 The Over-all Pattern of Health Care Financing 
Table 3.1 shows health care expenditures in the country by financing sources. 
Public financing was at 7 billion pesos according to recent estimates. This was nearly 
half of the 13 billion pesos spent by the private sector. However. an 8.0 percent 
increase for public spending in current prices, after adjusting for inflation, translates 
to a 40.8 percent fall in spending between 1988 and 1991. The fall reflects the 
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Table 3.1 
Health Care Expenditures, by Financing Source 
1988 and 1991 
Current Prices 
1988 1991 
Source Billion Billion %Change 
Pesos Pesos 1988-199 
PUBLIC 6.87 7.42 8.0 
Taxes 5.87 6.34 8.0 
Indirect 4.11 4.44 8.0 
Direct 1.76 1.9 8.0 
Operating Income 0.29 0.26 -10 3 
Foreign Assistance 0.09 0.11 22.2 
local Governments 0.62 0.71 14.5 
PRIVATE 6.n 13.00 92.0 
Household Spending 5.82 10.94 880 
Compulsory lnsuranc 0.71 1.73 143.7 
Private Insurance 0.24 0.33 37.5 
Total 13.64 20.42 49.7 
Adapted from Herrin, et.al., 1993. 
Real Prices t 1 98 7 = 1 00 l 
1988 1991 
Billion Billion 
Pesos Pesos 
6.31 4.49 
5.40 3.83 
3.78 2.68 
1.62 1.15 
0.27 0.16 
0.08 0.07 
0.57 0.43 
6.22 7.86 
5.35 6.61 
0.65 1.05 
0.22 0.20 
12.54 12 35 
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Source as 
Percent Perce.,t 
%Change o1Total of Total 
1988-199 1988 1991 
-408 504 363 
-40.8 43.0 31.0 
-40.7 30.1 21.7 
-40.8 12.9 9.3 
-69.6 2.1 1.3 
-24.4 0.7 05 
-32.6 4.5 3.5 
208 49 6 63 7 
19 1 42.7 536 
37.6 5.2 85 
·1 0.6 1.8 , .6 
·1.5 100 100 
economic difficulties in 1991 following a coup of military rebels in December 1989. 
Investments declined and government spending was squeezed. The decline in public 
spending was made up for by private spending, which showed a 21 percent increase in 
real terms between 1988 and 1991. Spending from the compulsory insurance 
programme, while only about one-sixth of household spending, rose by 37.6 percent 
in real terms during the period under consideration. Expenditures from private health 
insurance sources declined by 11 percent, in real terms, between 1988 and 1991. 
An examination of financing sources show that 85 percent of public 
expenditures came from taxes, of which 70 percent were from indirect taxes --a 
regressive form of taxation (WHO, 1991). The next biggest source of public 
financing was local government which contributed about 10 percent, followed by 
operating income raised from fees, at four percent, and foreign assistance at about 
two percent. The largest source of private health care spending was household budgets, 
comprising about 85 percent of total private spending or 54 percent of total health care 
expenditure. Compulsory insurance comprised an increasing share of health care 
spending, rising from 5. 2 percent of health care spending in 1988 to 8. 5 percent in 
1991. Private insurance remains the smallest source of health care spending claiming 
only 1.6 percent of total health expenditures. 
The efficiency of the health system can be gleaned from a comparison of the 
spending on health and health outcomes with other countries in tl:e region. Table 3.2 
shows total and sectoral spending for health as well as some indicators of health 
outcomes. The Philippines has the second lowest health care spending as a proportion 
of GDP and the second lowest health outcome; not much worse than Indonesia but not 
better than Thailand and Malaysia. The Philippines, with limited resources expended 
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Table 3.2 
Health Care Expenditures and Health Outcomes 
1990 
Total Health %Public % Private Per Capita Perinatal 
I 
Care Exp. Spending Spending Health Care Mortality/a 
as%ofGDP Exp. 
Countries (%) (US$) 
Indonesia 2.0 25.6 66.7 12.0 
Korea 6.6 44.0 55.8 377.0 
Malaysia 3.0 59.1 36.1 67.0 
Philippines 2.2 46.7 46.4 14.0 
Thailand 5.0 20.4 78.7 73.0 
a/ number per 1,000 births of perinatal deaths (late foetal deaths, occuring 
at 28 weeks of gestation or thereafter, and early neonatal deaths, occuring 
within the first seven days of life 
b/probability of dying between ages 15 and 60, expressed per 1 000 
Reference: 1 993 World Development Report I Summary Report 
40.0 
10.0 
25.0 
27.0 
25.0 
Female Life Prevalence 
Adult Expectancy of Malnutritio 
Mortality Birth (Under 5) 
/b 
212.0 59.0 14 
67.0 72.0 
120.0 71.0 24 
172.0 64.0 19 
163.0 68.0 26 
on health, appears more efficient in countering under-5 malnutrition; perinatal mortality 
appear~ not to be widely different from the next-ranked countries. nor does female 
adult mortality. 
3.3 Household Health Care Spending and Health Status 
As the biggest source of health care expenditures, household health care 
spending patterns deserve closer scrutiny. Table 3. 3 shows how expenditures on 
health care goods and services differ across income groups. The items covered under 
the heading health and medical expenses are as follows: drugs, hospitals. doctors· 
fedental fees, and other expenses which include many items from wheelchairs to 
traditional medicine. Health care expenses as a percentage of total expenditures 
increase with income, with the upper income quintiles reporting shares 75% higher 
than the share of the bottom quintile group. The bottom quintile's medical expenses' 
share of their household budgets is also higher than the share for each of the next three 
quintile groups. 
The distribution of these medical expenses. amongst the different forms of 
health care, showed that the lowest quintile group· s spending on medicines and drugs 
comprised 75% of their health care budget. Drugs comprised the biggest health care 
item purchased in all quintile groups except the upper group. This shows an over-all 
trend in poly-pharmacy or self-medication, presumably without medical advice. This 
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Table 3.3 
Health Care Expenditures by Households, 
By Expenditure Class and by 
Type of Health Care Items 
Expenditure Annual Medical Care 
Class Per House- Expenditures 
hold HCare as% of Total 
Expenditures HH Expenditure 
Pesos Percent 
1 180 3.8 
2 310 2.3 
3 372 2.8 
4 683 3.4 
5 1,690 6.6 
1987 FIES-NHS Matched Files 
Medical Care Expenditures as % of Total Medical Exp 
Drugs Hospital Doctor's Dental Other 
Fees Services Medical 
75.1 4.1 11.4 0.3 9.2 
61.3 6.1 18.0 1.4 11.2 I 
57.4 12.1 21.6 2.0 7.0 
51.3 15.4 24.4 2.3 6.6 
30.7 45.9 16.2 4.0 3.1 
----
does not reflect well on the efficiency of care-seeking beha\·iour as ill-advised self-
medication may be harmful. At the macro-level. the inefficiency translates into 
widespread drug resistance that wiJI entail greater expenses for more costly medicari4..1n. 
For the upper income group, hospital expenses got the biggest slice of the health care 
budget. The second biggest purchase for the bottom four quintile groups was doctors' 
fees. Expenditures for dental services ranked lowest in the population's health care 
spending. 
The finding that upper income groups are spending a higher proportion of their 
incomes on health care goods and services compared to the lower income groups 
indicates that health care is a normal good. Expenditures on it increase with income. 
Household expenditure data. particularly health care expenditure, however. may also 
suffer from under-reporting which may make the trends of middle and upper income 
groups mere statistical artifacts. But. higher spending shares by the low income 
group compared to the middle quintile group may reflect poorer health conditions 
among low income households. Indeed this is what one may find when information on 
health status of households is examined. 
Table 3.4 presents both the actual distribution of self-reported illness, with 
standardized distribution. Standardization allows the removal of collinearit\' in 
demographic variables, age and sex, with income. Age and gender differences are 
likely to be associated with morbidity and utilization of health care. The method for 
standardization is discussed in Appendix 2. 
The actual distribution of illness across income groups indicates a nearly one-to-
one correspondence: i.e. the bottom 20 percent of the income group report nearly 20 
percent of illness. the second 10 percent report another 20 percent of illness and so 
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Table 3.4 
Percent of the Population Reporting Illness 
Actual and Standardized 
Income Decile I Actual I Standardized 
First 12.4 18.5 
Second 11.8 9.5 
Third 11.5 11.1 
Fourth 10.6 12.2 
Fifth 12.6 9.6 
Sixth 10.3 8 
Seventh 10.4 7.7 
Eighth 10.4 7.9 
Ninth 10.1 7.8 
Tenth 9.7 7.7 
100 100 
Source of Basic Data: 1987 NHS-FIES Matched Files (NSO) 
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forth. However, upon standardization, differences between the upper income groups 
and the bottom quintile groups widened. Separating the effects of age-sex from income 
yielded a bunching up of reported morbidity in the lowest income decile. This 
indicates that groups with higher than average morbidity. i.e. younger male children 
and the elderly, are disproportionately located in the lower income bracket. This 
appears, therefore, to provide support for the view that low incomes are associated with 
poor health. A similar standardization procedure undertaken on British data by 
O'Donnel and Propper (1988), showed a narrowing of the degree of inequality in the 
reporting of morbidity between income groups upon standardization, indicating that the 
elderly, the high risk group, were well-distributed among various income groups. 
Table 3.5 shows that self-reported morbidity follows a U shape. with the 
lowest morbidity reported by the 36-49 age group. Large differences between the sexes 
in the youngest age group were reported in the urban areas. Mean number of days sick 
reported for both sexes averaged about 7 days. In terms of self-reported illness, 
women generally appear to be healthier than men. This may be in contrast with the 
pattern from other countries: like for example in Egypt, where, due to reporting 
problems, men were less likely to report an illness than women (Ellis, et al., 1994 ). 
Mortality trends in the Philippines. however. reflect the same gender bias in 
morbidity patterns: male death rates were generally higher than female death rates. 
across all age groups (Herrin. et al.. 1993). 
Combining illness with expenditure patterns, it is observed that illness ts 
concentrated among lower income groups while spending for health care shows 
concentration in fa,·our of the upper income groups. Determining the extent of 
concentration of illness and expenditures can be illustrated thr(1ugh a concentration 
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Table 3.5 
Percent of Population reporting illness, by urban/rural, age-sex 
Mean Days Sick 
Urban Rural Total 
Age Grou I Male !Female I Male !Female !Male l Female 
0-5 39.56 35.21 34.29 34.87 35.9 34.97 
6-15 24.73 23.21 23.35 23.89 23.n 23.68 
16-35 15.09 18.85 18.51 17.67 17.47 18.02 
36-49 9.95 10.09 10.84 9.73 10.57 9.84 
50+ 10.67 12.64 13.01 13.85 12.3 13.48 
Days Sick 6.79 6.42 6.73 6.58 6.63 6.53 
(Ave.) 
Source of Basic Data: 1987 NH$-FIES Matched Files (NSO) 
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curve. Wagstaff and \·an Doorslaer (1993) showed that one can plot concentration 
curves to examine the extent of inequity in health and health care financing. The 
method involves ranking individuals in terms of ability to pay measure. usually income 
or equivalent adult income. The matched data sets provided information on individual 
illness from the national health survey, and information on income from the fan1ily 
income and expenditures survey. The latter contained only information on family size. 
the individuals were ranked according to per capita income. 
Figure 3.1 shows the concentration curves. The diagonal represents equal 
distribution of illness and spending across income groups. The illness concentration 
curve was drawn (upper portion of the diagonal) by plotting the c11mulative proportion 
of the population ranked according to the measure of ability to pay, income, from the 
most disadvantaged to advantaged, against the cumulative proportion of illness. 
standardised for age and sex. The position of the curves suggests that lower income 
groups have a bigger share of the illness burden than the rich. The concentration 
curve for expenditures was drawn (lower portion of the diagonal) by plotting the 
cumulative proportions of the population, ranked according to income, by their 
expenditures shares. Household health care spending appears to favour largely the 
rich. The concentration of poor health among lower income groups suggests a double-
edged situation: poverty and ill-health. 
The curves do not provide conclusive evidence of the ext~nt of inequalities in 
health and health care spending, but were intended to be merely suggestive of the 
trends. There are bias attendant to both measures. Self-reported illness may interact 
with wealth. \Vagstaff and \'an Doorslaer (1993a) cited Blaxter's (1989, p. 217) 
obscr\'ation that self-assessed health produced "remarkably steep and regular gradient 
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by social class" (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer. 1993a. p.55). Health care expenditures. 
on the other hand, suffer from similar problems related to under-reporting and 
infrequency of purchase, and may therefore be underestimates. 
3.4 Private Institutional Sources of Health Care Financing 
3.4.1 Commercial Indemnity Health Insurance 
Private health insurance is the least developed as a source of health financing 
in the country, accounting for less than one percent of health spending. or P200 million 
( £4 million) in 1990. In 1988, there were only 102 companies reported in the 
Insurance Commission as being engaged in health insurance activities. This figure is 
not much different from the number of firms reported to be engaged in the same 
business in the 70s (Gamboa, et al, 1993). Health insurance is largely part of non-life 
insurance companies' activities rather than life insurance companies. Health insurance 
is considered as a "rider" or "sweetener" to life or accident insurance packages: but at 
a high added premium. While domestic ownership or ownership by nationals prevails: 
in the earlier years. foreign ownership was predominant. The deep economic crises 
in the mid-eighties saw some ownership realignments, with foreign firms comprising 
less than one-fifth of all firn1s in the industry in 1988. 
There is very little information available about health insurance companies in 
the country and that which is available is largely from the Insurance Commission. 
Basic information on enrolment is considered proprietary. Private health insurance 
is largely commercial indemnity where the insured are reimbursed. usually for 
hospitalization expenses. based on pre-agreed benefit ceilings. Any expenses beyond 
these ceilings han~ to be shouldered by the insured. 
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While industry sources interviewed in Gamboa, et.al.(l993) consider health 
insurance as their least profitable business. Table 3.6 shows that profits remain healthY. 
Gross premiums increased in real terms, even as gross risks or the face value of health 
policies have declined for most of the 80s. This trend implies L~at premiums rose 
faster than the risk values. Loss ratios, or the value of benefits paid over premiums 
have changed very little, appearing flat in real terms. For every 100 pesos received 
as premiums, 20 pesos are paid out as benefits in real terms or 51 pesos in actual 1988 
pnces. No comparable estimates can be made with other businesses. But Hsiao 
(1995) observed that costs and profits in the U.S. can only run as high as 25 percent 
of premium revenues. 
3.4.2 Health Maintenance Organizations 
Health maintenance organizations or HMOs differ from the traditional indemnity 
health insurance in the sense that they provide not only insurance but also offer direct 
care to members. They provide more comprehensive benefits, including inpatient, 
out-patient care, diagnostics and health promotion or preventive programmes like 
immunization and some health information. Like the traditional indemnity insurance 
modeL they do have benefit caps and exclusion items. Excluded are pre-existing 
illnesses and certain catastrophic illnesses. But beyond this. there is very little cost 
sharing involved, except when the services are sourced from non-affiliated facilities. 
Members are provided with cards which they can show to accredited facilities and 
receive free care. 
Extensive work by AI filer( 1989) on HMOs in the Philippines listed about 17 
conunercial HMOs. Table 3. 7 shows that these companies basically started operation~ 
in the 80s. although one began in I 960s. \lost of these companies originally be~an a~ 
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Table 3.6 
Financial Profile of Private Health Insurance Companies 
1987 Prices 
Year 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Number of 
Companres 
21 
98 
98 
98 
78 
104 
105 
102 
Gross 
Premiums 
'000 Pesos 
3,952 
4,153 
4,354 
3,282 
3,591 
4,102 
4,253 
4,307 
Percent 
Change 
5.1 
4.8 
-24.6 
9.4 
14.2 
3.7 
1.3 
Gross 
Risks* 
('000 pesos) 
1,761,509 
11173,704 
1,057,987 
998,745 
842,740 
772,370 
1,110,299 
1 '156,113 
* Gross Risks refer to the total face value of the health insurance policies 
** Gross Losses refer to the value of benefits paid out 
*** Loss Ratio refers to Premiums divided by Losses 
Source: 1981 - 1987: CRC (1991 ), Philippine Health Care Factbook 
1988: Insurance Commission Annual Report 1989 
Percent 
Change 
-33.4 
-9.9 
-5.6 
-15.6 
-8.4 
43.8 
4.1 
Gross .. Percent 
Losses** Change 
('000 pesos) 
1,420 
1,567 10.4 
876 -44.1 
1,655 88.8 
1,523 -8.0 
1,936 27.2 
2,347 21.2 
2,177 -7.3 
Loss 
Ratio*** 
(%) 
2.8 
2.7 
5.0 
2.0 
2.4 
2.1 
1.8 
2.0 
Table 3.7 
Number and Origins of Heal1h Maintenance Organizations (HMO) 
Name of 
HMO 
S1art of 
rations 
Organization Approx. 
Affiliation # Enrollees 
1 . Blue Cross 
2. Family Medcare 
3. Family HeaJthCare Plan 
4. Fortune Care 1985 
5. Health Care & Dev't 1980 
6. HealthKard lnt'l, Inc. 1987 
7. Health Maintenance Inc. 1981 
8. Health Plan Phil.,lnc. 1986 
9. lntercare 1978 
10. Ufecare 1986 
1 1 . Maxicare 1987 
12. Medicard 1986 
1 3. Pamana Golden Care 
14. PhilamCare 1982 
1 5. St. Patrick's 1965 
16. St. Vincent 1988 
17. Waterous Medical Corp. 1981 
Insurance Co. 
1987 Insurance Co. 
1991 Hospital-based 
1 985 Insurance Co. 
Hospital-based 
1 987 Hospi1al-based 
1986 
Hospital-Based 
1987 
1985 Insurance Co. 
1 965 Clinic-based 
1 965 Clinic-based 
Hospital-based 
1989 
5,000 
10,500 
25,000 
4,000 
1,000 
78,000 
5,000 
30,000 
18,000 
90,000 
80,000 
10,000 
5,000 
14,000 
• Includes PMCC-HMO Tie-up members (a pilot project using compulsory insurance 
funds and HMO facilities and systems) 
Source: M .Aifiler, 1989. "Health Maintenance Organization As An Alternative 
Mode of Financing and Delivering Health Care in Philippines,' PIDS. 
1991 info: interviews with industry sources 
Reference R. Gamboa, 1993, various tables 
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1991 
50,000 
< 1,000 
50,000 
185,102• 
35,000 
10,000 
15,000 
25,000 
30,000 
226,367• 
100,000 
Client 
base 
Coporate 
40% Corporate 
1 00% Corporate 
85% Corporate 
1 00% Corporate 
90% Corporate 
60% Corporate 
1 00% Corporate 
80% Corporate 
1 00% Corporate 
hospital-based, that is. they were provider-initiated, while a number were offshoots of 
major insurance companies. Their origins as provider-initiated firms suggest that these 
HMOs just built on the existing networks among providers. Total estimated 
membership was 375,500 in 1989, less than one percent of the population. The 
figures in 1991 were incomplete. The client base of HMOs were mostly corporate. 
That is, group coverage appears to preferred to individual coverage to prevent adverse 
selection. However, firms themselves practice selection by locating most 
facilities in Metro Manila (Table 3.8); where most enrolees are likely to have steady 
employment, higher income, more likely to be in better health. 
The same table indicates that most Philippine HMOs neither own hospitals nor 
employ full-time medical specialists. Instead, they arrange for clients to receive care 
from accredited providers, working on existing networks among other providers. 
Members who choose their own providers outside the HMO accredited providers are 
likely to be reimbursed at less than the full cost of care. This peculiarity signifies that 
HMOs in the country are unlikely to play a significant part in containing costs. 
Relying on accredited facilities suggests that reimbursements to provider remain largely 
on a fee-for-service basis. 
3.5 Compulsor)' Financing of Health Care: The Medicare System 
3.5.1 Organizational Structure and Population Coverage 
The compulsory health insurance programme is known as Medicare. It covers 
the employed population in the country. although an increasing number of self-
employed can join in voluntarily. It was organized as part of the over-all social 
security system: as such fund collection and fund management remain with the two 
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Table 3.8 
HMO Professionals and Facilities Support 
Name of #Primary # Accredited Accredited Hospitals #of Med.ca: 
HMO Physicians Physicians Metro Outside Own Service 
Metro Manila Manila Metro Ma:1ila Clinics Un:-:s 
1. Blue Cross 13 8 2 8 
2. Family Medcare 21 64 2 21 
3. Family HealthCare Plan 
4. Fortune Care 10 94 19 8 4 19 
5. Health Care & Dev't 150 10 2 10 
6. HealthKard lnt'l, Inc. 17 89 15 1 14 
7. Health Maintenance Inc. 26 400 13 2 3 13 
8. Health Plan Phil.,lnc. 45 165 9 14 1 19 
9. lntercare 8 156 10 7 
10. Ufecare 32 232 16 12 13 
11.Maxicare 9 135 9 1 9 
12. Medicard 19 235 18 9 8 
13. Pamana Golden Care 16 12 1 16 
14. PhilamCare 23 262 H 23 5 12 
15. St. Patrick's 30 8 8 
16. St. Vincent 8 5 1 8 
17. Waterous Medical Corp 12 92 7 
Source: M.Aifiler, 1989. "Health Maintenance Organization As An Alternative 
Mode of Financing and Delivenng Health Care in Philippines,· PIDS. 
Reference: R. Gamboa, 1993, various tables 
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systems, the SSS (Social Security System) for private sector members and the GSIS 
(Government Service and Insurance System) for government members. HistoricallY. 
~ 
the Medicare has operated separately from the Department of Health. It was mandated 
in 1969 and formally established in 1972. After the 'people power revolution' in 1986, 
Medicare (more strictly, the Philippine Medical Care Commission, PMCC) was 
transferred to the Department of Health as an attached agency. The PMCC Board. 
headed by the Secretary of Health, serves as the policy-making body for ~ledicare. 
The PMCC staff undertakes accreditation of physicians and facilities as well as benefit 
reviews, monitoring functions and providing technical support to the PMCC Board. 
Membership is compulsory to government and private employees and their 
dependents. Including dependents. total programme coverage reached about 2~ .23 
million in 1988. This comprised about 38 percent of the population (Table 3.9). 
Despite its compulsory character, recent estimates showed that principal membership 
was barely five million or about one-fourth of the employed (Gamboa, et.al., 1993). 
This reflects inefficiencies in the social security system as a whole. The 
predominance of small-scale, informal businesses in the country make compliance with 
the laws hard to monitor. Staff shortages in the monitoring agencies contribute to 
inspection and collection problems. 
3.5.2 Contribution Structure and the Burden of the Payroll Tax 
Contribution to the Medicare is a form of a payroll tax. Members contribute 
a portion of their monthly income based on a contribution structure. The contribution 
base is capped for monthly earnings above 3,000 pesos; implying that contributions 
are uniform e\'en for salaries beyond this amount. At present. those earning a~we 
PJ,OOO pay P37. 50. and the employer pays the same amount. Those earning Pl.OOO 
10~ 
Table 3.9 
Medicare Programme Coverage 
1972-1988 
Total Coverage /a Principal Members 
Year Total No. As% of Total As% of 
(Million) Population (Million) Employed 
1972 5.59 14.4 1.78 14.2 
1973 8.47 21.0 2.12 15.3 
1974 9.25 22.5 2.28 16.5 
1975 10.99 26.1 2.72 18.8 
1976 12.42 28.6 3.08 21.7 
1977 13.54 30.4 3.35 23.4 
1978 14.72 32.1 3.65 22.7 
1979 16.01 34.0 3.97 24.5 
1980 17.56 36.5 4.35 26.5 
1981 18.40 37.1 4.56 26.2 
1982 19.53 38.5 4.84 28.0 
1983 21.32 41.0 5.44 28.3 
1984 27.63 51.8 5.69 30.2 
1985 29.06 53.2 5.98 29.8 
1986 29.77 53.2 6.11 21.7 
1987 21.84 38.1 4.52 21.5 
1988 22.23 37.9 4.60 20.0 
a/ Includes principal members and dependents, including self-employed 
retirees 
Reference: PMCC; Gamboa, et al (1993) 
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pay P15.65, with the employer paying the same amount. This is a regressive feature 
as the contributions beyond the maximum salary base are not proportionate to income. 
Beringuela ( 1992) estimated the incidence of the Medicare tax using a 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model showing a broad set of interaction in 
production, consumption, taxes and income distribution. Her findings basically showed 
the effect of the tax to be small, generally less than one percent. As the tax lowers 
the disposable income received across income groups, the reduction in income after tax 
is much less for the upper income groups than for the lower income groups. In 
examining the degree of cross-subsidization the lower income quartile of workers. for 
both private and government sectors, were shown to receive more cross-subsidies from 
middle quartile groups than from the highest income quartile. 
3.5.3 Organization of Care, Benefits and Provider P~yment 
The Medicare programme provides coverage for hospitalization in both public 
and private facilities. This provides an immediate bias towards inpatient care. Data 
provided by PMCC showed that the leading causes of hospitalization are acute gastro-
enteritis, acute bronchitis and broncho-pneumonia (Solon, et al, 1990). The rate of 
member availment of their benefits averaged, since 1972 to 1990, around 6.5 percent 
of members with higher availment rates for government employees (10.4 percent) 
compared to private employees (5.4 percent) (Gamboa, et al, 1993). It appears that 
government workers are less likely to be healthy or more likely to seek care than 
private sector employees. 
The Medicare programme does not provide "direct' sen·ices. i.e. engaging its 
own doctors and operating its own facilities. Instead, its members are allowed to use 
any accredited facility and physician (of which there were 14,77.5 in 1992: as n:ported 
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in Gonzalez, et al., 1993 ). Providers are paid on a modified fee-for-service basis. The 
programme pays, for a period of confinement, on a fixed rate basis for in-patient 
charges like a daily room and board, professional fees. operating room, drugs and 
diagnostic tests. Hospital charges beyond the amount covered by Medicare are 
shouldered by the patients. 
Benefits have not really kept up with inflation and with the contributions from 
employers and employees not changing very much, the amount paid out from 
Medicare has dwindled from its original target of 70 percent of hospital costs to only 
about 49 percent (Gamboa, et.al., 1993), indicating the heavy burden of cost-sharing. 
Table 3.10 shows that support values cover a lesser percentage of costs incurred in 
private hospitals than in public hospitals. The costs covered, or support values. in 
private facilities ranged from only 37.8 percent of room and board expenses. 41.1 
percent of medical expenses. However, professional fees and surgeon fees in private 
facilities may not reflect the true picture of actual charges since physicians are known 
not to report their actual fees since the system reimburses a fixed amount relative to 
the value of the procedures. 
Without any restrictions or laws against hospital charges. the low support value 
from Medicare implies that the greater part of costs falls on the consumer. The burden 
of the financial risk therefore, is borne heavily by the consumer and the social 
insurance system. The extent to which hospitals may suffer from bad debts is not 
known. but infom1al discussions with hospital owners indicate that it is prevalent. 
3.5.4 Consequences of the Provider Pa)ment System 
Summarizing the discussion above. from a member's perspective, the combined 
effects of the small decrease in disposable income arising from the payroll tax and 
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Table 3.10 
Average Actual Costs and Medicare Support Value 
1989 
Average Actual Costs (pesos) Medicare Su_pport Value(%) 
Gov't Priv. Combined Gov't Priv. 
Hos_Q_ital Item HOS_f>_itals Hospitals Average Hospitals Hospitals 
Room & Board/Day 50.58 107.62 89.4 91.8 
Medical Expenses 519.73 896.12 806.02 75.8 
Drugs/Medicines 345.38 628.57 560.78 79.1 
Lab, X-ray,etc. 218.02 319.47 296.03 69.1 
Professional Fees 171.96 292.13 66.17 83.2 
Operating Room Fees 
RUV 5 and below 228.22 670.58 502.65 89.9 
RUV 5.1-10 371.38 1183.37 881.77 96.5 
RUV 1 0.1 and above 731.57 1635.79 1348.09 100 
Surgeon's Fees 
RUV 1-5 643.08 2106.94 1477.93 90.3 
RUV 5.1-10 1916.91 4106.77 3196.38 100 
RUV > 10.1 2883.81 6267.98 5033.21 95.1 
Anesthesiologists' Fees 
RUV 5 and below 238.81 1045.33 649.98 87.98 
RUV 5.1-10 606.87 1673.53 1160.45 98.4 
RUV 1 0.1 and above 875.15 2007.64 1552.37 92.9 
Other Fees 205.74 272.9 263.09 0 
Total Amount/Claim 1383.29 2100.95 1931.52 84.7 
Ave. Length of Stay 5.02 3.39 3.78 
%of Claims 24 76 100 
Source of Data: Philippine Medical Care Commission, Support Value Survey 
Adapted from R. Gamboa, et.al., 1993. p. 24. 
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declining support values from Medicare, have led to a low utilization of Medicare 
benefits. With providers being immune from financial risk by the reimbursement 
system, Griffin and Paqueo (1993) observed that the Medicare system may have 
caused a rapid increase in the number of primary care hospitals (less than 25 beds). 
With Medicare reimbursement, these facilities can expect financial viability. Roemer 
(1991) observed that: 
"the administrative design of the Medicare system clearly suggests that it is also 
meant to give substantial financial support to the private market within the 
national health system -- both private doctors and private hospitals (. 300). 
Comparative analysis of revenues per bed, across facility types, by Griffin. et 
al. (1994), seems to support this observation. The authors raised the following 
concern: 
The Medicare reimbursement system explicitly provides higher rates of 
reimbursement for secondary and tertiary hospitals relative to primary hospitals. 
It also distinguishes between regular and catastrophic cases. Thus one would 
expect that the revenue per bed would be substantially higher in secondary and 
tertiary hospitals relative to primary care hospitals, but it is not. It appears that 
primary hospital owners are able to achieve almost any level of revenue per bed 
that they desire, despite rules that provide them with lower reimbursement 
prices (p. 45). 
The behaviour described above appears to suggest opportunism. Gonzalez, et 
al (1994) noted that PMCC suspects high incidence of fraudulent claims in certain 
regions of the country; an observation which can be examined against the distribution 
of facilities in Chapter 5. PMCC observed that close monitoring of 87 primary 
hospitals in 1991 brought down reported occupancy rates from 34.3 to 11.3 (PMCC, 
1993). This reduction in occupancy rates resulted in a decrease in "unecessary claims 
which could have been filed and drained the Health Insurance Fund (Ibid., p.l5). 
While the Medicare system. has the potemial to act as a bulk purchaser of care for its 
members. its role has been limited largely to financial intermediation. The extent to 
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which the social health insurance fund is a major force in health financing is limited 
by the fact that its fund management does not rests with the PMCC. 1be National 
Health Insurance legislation introduced recently addresses this concern by combining 
the fund sources. Its implementation programme, however, remains to be drawn-up. 
The design of the programme which pays on a fee-for-service reimbursement, and the 
weakness of its monitoring systems has prevented Medicare from using the funds' 
potential to influence the health system towards efficiency and equity. However, 
there have been efforts to improve the system. One such attempt involved directly 
contracting with health maintenance organizations (HMOs) for integrated financing and 
delivery. This is discussed next as it highlights the sources of inefficiencies and the 
difficulties of effecting changes in a pluralistic health care financing system. 
3.6 Alternative Financing Scheme: The PMCC-HMO Tie-Up 
The Medicare system has sought ways to expand its benefits without undue 
burden to its members. One of the ways explored was the provision of health 
maintenance type benefits to members. In 1987, the PMCC launched an experimental 
programme to enhance the benefits for Medicare members by including outpatient care 
through the provision of HMO-type services. The programme, known as the PMCC-
HMO Tie-Up Project, was not expected to involve major investments as HMOs were 
already operating in the country. It also viewed that the programme would involve 
minimal administrative costs as claims for reimbursement would now be filed with the 
HMOs. 
HMOs, or health maintenance organizations. are vertically integrated firms, 
offering out-patient and in-patient services, in a pre-paid insurance scheme, through its 
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own salaried doctors and facilities (close panel) or through accredited providers 
(preferred providers). The concept was for the Medicare contributions from the social 
security scheme to be passed-on to the HMOs who were contracted to provide services 
for tie-up members. Membership was voluntary. The two social security agencies, 
SSS and GSIS remained as collecting agents, with a proportion of the contributions 
(initially 3 percent then increased to 34 percent) being retained by them. The latter 
adjustment was made after the first year evaluation which showed low utilization rates; 
and the increased administrative burden of member verification and validation of 
contributions on the funders. The additional portion retained by the funders was seen 
to facilitate the administrative delays. 
On the initial solicitation of interest, 12 health insurance companies and 4 
HMOs were invited. The four HMOs submitted proposals; but the project began, in 
June 1988, with only one HMO signing a memorandum of agreement. Nearly a year 
later, in May 1989, another HMO (not in the original four) entered into a memorandum 
of agreement with the PMCC. The geographic coverage of the programme was 
initially limited to Metro Manila. The benefit package included free medical 
consultations and benefit caps for in-patient care which are generally higher than the 
regular Medicare programmes. So for the same amount paid by regular members 
(around 68 pesos at that time), tie-up members were able to get more benefits with 
their contribution. Membership was voluntary. 
After two evaluations, the programme was terminated. Results from the study 
conducted by an Arthur Andersen Consulting group ( 1994) showed that the contracted 
HMOs directed marketing efforts towards the top 1000 corporations in the country. 
There appeared to be inadequate member education and information, as direct 
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interviews with members showed that they were not aware of basic procedures. Mis-
routed claims, with claims still being forwarded to the funders rather than the HMOs, 
also show insufficient information. The financial support offered by the programme. 
however, does not compare favourably with the regular Medicare programme, with 
support values estimated at 34 and 41 percent, respectively. This low support value 
arose largely from the tertiary nature of services largely offered by the HMOs. Low 
utilization rates (less than 1.0 percent of members) translated into profit margins 
ranging from 15 to 30 percent, on a cash basis, and 35 to 44 percent on accrued basis. 
Accrued rates suggest that reimbursement delays were experienced; hence, accrued 
rates are the profits to be realised once the remittances materialise. These margins 
were high compared to the profit margins of these HMOs on their regular program (1.0 
and 19 percent). 
For the collecting agencies, the SSS and GSIS, the delays arose from 
membership verification and validation of contributions. Mis-routed claims also held 
up the system. These costs comprise part of the transaction costs of the contractual 
arrangement between the two major parties: the funders and the HMOs. The extent 
of the costs was not foreseen before the contract. However, as will be shown in 
Chapter 7, these costs arose largely from the problem of motivation because of the 
unequal sharing of the burden of risks. Despite positive net gains arising from their 
share of the collections, the funders pushed for the programme termination. 
The lessons from this experimental programme suggests that financing schemes 
that do not veer away from a fee-for-service orientation are unlikely to effect major 
changes in the health system of the country. The financial risks arising from the 
payment system are unequally shared, favouring the providers. The programme also 
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highlighted the nature of costs in health care market transactions, particularly between 
institutional payers and providers. The extent to which these costs influence the 
structure of the health care market is discussed in Chapter 7. 
3. 7 Conclusion 
Health care financing in the country can be viewed as failing on both equity and 
efficiency grounds. The previous chapter showed that allocation pattern of government 
has been found to be unequally distributed among the regions, as against the regions' 
infant mortality profiles. In this chapter, an analysis of health care expenditure patterns 
showed that govermnent spending was declining as a source of health care financing. 
A comparative picture, in this chapter, suggests that the inefficiency of the financing 
system reflects its level of development. 
There was a heavy burden of household-based financing based on ability to 
pay. That this ability to pay did not coincide with the propensity for ill-health, 
suggests that the burden of disease was not equally shared. The heavy burden of 
cost sharing meant that compulsory insurance programme had limited impact in the 
sector. Population coverage and utilization rates were low. While low utilization 
rates mean that reserves are accumulating, the design of the reimbursement system 
provided impetus for opportunism. Private health insurance and health maintenance 
companies remain an unaffordable option for many. The strong profit orientation is 
unlikely to affect provider or consumer behaviour since it undertakes mainly financial 
intermediary functions. 
The failure of the main institutions in the health sector, both government in 
general and health financing institutions, in particular, determines the market structure. 
In this pluralistic market. households are often left to fend for themselves, leaving aside 
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those with limited paying capacities and greater health needs. There is very limited 
information on how these households behave. Thus, much less information on how 
providers behave. Amidst these concerns, baseline infom1ation on consumer demand 
and the health care market is vital. Health sector reforms. particularly in areas that 
promote efficiency and equity, need to be guided by an understanding of the behaviour 
of households and the supply-side. The basic conditions of demand and supply. given 
the financing system, shape the structure of the market. Strengthening regulatory 
capacities entails the ability to foresee the impact of changing prices, income and other 
policy variables on consumer and provider response. 
The next chapter examines the determinants of demand for out-patient care in 
the country. It also situates the examination of demand for healt!1 care in the context 
of a user fee policy for goverrnnent services. 
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Introduction 
Chapter Four 
The Conditions of Demand for Health Care 
in the Philippines 
The analysis of health care financing in the Philippines showed heavy reliance 
on household out-of-pocket outlays and the limited capacity of insurance schemes to 
ease the burden on households posed by financial losses arising from illness. 
Government tax-supported spending, has been shown to be inequitably allocated and 
inefficient; and has a limited budget constrained by pressures of the nation's debt (see 
Section 2.3 above). Health sector allocations need to address the twin-challenge of 
meeting basic health care needs whilst maintaining costly curative facilities. 
Health care financing reforms, like those introducing pricing in government 
facilities, currently sweeping across developing countries, are likely to influence the 
pattern of household spending and demand for health care. The study of health care 
demand can provide valuable insights into the welfare effects of policy reforms that 
propose to introduce or increase prices in government facilities. This study examines 
the demand for out-patient health care from two perspectives: a) the determinants of 
the choice for provider and; b) the effects of changes in prices that may result from 
a user fee policy on demand for health care. The latter analysis provides an 
opportunity to estimate for basic demand parameters that are vital to understanding the 
market structure of health care in the Philippines. Estimates of the responsiveness of 
demand for health care by different income groups to changes in prices and time costs 
serve to highlight the equity impacts of the pricing reforms. The model used also 
allows the simulation of utilization and welfare effects of user fee policies. 
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The chapter is divided up as follows: The first part analyzes the policy issues 
and the behavioural assumptions of consumer demand models, particularly applicable 
for developing countries. The second part uses a provider-choice model to estimate the 
demand for out-patient care from a provider-choice model for the Philippines. The 
third part shows the results of the model. The chapter ends with a summary of the 
findings and implications for policy. 
4.1 An Overview of Health Care Demand Studies in Developing Countries 
4.1.1 A Review of the Policy and Research Issues 
Health care demand in the Philippines has been the subject of pioneering work 
estimating demand functions. The work by Akin, et al. (1985), on the demand for 
primary health care services in the Bicol region, along with the work of Heller (1982) 
for Malaysia, broke ground for current global initiatives in health financing (McPake, 
1993). These studies showed a weak, and often insignificant, explanatory power of 
economic variables. This evidence served as the basis for calls to introduce user 
charges in government facilities in developing countries (World Bank, 1987). Using 
an extensive set of prices data, including service fees, transport time and fares, drug 
expenses, along with information on insurance status, household assets, education, 
illness severity and quality of care, Akin and his colleagues found that only non-
economic factors such as urban residence, mother's education and quality, were 
significant factors influencing the choice of provider. Heller's thorough examination 
of various aspects of demand; i.e. distinguished by type of care, discretionary versus 
curative, and the actual amounts of care consumed, showed that cash price, and time 
costs did not affect demand. It was also found that income had a weak influence on 
the decision to seek care, but had a clear effect on the type of care sought. 
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The insensitivity to economic variables of household choice of health care 
delivery services has been confirmed in other studies in the Philippines by Schwartz. 
et al.(l988), and Wong, et.al.(l987) for child and adult outpatients, and prenatal care 
delivery choices, respectively. However, it is not just important to koow whether 
prices or income influence demand. It is also important to know how the effects may 
be felt across income sub-groups and to simulate behavioural responses for given 
changes in policy. 
Subsequent analysis focused on the extent to which prkes or fees prevent 
individuals from seeking care. Analysis of longitudinal data by Waddington and 
Enyimayew ( 1989; 1990) showed that a decline in utilization was an initial response 
in urban areas in Ghana, but utilisation level was regained thereafter. Rural health 
centre utilisation, however, never reverted to pre-user charge level. A work on 
Kenya, by Mwabu ( 1987), showed that user fees do prevent individuals from seeking 
care, especially if there are no perceived changes in the quality of services offered. 
A recent study in Cameroon (Litvack and Bodart, 1993), using an 'pre-test-and-post-
test' experimental approach, showed that there was willingness to pay if supplies in 
health facilities (a measure of quality) could be assured. This willingness to pay was 
shown to be exhibited most by the poorest quintile groups whose probability of seeking 
care increased in greater proportion than the rest of the population. A study by 
Tembon (1995), for another province in Cameroon, showed that a substantial portion 
of health care costs borne by households are attributed to transport expenses and time 
lost from work. Therefore, reducing travel time and distance can serve as policy goals 
to improve accessibility of service facilities. Simulations, however, showed that 
household response to improved access was not as great as its response to changes in 
117 
actual facility charges. This appears to imply that fees or facility charges are greater 
deterrents to utilization than access costs. 
McPake ( 1993) observed that the failure of models that showed prices to be 
insignificant may be due to the inadequate treatment of the 'quality of care' variable. 
Price variables, for example, may show net positive effects; i.e., the higher the price 
the greater the demand. This is has been taken as proof of the price-quality interaction 
in health care demand; i.e. higher price is often perceived to be associated with higher 
quality service quality. Studies on user charges incorporated in community financing 
schemes also showed this price-quality interaction (Litvack, 1994; McPake, 1993). 
The use of price as an indicator of quality suggests that non-price competition may 
prevail and that price may no longer serve as a useful allocative device in the market. 
The extent to which this is so in the Philippine out-patient care market can be 
accommodated in the health care demand model used in terms of the nature of the 
relationship between price and the demand for out-patient care. 
Gertler et al (1987) and Gertler and van den Gaag (1990), in their studies on 
Peru and Cote d'lvoire, showed the differential response to prices by rich and poor 
households. Earlier models were shown, by Gertler and colleagues, to have mis-
specified the relationship between income and price as independent of one another. 
That the poor are more sensitive to price changes than the rich is not captured in earlier 
demand studies cited above because of the way the models were specified: prices and 
income variables were entered separately into the demand function. This implies that 
the poor and rich face and respond to price differences among providers in the same 
manner. The alternative method that enters prices as interacting with income captures 
this differential response and simulates the effects of policy on different income groups 
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in terms of the reaction of these groups to changes in the prices of medical care. 
And it is this model which this study applies for the Philippines. 
The role of other factors affecting demand needs to be investigated as well, 
since in most developing economies the services are offered free. In the absence of 
prices or fees at facilities, travel time serves as a rationing device, with the poor eased 
out of the market because of distance to the facility (Acton, 1975). Household 
composition factors, like number of children and adults, also affect demand. 
Demographic characteristics of households, i.e. age and sex, have been shown to 
influence household health production functions, and therefore the utility derived from 
health care (Pollack and Wachter, 1975). These, and other factors used in this study 
are discussed in the specification of the model below. 
4.1.2 Behavioural Assumptions 
An exhaustive review of the demand for health care analysis is made in Akin, 
et al. ( 1985). This section provides a brief sketch of the key elements in consumer 
behaviour that are highlighted in this study. 
The analysis of consumer behaviour in health care demand studies starts off 
with the assumption that individuals seek to maximize utility within the set of feasibility 
constraints. This decision making unit, widely viewed as an individual, derives utility 
from the consumption of goods or services. In health care, the ultimate objective is 
the maximization of health. Medical care is an input, among other inputs, in the 
production of health. This view is known as the health production function and is 
developed from a model pioneered by Grossman (1972). The demand for medical care 
is seen as a derived demand for health. A vector of characteristics that influence one's 
health include age, gender. food intake or other goods. Choices of goods/services are 
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constrained by the prices of these goods and the households' command over resources 
or income. Consumption of goods M (medical care) and X (other goods) is determined 
by the amount of resources available to the consumer or income (Y) and the prices 
of these goods (P) and the amounts of the goods bought. The individual maximizes 
welfare by choosing a combination of goods and services that fits within the budget 
constraint. 
Becker ( 1965) argued that consumption activities involve time, and that prices 
of goods do not just include cash or money prices but also involve the use of time, 
which has a money equivalent expressed as wt, i.e. the hourly wage multiplied by the 
amount of time spent in wage employment. The role of time prices in health care 
demand has been fitted into the basic utility maximizing framework by Acton (1975). 
A crucial notion is that money and time spent on health care are money and time lost 
for other pursuits. 
In summary, the basic theoretical premise about health care demand is that a 
consumer acts rationally in terms of maximizing his or her utility, given the choices 
depicted in his or her health production function, and subject to his or her budget 
constraint. In equilibrium, the consumer attains maximum utility when the marginal 
utilities of the commodities are equal to their price. 
Standard demand functions are written as follows: 
(1) M* = m(Y, Pm, Px, a) 
(1.1) X* = x(Y, Pm, Px, a) 
where M* and X* are optimal quantities of the goods M and X that yield maximum 
utility. And a refers to a vector of individual and demographic characteristics of the 
household affecting the demand. 
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4.1.3 Policy Parameters 
Consumer demand equations permit the analysis of parameters of interest for 
policy-makers. These include estimates of the price elasticity of demand, income 
elasticities and willingness to pay. These parameters, as explained below, are vital for 
the formulation of policies that seek to alter utilization behaviour of certain groups 
for redistributive purposes. These parameters can also serve as "bases for accurate 
forecasts of future use and plans concerning the distribution of resources" (Rosko and 
Broyles, 1988). 
Elasticities measure the degree of responsiveness of household demand to 
changes in prices or income. Policy-makers interested in increasing fees for health 
services or introducing them, can estimate the impact of these policies on households 
or consumers from knowing price elasticity of demand. An elastic demand means that 
households will respond strongly to price changes; while an inelastic demand means 
that the response of households will be less than the proportionate change in price. A 
developing economy wishing to anticipate changes in demand for health care when 
income changes by a certain proportion can also benefit from the information provided 
by income elasticity. 
Given the predictions on price and income effects, the over-all welfare effect 
is measured in terms of the compensating variation concept. It is the amount needed 
to be paid to an individual who has been made worse off by a price increase, to make 
him or her as well off with the new prices as he or she was before the price change. 
Identifying the amount needed to compensate individuals for the welfare loss can 
be gleaned from consumer demand functions. If the demand equation ( 1) above is 
incorporated into a utility function: max U = U (M, X), an indirect utility function 
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can be written as: 
where ll shows the maximum welfare level that can be reached with income Y, prices 
P and other individual characteristics, a. 
An inverse of the indirect utility function yields: 
Equation (3), known as the cost function, shows how much outlays or how much 
income, i.e. the compensating variation, is needed to achieve the maximum welfare 
or utility ll, given prices and other characteristics are constant. A change in the price 
from Pm to P,/ results in: 
The difference (Y- Y) is the amount needed to compensate those who suffer a welfare 
loss as a result of a price increase or, as in this study's context, the introduction of 
fees in government services 1• 
4.2 A Model for the Demand of Out-patient Care in the Philippines 
This section describes the model used to estimate a demand function for out-
patient care and discusses its differences from earlier health care demand models (Akin, 
1Welfare economics, through the Hicks-Kaldor test, posits that compensation of 
losers by gainers following a policy change can lead to potential Pareto improvement. 
Scitovsky on the other hand, showed that if gainers can compensate losers to push 
through a policy change. it must also be shown that a reversal to the status quo cannot 
be made. There are doubts on the extent to which these compensation tests can 
contribute to allocation decisions given that these tests abstract from making value 
judgn1ents on the nature of the welfare function, i.e. whether a one-to-one 
correspondence of utility gains and losses can be made between a poor and rich 
individual can be made (Gravelle and Rees, 1992). But the usefulness for policy of 
measures such as compensating variation or willingness to pay has been generally 
acknowledged (Just. et al.. 1982). 
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et al., 1985; Heller, 1982) to highlight the analytical issues addressed by the model. 
The section ends with a discussion of the hypothesis on the nature of the health care 
demand function. 
4.2.1 Analytical Specifications of the Model Used 
This sub-section provides a descriptive account of the behavioural and empirical 
models used in estimating household out-patient demand. The mcdel is more formally 
developed in Appendix 3. 
The consumer demand model used in this analysis is the choice of provider and 
applies the specifications of Gertler, et al. ( 1987) and Gertler and van der Gaag ( 1990). 
A discrete choice model on out -patient care captures the discretionary nature of 
patient-initiated care. This approach is appropriate given the weak referral system and 
the private, pay-as-you-go, nature of health care purchases in the country. 
The starting point of a choice-theoretic framework is the idea that when faced 
with the need for medical care, a consumer is faced with a choice of getting treatment 
from a set of providers or not seeking any assistance (self-care). One of several 
providers offers the individual the expected improvement in health for a price which 
can be expected to reduce the consumer's income and, thereby affect, his or her 
consumption of other non-medical goods. The provider chosen is the one whose 
quality and price yields the highest utility for the consumer. The consumer achieves 
utility not only the consumption of medical care but also consumption of other goods. 
The solution to the utility maximization problem begins with the system of 
demand functions for the alternative providers, expressed in terms of the probabilities 
of choosing the providers. The distribution of the variables in the functional form of 
the consumer's utility function determines the form of the demand function. 
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The demand function for an alternative is the probability that the utility derived 
from that provider is greater than that from any other alternative, including self-care. 
The probability that self care and provider j is chosen from among the set of 
alternatives is shown, respectively : 
(3) 
(4) 
exp(V) 
J v 0 
exp(V )+[Eexp(...l)] 
1 0 
v. 
exp(_l_) 
llj=(l - 1to)---:-
[ E exp( _1)] 0 
0 
where a is 1 mtnus the correlation between the error terms of the provider 
alternatives. Vj represents the utility derived from alternative j, with the following 
parameters: 
where X is a vector of socio-economic variables, (Y -PrwTj) is the consumption term 
where Y is total income, Pis provider prices, w is the opportunity cost of time and 
TJ is the travel time to the provider. The conditional utility function is therefore shown 
to be linear in characteristics that affect health and quadratic in consumption (net of 
medical care). 
124 
In summary. the demand function for a provider alternative is the probability 
that the provider yields the highest utility, among other providers, where utility depends 
on the expected improvement in health and consumption net of medical care. In a 
discrete choice specification, a poorer household is likely to choose a low price - low 
quality provider since choosing a high price - high quality provider is likely to 
represent a significant reduction of household budgets allotted for other needs. While 
higher income earning household is likely to choose a high price -high quality option. 
This behaviour is consistent only if health is a normal good. that is, the demand for 
health increases with income or the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for 
health diminishes as income increases, holding health constant. 
The estimated demand functions take the form of a nested multinomial logit 
(NMNL). The NMNL specification can accommodate the following features of the 
demand model (Gertler and van der Gaag. 1990. p. 73): 1) correlation across sub-
groups of alternatives and therefore non-constant cross-price elasticities; and. 2) the 
grouping of closely similar alternatives yield cross-price elasticities that are more 
elastic within than across groups. These features imply that the estimating technique 
be one which captures the degree of complementarity and substitutability within and 
among alternative provider choices. 
The model is estimated using a full information maximum likelihood (FI~tLJ 
which is shown by Henscher ( 1986) to be more efficient than two-step estimates 
(Gertler and van der Gaag. 1990). The LIMDEP programme software was used to 
obtain the results of the demand model. 
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4.2.2 Limits of Earlier Health Care Demand Models 
Earlier studies on demand for health care (Akin, et al, 1985; Schwartz, 1988; 
Dor and van der Gaag, 1987; Ching, 1992) is limited in four ways: 1) the 
specification of the utility function; 2) estimating techniques; 3) how quality of care 
is captured by the model; and 4) data problems. 
Firstly, earlier demand models specify linear utility functions where income is 
shown to vary with the provider alternatives2• Such linear specification of the utility 
functions is inconsistent with stable utility maximization; for it implies that (Gertler 
and van der Gaag, 1990): 
" ... two alternatives that provide the same improvement in health for the same 
price must yield different levels of utility to the same individual ... if this is true, 
then preferences are not ordered and transitive, and stable utility functions, 
therefore, do not exist (p.66). 
The use of a single consumption term, (Y -PrwTj), differs from the usual 
separate treatment of prices and income, similar to equation (1). With prices shown 
to be interact with income, one can examine whether health is a normal good, with 
demand increasing as income increases, as discussed above. Specification of income 
and prices as a net consumption terms implies that even though provider prices may be 
zero, as is often-considered for government services, a price parameter can still be 
captured using travel time costs. 
2 Consider the following conditional utility functions for doctor and self-care demand 
respectively: Ud = aJid + a1(Y - PJ; U, = aJls + a1Y. The alternative chosen is that 
which yields a positive net change in utility: Ud - U, = ao(Hd - HJ - a.Pd > 0. Income 
differences out but can influence choice so long as the marginal rate of substitution of health 
for consumption is allowed to vary. The specification of earlier models allow consumption 
coefficients to vary by alternative, i.e. Ud = aJld + a.iY -P J; U, = aJlo + a .. Y · The 
choice of alternative is determined by: Ud - U, = ao(Hd - HJ - a.d Pd +(aid - a.JY > 0. 
The restriction of different coefficients on consumption (non-health) implies different marginal 
utility of consumption for two alternatives despite same level of consumption. 
126 
A second problem with earlier demand estimates relates to the estimating 
techniques used, especially those using other forms of logit models. The problems 
with logit models in general, and the properties of multinomial logit specifications 
have been extensively discussed in Bitran (1988) and Tembon (1995). The implication 
of the problems related to multinomial and conditional logit models, as applied in the 
Philippines by Schwartz, et al.(l987) and Ching (1995) respectively, is to lessen the 
impact of variable changes on the demand for health care. Multinomial logit (MNL) 
imposes restrictions that cross price elasticities are the same across alternatives. 
Conditional logit models also impose the same restrictions and cannot assess the impact 
of income on demand, as only differences in utility matter (Bitran, 1988)3• To avoid 
this problem, Ching ( 1995) used a conditional logit specification in combination with 
Gertler-type specification of income and price as naturally interacting and tested for the 
correlation across alternatives. However, beyond this, Ching's work did not go 
further to simulate differential household responses to user fees, cross-price effects and 
estimates on welfare, as this study has done. But a comparison of related findings are 
made in the discussion below. 
A third problem of health care demand estimates is related to the treatment of 
'quality of provider' in the models. The problem stems from the difficulty of 
3Bitran (1988) cites Mwabu (1986) illustrating the conceptual differences between 
conditionallogit and multinomial logit in terms of a one-mile walk to providers. Conditional 
logit considers a one-mile walk to a goverrunent health centre would be equally undesirable 
(same utility function) to another individual as a one-mile walk to a traditional provider. 
Multinomial logit, on the other hand, would have individuals valuing (different utility 
functions) each one-mile walk to different providers differently. Nested log it is a generalised 
form of multinomial logit which allows correlation across alternatives, avoiding the problem 
known as Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). Hence, a person choosing a private 
provider over self-care may likely choose goverrunent provider ove~ self-care. Nes~ed 
multinomiallogit assumes that consumer choices can be mapped sequentially~ first a ch~1ce 
whether to seek care or not, and when a decision to seek care is made, the different cho1ces 
can be categorised. 
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measuring the 'quality' variable. Akin, et al. (1985) used a dummy variable, whether 
the attending person was a physician or nurse, as a measure of quality. The availability 
of drugs or supplies has been used as a measure of 'quality' by Mwabu and Mwangi 
(1986) and Litvack and Boddart (1993). These measures of quality may be considered 
as exogenous measures of quality arising from consumer perceptions. The demand 
specification of Gertler and van der Gaag ( 1990), as followed in this study, treats 
quality as an unobservable variable and considers it as synonymous to the efficacy of 
the provider. As such, quality enters as part of the household production function for 
health, with individual and provider characteristics as explanatory variables. This 
implies that the reduced-form health care demand model is derived from a utility 
function where the measure of price effects are adjusted for quality. Individual 
characteristics, such as age, education and severity of illness, is shown to influence 
provider's productivity relative to self-care. Appendix 3 shows how this is formally 
incorporated in the model. 
A fourth problem related to earlier demand function estimates is related to data 
limitations. The study by Akin, et al.(1984) on the Philippines, for example, 
estimated prices separately from the household survey. Prices applied were those that 
prevailed three years after the survey. Gertler and van der Gaag ( 1990) observed that 
data problems can probably account for the lack of significance of prices and income 
in earlier estimates by Akin et al. (1985), as following the latter's specifications, using 
the Living Standards Survey data for Cote d'Ivoire and Peru, prices and income were 
shown to be significant predictors of health care demand. Ching's (1995) estimates, 
while based on a national survey data base, also failed to consider time costs as pan 
of the household budget constraint due to the lack of data on wages. Hence, a 
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comparison of differential household response to time costs with medical care prices 
cannot be made. 
Moreover, the treatment of income also poses some problems (Bitran, 1988). 
The use of current income does not take into account that people may be forced to 
borrow for some necessities like health care or that consumption often exceeds income, 
particularly for low income households. For health care emergencies for example, 
households have been observed to sell belongings and other assets (Tembon, 1995; 
Abel-Smith and Dua, 1988). Heller (1982) observed that seasonality also affects the 
reporting of current income; suggesting that expenditures can better capture permanent 
income as a measure of household welfare. Household expenditure, as a proxy 
measure for permanent income, is used in this study as a more appropriate measure 
of income. 
4.2.3 Factors Affecting Demand for Health Care 
The quantitative analysis of health care demand involves the estimation of the 
demand equation, generating testable hypotheses on the effects of the right-hand side 
variables on quantity of medical care consumed. The factors that are hypothesized to 
influence demand, the expected direction of influence and specification issues are 
shown below. Earlier reviews on the factors determining demand for health care by 
Akin, et al.(l985) and Ching (1989) are not repeated here. Emphasis is placed on the 
factors that have been adjusted to allow for modifications introduced in the model. 
Income 
If health is a normal good, a higher income is expected to lead to increased 
demand for medical care. Poorer households are likely to demand lower-priced, lower 
quality providers; while alternatively, higher income households will seek higher-priced 
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providers. The consumption tenn in the model shows a net income concept, income 
net of the price of seeking care. In most demand studies in the developing world, it 
is household income which is the relevant measure rather than the individual's. Due 
to considerations of household welfare and problems, cited above, with the 
appropriateness of income measures, the study uses average monthly value of 
household expenditure to represent income. Expenditure, especially if it exceed 
income, incorporates a wealth component especially as it reflects one's ability to 
borrow from friends or relatives. 
Households, however, are just as prone to under-report expenditures, just as 
they may under-report mcomes. The questionnaire design tried to address this 
problem by including a checklist that itemized weekly, monthly and annual 
expenditures. 
The average monthly value of household expenditure is estimated by summing-
up weekly expenses by households especially for food, transportation, leisure 
(magazines, comics, beer or alcoholic drinks), with monthly expenses like rent, 
utilities and payment for household services. Other yearly expenditure items like 
school tuition, insurance premiums, mortgage, clothes, membership dues, etc., were 
adjusted to obtain monthly figures. 
Price of Medical Care 
The price of medical care includes not only out-of-pocket payments but also 
time costs. Out-of-pocket payments to the provider include not only professional fees. 
but also treatment costs in tem1s of drugs, tests, and other supplies. Expenditure for 
health care visits therefore reflect these out-of-pocket payments. For improved 
precision in the estimates (since some households reported not only fees but other 
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treatment costs and other households did not for difficulty of recall), and to capture 
variation in prices across alternatives, direct out-of-pocket outlays were estimated 
indirectly through hedonic pricing. The estimates are shown in Appendix 4. 
Specifying price of medical care as a function of individual characteristics, like age. 
sex, education, location, regio~ types of complaints and market structure (number of 
providers) capture the extent to which these variables are reflected in prices. The 
indirect estimates yielded low coefficients and t-values; but similar findings were 
observed by Ching ( 1995) and Gertler, et al. ( 1987). 
Time Price 
The time price is critical in developing countries. Given the widespread policy 
of free health care in the public sector, it is time that serves to determine who will seek 
care; i.e., those for whom the time price is relatively low (Acton, 1975). The time 
spent travelling to obtain care also serves as an indirect cost of access (Gertler and van 
der Gaag, 1990). 
Time cost is a product of the travel time spent obtaining care from the provider 
and the individual's hourly wage. The time involved in consuming health care is seen 
as a lost opportunity to earn. If obtaining care is time-intensive, then wage loss is 
greater, and the price of seeking care is high and the subsequent demand will be low. 
For non-wage earning individuals and children, the hourly wage rate applied is the 
village-level agricultural wage rate. 
However, this measure of time price (where wages are multiplied by travel 
time) is not without problems. It assumes that there is always a positive time price; 
which may not be true where unemployment maybe the norm. as more commonly 
observed in rural areas. The time price measure also correlates with wage income and 
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its inclusion would result in multicollinearity. This problem is partly avoided in the 
model which used, in the consumption tenn, expenditures as a proxy measure of 
income. 
Transportation costs were estimated separately from travel time costs to 
facilitate travel time elasticity estimates. Transportation costs reflect not just distance. 
but also the state of roads and transport supply factors. 
Other Household Characteristics 
Individual and household characteristics that are expected to influence the choice 
of provider include severity, age, education, sex, number of children in the household 
and the number of adults in the household. 
Severity and age may be considered as health status variables. Severity, 
introduced as a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if the self-assessment (or 
mother's assessment in case of children) of illness is serious4 • Perceptions of severity 
of the complaint is expected to trigger the initial decision-making process of seeking 
care. Weaker immune systems, and therefore, greater susceptibility to illness, are 
generally ascribed for very young or very old individuals. Therefore, age influences 
the likelihood of experiencing health problems and seeking care (Bitran and Mcinnes, 
1993). 
Education can be viewed as an efficiency factor, one which improves the 
general productivity of non-market care (self-care) for an individual (Grossman, 1972). 
Given the endogenous treatment of quality in the model, education can be viewed 
4 Self-assessment of the severity of complaint was asked as follows: How did you assess 
the severity of the complaint: mild, moderate, severe. The question followed questions 
related to whether the reponed complaint (4 weeks recall period) by a household member 
prevented the member from doing his or her usual activity, whether it made him/her stay in 
bed and the number of days in bed. 
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therefore to improve the efficacy (quality) of care as with more educatio~ one can 
better implement treatment regimens on one's own. Alternatively, more education can 
mean better healthier or less use-intensive lifestyles (Muurinen and Le Grand, 1985). 
One could also have better information on health care sources with more education. 
With more education, one can also have higher earning capacities, hence the greater 
the demand for health care. 
Gender is considered in the model by using a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 for males. Males are more likely to incur higher wage loss if untreated, 
which may prompt more immediate care, if not better care, than females. 
Household composition variables refer to the number of children or adults in 
the household. A child's health may depend on the number of other siblings (Pollack 
and Wachter, 1975). While having more adults may mean a propensity to self-treat 
using the household's broader range of experience. Alternatively, household 
composition variables can be viewed as a productivity factor, indicating enhanced 
income-earning capabilities of the household. Having more children may also involve 
adult time, lowering income-earning capabilities. Having more adults on the other 
hand increases earning capabilities and therefore demand for health care. 
4.2.4 Data 
A household survey was undertaken to examine household decisions about 
choice of provider. It is a rider to a bigger research undertaking conducted by the 
Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS) for the Department of Health 
(DOH). Henceforth, the database will be known as PIDS-DOH. The focus of the data 
gathering was on the role of economic factors, particularly income, prices and time 
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costs, in health seeking behavior. The sampling design used in the household survey 
is described in Appendix 1. 
4.2.4.1 Study Sites 
A household survey was conducted in four regions of the country, namely: 
Regions II, VII, X, and the National Capital Region. A location map is shown in 
Figure 4.1. The regions were chosen on the basis of socioeconomic conditions 
(GOP, population and health indicators and facilities). Table 4.1 shows how the 
provincial sites in the study compare with each other in terms of economic indicators. 
A total of 2,800 randomly-selected households, following a multi-stage sampling 
technique, were covered by the survey comprising 11,651 individuals. 
4.2.4.2 Descriptive Highlights 
For the majority (67 %) of households, who reported out-patient consultation 
during the past month, the consultation was as an initial visit; while more than one-
fourth (26 %) reported that the consultations were follow-up consultations. While 
initial consultations may contain elements of what Heller ( 1982) distinguished as 
discretionary (own volition) and necessary (arising from illness) care; follow-up 
consultations may also suggest discretionary (check-up) but at the same time some 
supply-inducement. The model does not distinguish between these types of care. 
Most out-patient consultations occurred in private clinics (41 % of households 
consulted privately), while 30 %consulted at the out-patient department of government 
facilities. Public clinic facilities like barangay health stations and health centres were 
visited by 23 % of the sample households. These figures appear not to deviate much 
from the pattern observed from national data. Data from national survey data, analyzed 
in Herrin. et al.(l993). showed a greater proportion of households utilising public 
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Table 4.1 
Background Information on Study Sites 
PIDS-DOH Household Survey 
(as of 1990) 
Population 
a/ 
Region2 
Cagayan Valley 829,974 
Quirino 114,132 
Aegion7 
Cebu 2,&45,735 
Bohol 948,315 
Region 10 · 
Surigao del Norte 425,978 
Misamis Oriental 865,051 
National Capital Region 7,928,867 
(NCR) 
o.ta&o..ua: 
w l'tlllppiN s-11 Y.-t>ook. 1 WIW1_, 
111 ~- eL.R .___, .. NpOneCI tn Z~ng~ptn. , .. 
Per Capita 
Income 
(Pesos) 
a/ 
5,944 
9,823 
9,857 
27,082 
Infant 
Mortality 
Rates 
a/ 
31.8 
23.8 
28.0 
32.0 
20.0 
20.0 
27.4 
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Physician Midwife 
To Pop'n To Pop'n 
Ratio Ratio 
a/ aJ 
1:6518 1:4549 
1:13,746 1:7824 
1:7721 1:3688 
1 ;12,242 1:n81 
Total No. of . I Beds 
Public Private 
b/ bl 
748 240 
160 240 
2045 1718 
492 207 
445 60 
580 426 
10620 3158 
hospitals (38% ), compared to (23%) of households reporting private doctor care. 
These facilities were largely outside the village. For 57 % of households. 
consultations were made at municipality level; while 27 % were made within the 
village. Some 12 % reported going further afield at the provincial level for their out-
patient consultations. 
In general, 86 % of households reported to have a 'usual source of care'. The 
usual source of care for 62 % of households were outside of their villages but within 
the same municipality. While for 24 %of households, consultations were usually made 
within the same barangay; and 13 % of households went to another municipality. 
The survey also contained some statements to capture household attitudes and 
views: whether they agreed or disagreed. Responses to some of the statements are as 
follows: 
1. We have enough facilities to take care of our needs. 71 % Yes 28 % No 
2. Doctors in public hospitals are just as good as those in private hospitals. 
67 % Yes 32 % No 
3. If the charges in a public hospital were the same as that of a private hospital. I 
would prefer to go to the private hospital. 77 % Yes 23 % No 
4. A doctor who charges more has better expertise than a doctor who charges less. 
37 % Yes 63 % No 
The descriptive data provides indication of the choices and preferences of 
sample Filipino households. The differences in household characteristics and their 
influence on the choice of provider can be assessed in tenns of the health care demand 
model, outlined in the section 4.2.1. The next section presents the determinants of 
health care demand and the policy implications that flow from the model. 
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4.3 Results 
4.3.2 Determinants of Provider Choice 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the study's provider choice model. The unit of analysis 
is the individual. In cases where more than one sick member may be found in a 
household, sick household members were interviewed individually for questions on 
health status and utilisation5. Sick household members were individually interviewed 
for questions on health status and utilisation. Mothers responded for children. The 
analysis covered a sample of2,039 individuals who reported an illness complaint during 
the past four weeks preceding the survey. 
The model is specified as a nested multinomial logit. with the provider choices 
nested within the prior decision to seek market care over home-care. Table 4.2 shows 
the descriptive statistics of the variables used. 
The results on Table 4.3 show that prices and income play important roles in 
the demand for medical care. The coefficients of the consumption term and its square 
are significantly different from zero. Medical care prices entering the consumption 
term and the consumption squared term including both a squared price and a price-
income interaction term, the coefficients being significantly different from zero indicate 
that income and prices influence the choice of provider. The signs of the coefficients 
also indicate that with health as a normal good, a low income individual would choose 
additional consumption to additional health and that the marginal utility of consumption 
is diminishing. The magnitude of the impact of prices and income on demand cannot 
~There was an insignificant number (less than 10 households) of households who reported 
more than one member sick during the reference period. and therefore the problem of 
correlation in the errors across observations was viewed to be negligible. 
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Table 4.2 
Descriptive Statistics of an NMNL Model 
of Out-patient Provider Choice 
Variables Description 
Consumption log of (total expenditures 
less price less time costs 
less transport costs) 
total expenditures pesos per month 
price pesos 
time costs pesos per hour 
transport costs pesos per visit 
Education no. of years completed 
Severity dummy ( = 1 if complaint 
is severe from self-
diagnosis) 
Age years 
Sex dummy (=1 if male) 
NChild No. of Children < 15 
years 
NAdult No. of Children > 14 years 
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Mean S~anda~d 
Dev,ation 
8.08 1.05 
5,406 8,358 
44.30 83.82 
0.50 0.50 
3.48 10.84 
8.81 3.30 
0.20 0.40 
19.79 20.28 
0.49 0.50 
2.64 1.72 
3.14 1.56 
Table 4.3 
An NMNL Model Of Out-Patient Provider Choice 
Philippines, 1993 
Variable 
Consumption 
Consumption Squared 
Sigma 
Private Doctor 
Education 
Severity 
Age 
Sex 
Nchild 
NAdult 
Public Clinics 
Education 
Severity 
Age 
Sex 
Nchild 
NAdult 
Public Hospitals 
Education 
Severity 
Age 
Sex 
Nchild 
NAdult 
Sample Size 
Log-Likelihood 
Levels of Significance: 
*** .01 
** .05 
* .1 0 
Coefficient T-Value 
5.319 
-11.629 
0.275 
0.027 
0.066 
-0.006 
0.358 
-0.090 
0.228 
-0.009 
0.007 
-0.006 
-0.400 
0.261 
-0.274 
-0.019 
-0.079 
0.012 
-0.089 
-0.013 
-0.007 
2,039 
-1,449.097 
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1.91 
-53.37 
4.43 
1.75 
0.50 
-1.65 
2.79 
-2.39 
5.63 
-0.48 
0.04 
-1.42 
-2.58 
5.91 
-4.97 
-1 .01 
-0.51 
3.10 
-0.59 
-2.81 
-1.58 
*** 
*** 
*** 
* 
* 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
however be discerned directly given their nonlinear specifications. A closer 
examination follows with the discussion on elasticities. 
The estimated value of sigma ( <f) is significantly different from zero but is 
close to zero, indicating that the alternatives are closer substitutes to one another than 
they are to self-care. One provider's demand is more sensitive to another provider's 
change in price than is self-care. A price change is more likely to push individuals to 
another provider type than to totally drop-out of the market. 
Analysis into the impact of other household characteristics on the choice for 
private doctors, government clinics and government hospitals shows that the influences 
are likely to have varying effects. 
The demand for a private practitioner is shown to be highly influenced by sex 
and the composition of households to which the individual belongs. Males are more 
likely to seek care from a private doctor. Having more children in the household is 
likely to lessen the likelihood that care will be sought from a private doctor, while 
having more adults will increase that likelihood. Having more adults could imply 
higher earning capacities and the higher priced alternative is chost"n: a private doctor. 
Years of schooling and age influence the choice for a private doctor rather 
weakly. If these variables are considered as quality variables, given the endogenous 
treatment of quality in the model, then its significance for the private doctor equation 
suggests that education and age increases the expected productivity of private doctor 
care relative to the self-care alternative. The positive coefficient for education implies 
that education increases the perception of the relative efficacy of care from a private 
doctor. However, the negative sign of the age coefficient suggests that the older the 
individual the less likely will a private doctor be perceived as one of higher quality. 
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The 'age' variable may reflect more on the health status of the individual, such that 
adult health complaints, largely of the chronic type, are likely to be more costly from 
private sources, thereby lowering the probability of choosing a private doctor. 
The same highly significant variables that influence private doctor choice also 
influence, albeit in opposite directions, the choice for government clinics. However, 
while being male would influence demand for private doctor positively, the influence 
is negative for government clinics. Males are unlikely to choose- public clinics. The 
number of children has a positive and significant effect on the demand for care from 
public clinics, while the number of adults reduces the demand for this provider option. 
This may be due to the fact that the focus of activities in public clinics is mostly 
preventive care (maternal and child health, family planning, well-baby care, etc.) 
directed at mothers or children. Furthermore, public clinics are likely to be largely 
staffed by women. Understandably, having more children will likely increase the 
choice for public clinics, as they comprise the clinics' major target clientele. 
The demand for government hospitals is strongly influenced by age and 
household age composition. The age effect is highly significant at one percent and 
negative. This is in direct contrast to our private doctor estimates. Older individuals 
are likely to seek care in government hospitals. Health complaints of an older 
individual are likely to require more medical skills which hospitals can provide and 
which can be provided more cheaply at a government hospital. 
Having more adults and children influence the demand for public hospital care 
significantly as in the other provider types. However, the direction of the effects are 
both negative for public hospitals. Interpreted as a productivity factor, having more 
adults increases households earning capacities and, therefore, increase the preference 
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for private care as opposed to public hospital and clinic care. For the latter. adult 
chronic illnesses are likely to be more effectively served in hospitals than clinics. 
Having more children on the other hand reduces demand for both private and public 
hospital care but increases the demand for public clinics. 
The non-significance of the health status variable, severity, ts surprising. 
Health demand studies earlier cited (Akin, et al, 1984; Heller, 1986) show this factor 
to be highly significant even compared to economic factors. This may be due to the 
limits of our data which rely on self-reported morbidity and the individual's own 
assessment of the severity of his/her complaint. Furthermore, severity self-
assessments may also interact with other factors which we were unable to capture. 
Compared to clinical-based health indicators, Behrman and Deolalikar (1988) makes 
this statement about self-reported measures of health status: 
... Frequently, respondent-reported disease data are used as indicators, though 
such reports are likely to be determined endogenously by characteristics like 
wealth (p. 702). 
4.3.2 The Degree of Responsiveness of Demand to Changes in Prices 
This and the next sub-section presents the price and time elasticity estimates 
using the method discussed in Appendix 5. The results are discussed in the context 
of the immediate policy implications that flow from it. From the elasticities measured, 
one can make forecasts regarding the impact of changes in price on health care 
demand. In addition, estimating elasticities is a good starting point for further analysis 
on the revenue impact as well as welfare effects of these changes. 
To examine the effects of consultation price on the utilization of medical care. 
across income class and provider type, arc price elasticities of demand were estimated. 
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Within an income group, only the price is allowed to vary, and within a price range, 
only income varies. Three levels of fee changes were examined. Table 4.4 shows 
the arc price elasticity estimates. Reading across a row shows the movement of price 
elasticities as income rises, holding prices constant. Reading down a column shows the 
price elasticities moving down the demand curve, holding income constant. 
The general trend confirms the model's prediction that price elasticity of 
demand falls with income, i.e. the poor are more price sensitive than the rich. Our 
estimates show that for private doctor demand, lower income groups exhibit greater 
price sensitivity than higher income groups. Generally, however, health care demand 
is less than one, that is it is price inelastic, except for the lower income group at the 
highest fee levels. This implies that the demand of the poor is likely to fall when 
high fee levels are set. 
For government clinics, however, demand is generally inelastic, such that price 
changes are unlikely to alter demand significantly. Government clinics are barangay 
health stations or rural health centres and they serve as frontline units for the 
government's public health care, mostly preventive, activities. The norm is for 
services offered at these levels to be free and exceptions to the norm are likely to be 
largely voluntary. The inelasticity in demand for public clinics may reflect the limited 
services offered in these facilities. Gertler and van der Gaag's (1990) study for adult 
health care demand in rural Peru yielded similar results. The trend of the impact 
across households is as expected, i.e. price elasticity of demand falls with income. The 
largest response appears for the middle income group, the group which are likely to 
move out of public clinic facilities towards private facilities. Demand for 
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Table 4.4 
Arc Price Elasticities for Out-Patient Care 
Price Income Classes 
Changes 1 2 3 4 5 
(Pesos) (lowest) (highest) 
Private Doctor 
0-50 -0.5153 -0.4365 -0.0235 -0.1737 -0.3640 
50- 100 -0.7693 -0.2017 -0.1122 -0.2258 -0.0002 
100- 150 -1.6515 -0.4506 -0.2383 -0.2380 -0.3528 
Public Clinics 
0-50 -0.0094 -0.0167 -0.0784 -0.0149 -0.0293 
50-100 -0.0204 -0.0362 -0.1657 -0.0298 -0.0556 
100- 150 -0.0216 -0.0378 -0.1771 -0.0303 -0.0562 
Public Hospitals 
0-50 -1.3123 -0.0345 -0.0203 -0.0190 -0.0087 
50-100 -2.0541 -0.0330 -0.0198 -0.0186 -0.0085 
100-150 -4.4581 -0.0152 -0.0092 -0.0092 -0.0043 
Mean Income 853 1,953 3,205 5,179 18,974 
(Pesos Per Month) 
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government hospital care by the poor is elastic, given changes in income and prices. 
The highest price elasticity is felt by the lowest income groups at the highest fee level, 
with public hospital out-patient services charging similar rates as private facilities. 
While across income groups, with prices held constant, price elasticity of demand 
increases as income levels decline. 
The lower income group appears to be more price sensitive when it comes to 
using government hospitals than to using private doctors. The highest income group 
on the other hand exhibits the lowest price sensitivity for government hospital care 
relative to other provider types. 
The differential response by income groups to price changes suggests that health 
care financing reforms, particularly those that intend to levy fees in government 
facilities, are likely to be regressive -- reducing the lower income groups' utilization 
of these facilities substantially relative to the upper income groups. If the objective 
of a user fee policy is to increase resources in public facilities that can be ploughed 
back for improved quality, then appropriate mechanisms need to be instituted such that 
charges for upper income groups, which showed inelastic demand for services from 
public facilities, are used to provide free care for the lower income groups who will 
most likely decrease their utilization of public health services if faced with increased 
charges. Such differential charging does not appear to violate equity principles 
premised on the notion that the financing of health care reflect the ability to pay. 
The 'income' variable, net of the price of medical care, was introduced as an 
exogenous variable. If a severely ill patient is likely to seek greater medical attention 
or an accident or illness may reduce income, then the assumption of the exogeneity of 
income (consumption) introduces a simultaneity bias in the estimates. This bias is 
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likely to create a downward impact on estimated price and income effects, bringing 
them closer to zero. 'Price' is also entered in the demand model as a reduction in 
consumption and its effect is likely to bias the estimates closer t\J zero. Estimated 
price elasticities, therefore, should be on lower bounds of the true elasticities (Genler, 
et al., 1987). 
4.3.3 The Degree of Responsiveness of Demand to Time Costs 
In purchasing medical care, not only monetary resources are expended but also 
the time available for home production, work or leisure. Travel time involves a loss 
on the part of the consumer, which can be quantified, by multiplying the time loss by 
the hourly wage rate. This serves as an estimate of the opportunity cost of time spent 
in seeking out-patient care. Time spent travelling reflects the location of facilities and 
signifies the distributional structure of or access to health facilities. 
Estimates of arc time elasticities (shown in Table 4.5) were made across 
provider options and income classes by considering three travel time levels, with each 
range equivalent to hourly changes. Like the previous table, reading across the row 
reflects change in time elasticity as income rises and travel time held constant. Reading 
down the column reflects changes in time elasticity for increasing travel time, with 
incomes held constant. 
The results are similar to the findings of Acton (1975) that the demand for 
public care is more responsive to travel time prices than the demand for private doctor 
care. The results of the study further showed that demand for the private doctor is 
more time elastic at higher travel times, for all income groups but most especially for 
the lower income group. The latter experienced drastic reduction in demand beginning 
at the second hour range. 
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Table 4.5 
Arc Time Elasticities for Out-Patient Care 
Arc Time Elasticities for Health Care Demand 
Income Quintile 
lowest highest 
1 2 3 4 5 
(mean income*) 852.65 1,952.86 3,205.01 5,179.31 18,974.61 
!Travel Time change 
(Hours) 
Private 
doctor 
0-1 -0.2315 -0.2070 -0.1780 -0.2062 -0.2047 
1-2 -1.0517 -0.7256 -0.6421 -0.2530 -0.7002 
2-3 -1.1884 -1 .0902 -0.9694 -1.1230 -1.1545 
Govt 
clinic 
0-1 -0.3798 -0.3101 -0.7364 -0.3348 -0.0597 
1-2 -0.2416 -0.2551 -0.4866 -0.3420 -0.2124 
2-3 -0.1616 -0.1711 -0.3266 -0.2315 -0.1070 
Govt 
hospital 
0-1 -0.1312 -0.1813 -0.2069 -0.2134 -0.2988 
1-2 -0.4730 -0.6473 -0.7451 -0.7748 -1.0618 
2-3 -0.7088 -0.9700 -1.1162 -1.1606 -1.5908 
* Mean 1ncome for each qUintlle 1s 1n pesos per month 
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Estimated arc time elasticities for public clinics are of greater magnitude than 
estimates of price elasticity. This confirms that for clinic demand. time serves as a 
rationing device. Given negligible or token pricing, the demand for the care offered 
in public clinics is largely determined by time costs, confirming a similar prediction 
by Acton (1975). The middle income group's responsiveness to changes in time costs 
is higher than that of both the lowest and highest income groups. This reflects wage 
or income effect, as the middle income groups are likely to be involved in wage-
earning activities, and therefore experience the highest opportunity costs of time. The 
relative unresponsiveness of the highest income group relative to the lower income 
groups is probably due to lower demand for public clinics from this group. Only 4 
percent of those belonging to the highest income group used public clinic facilities. 
For government hospitals, time elasticity increases with income. i.e. demand 
is more time elastic for upper income groups. Public hospital care demand for the 
highest income quintile is more than double the elasticity of the lowest income quintile. 
And this responsiveness begins for the upper income group at relatively lower time 
range. The behaviour of this group is not unlike the lower income group's behaviour 
with regards to private doctor demand. The trend for the upper income groups is 
reflective, not only of wage impacts, but also of the fact that this group can afford 
private doctors and therefore would shift utilization to private doctors when public 
hospital facilities are at some considerable distance. 
Compared to their price elasticities, the poor's responsiveness to time is of a 
smaller magnitude, implying that prices determine their demand for government 
hospitals more than time costs. For the highest income group, time is a more JX'lent 
rationing device than prices for hospital care. The demand for public ho-;pital care t\ \f 
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the upper quintile group is shown to be more sensitive to time costs than direct fee 
charges. This implies that for careful targeting of scarce public resources for 
hospitals, charging the upper income groups could largely be made for cross-subsidy 
purposes (to provide quality and affordable services to the poor) and not so much to 
build more hospitals. Public policy for hospitals can also include price discrimination 
in terms of location; charges in facilities found in provincial capitals may differ from 
charges in facilities found in districts or smaller municipalities. Our figures show that, 
of the government hospital users, only 9.2 percent belong to the lower income group 
while 11.7 percent are from the upper income quintile. 
That longer travel time may reflect on the quality of the provider cannot be 
directly inferred from the estimates. But it can be surmised that access to higher 
quality care, usually in central and urban locations, may be restricted by longer travel 
time for patients coming from afar, that is, outside these centres. This introduces a 
bias to the estimates, but the unobservability of the quality variable in the model, where 
quality is considered an attribute of the health production function, rather than as a 
specific facility attribute, precludes certitude on the direction of bias. 
4.4 Consequences and Policy Options 
Information on the relative price and time responsiveness of different income 
groups provides valuable insights into the potential impact of health care financing 
reforms, particularly of pricing policies for public facilities. The impact on utilization 
and revenues, arising from price changes, can be estimated from the data. We can 
also estimate the level of income needed to compensate households for any welfare 
changes arising from a price increase. Indirectly, this indicates the minimum income 
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or subsidy levels that can support participation in some risk-sharing schemes to sustain 
or raise current levels of utilization. 
The impact of alternative fees were estimated for urban and rural senings in the 
sample. The simulations emphasized the effects of changes in prices of medical care. 
This approach is considered appropriate in the light of the market-oriented nature of 
the health care market as well as our concern of linking our analysis to health care 
financing reforms, particularly directed at enhanced risk-sharing participation. To 
address the latter issue, the analysis focuses on current public utility users. They 
belong to an income range that are likely targets of risk-sharing mechanisms -- the 
second to the fourth quintile groups. 
Some salient characteristics of these areas are shown in Table 4.6. \\'e observe 
large differences between urban and rural areas. In terms of socio-economic 
conditions, urban households earned and had higher per capita budgets. There was 
higher per capita non-food consumption, compared to food consumption in urban areas. 
There were large differences in living conditions: with nearly 85 percent of urban 
dwellers, compared to 18 percent of rural households, reporting piped-water facilities. 
Flush toilet facilities were not as common to urban households as expected. Morbidity 
conditions were not widely different in the two areas, although nearly four times of 
urban dwellers, compared to rural dwellers, were shown to seek non-home care for 
illness complaints. Tran~l distance to the nearest health provider were not so much 
different for goverrunent clinics and private doctors in the two areas; although. it took 
rural households twice as long to get to government hospitals. 
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Table 4.6 
Differences Between Urban and Rural Areas 
Household Samples, Philippines 
Urban-Rural Differences 
urban 
(N=2137) 
Daily wage rates - pesos 
(ave. for commonest 
reported occupations) 205.78 
Mean total expenditures 
(pesos per month) 6290.02 
Mean per capita 
food consumption 
(pesos per month) 602.84 
Mean per capita 
non-food consumption 
(pesos per month) 678.2 
Percent with Piped Water /a 85.4 
Percent with flushed toilets 13.9 
Percent with reported ill 
member(s) 57.7 
Percent sought market care 38 
Distance (in minutes) of 
nearest health provider 
govt clinic 20 
govt hospital 21 
private MD 26 
a/ percent of households 
Database: PIDS-DOH Household Survey 
rural 
(N=661) 
129.96 
2581.19 
212.11 
217.15 
17.5 
5.3 
53.9 
10.2 
24 
47 
24 
4.4.1 Utilization Impact 
The price scenarios used private consultation prices as benchmarks. The base 
case price scenario assumed that public clinics and government hospitals charged zero 
fees. Scenario 1 assumed that government hospitals charge one-half the price of the 
private sector for outpatient services and clinics charge zero prices. Scenario 2 
assumed that government hospitals charge the same rate as private hospitals and 
government clinics begin charging one-third of the price of private clinics. Scenario 
3 assumed that both government facilities charged full private sector prices. 
Table 4. 7 shows the changes in the probabilities of seeking care and the 
estimated changes in utilization arising from the assumed price chunges. For the urban 
areas, the probability of seeking care from a private doctor increases with each price 
change in the public sectors. Each price increase in the public sector lowers the 
probability of public facilities being utilized. In the rural areas, the same trend is 
observed. The probability of seeking care halved between the base-case and the 
highest-price scenario. It is observed that for both urban and rural areas, when 
government hospitals introduced charges, the probability of public clinic use is 
increased. But the reduction in the probability of public clinic use was much higher 
when public clinics introduced charges, compared with the change in consumer 
behaviour towards government hospitals. 
The number of those seeking private doctor care for out-patient consultations 
in the urban areas doubles from the base scenario to scenario 3 reflecting a shift 
towards private doctor use when public facilities are charging the same fees as private 
doctors. The number seeking clinic care drops dramatically in the urban areas. 
Charges at the public clinic levels drive people to the government hospitals. even if 
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Table 4.7 
Changes in UtillZation Due to Price Changes 
[A. Probability Changes I 
Urban Aura' 
Private Public Pub:,::; Pnva~e Pu:J:1c P~:: aC 
Scena·io /a Doctor Clinics Hosp:ta's Doctx Cl:nics Hos;:r~a s 
Base 0.268 0.221 0.257 0.247 0182 0255 
Scenario 1 0.2H 0.287 0.206 0.248 0.329 0.223 
Scenario 2 0.216 0.192 0.237 0.205 0 189 0.223 
Scenario 3 0.563 0.057 0.152 0.298 0.079 0 105 
IB Chan~es in Actual Number of Co.'lsume:s I 
Base 545 451 524 504 370 520 
Scenario 1 442 585 419 505 672 455 
Scenario 2 440 391 484 418 386 454 
Scenario 3 1,148 115 310 607 16i 215 
a' Scenarios refer to: 
Base: zero prices in government facilrties 
1 : Public hospitals charge 1/2 the rates of private doc1ors; public clinics zero charge 
2 : Public clinics charge 1/3 of the rates of public doctors; government charges the same ra1e as priva~e doctors 
3 : Public out-patient prices are the same as private doc1or prices 
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public hospitals charge as much as the private facilities. That over-all utilization in the 
urban areas did not show a decline with the introduction of user charges suggests that 
income conditions of households can support such change. In the rural areas, 
however, price policy changes in governmem hospitals bring down utilization 
drastically. The introduction of fees in government facilities can shift utilization 
toward public clinics so long as these clinics do not impose fees. Fees at public 
clinics level, however, are likely to bring down utilization. Since the number 
seeking care from private doctors did not increase (in fact it dropped by 21 %) when 
public clinic prices increased, we can assume that the 74% drop in clinic utilization 
dropped out of the market into self-care. Figure 4.3 illustrates this utilization response 
in the two areas. 
4.4.2 Revenue Impact 
The estimated revenue changes arising from price changes in public facilities 
are shown in Table 4.8. The over-all impact of these price changes in the public sector 
was estimated to increase revenues in the private sector. In the urban areas, the 
dramatic drop in public clinic demand and the resulting shift towards public hospitals 
would have doubled the latter's revenues. The increase in public clinic revenues as a 
result of charging would have been much less than the increase in the revenues 
brought to public hospitals. 
The impact of public charges on private facilities' revenues in the rural areas 
was much less than in the urban areas. The revenue increase for government hospitals 
in the rural areas was much higher than their counterparts in the urban areas for the 
first price level change. But while for urban public hospitals revenues increased 
thereafter, revenues for rural public hospital tend to fall. This is due to the high drop-
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Table 4.8 
Changes in Total Revenue Due to Price Changes 
Urba:1 RJra' 
Private Public Public Prrvate Pub!1: P..;b .c 
Scenario /a Doctor Clinics Hospitals Doctor Cl·'l:::s Hos~-:a s 
Base 73,245 0 0 59,803 0 0 
Scenario 1 59,335 0 28,148 59,997 0 30,530 
Scenario 2 59,089 17,496 65,003 49,683 15,26~ 53,871 
Scenario 3 154,183 15,498 41,619 72,127 19,103 25,495 
a/ Scenarios refer to: 
Base: zero prices in government facilities 
1 : Public hospitals charge 1/2 the rates of private doctors; public clinics ze~o charge 
2 : Public clinics charge 1/3 of the rates of public doctors, government charges the same rate as prrva:e doctors 
3 : Public ou1-patient prices are the same as private doctor prices 
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out rate from the health care out-patient market in the rural areas. 
4.4.3 Welfare Impact 
Economists interpret welfare changes arising from price changes as a 
willingness to pay measure. Economic models assume that price changes bring about 
a change in consumer welfare. To restore the consumer to his or her original welfare 
position before the price change, he/she must be compensated or have his/her income 
taken away. This income adjustment measure is known as compensating variation 
(CV). CV is interpreted as the amount of income that an individual must earn or be 
paid to make him just as well off after a price change as before the change. A negative 
CV means the consumer becomes worse off because of the price change and must 
receive transfers to make him/her as well off with the new prices as he was with the 
old (Gravelle and Rees, 1992). In as much as we dealt with price increases in the 
public sector, the CVs estimated were negative( Table 4.9) and indicate welfare losses 
for consumers as a result of charges at public facilities. 
We observe that price changes in public facilities result in individuals being 
generally worse off. The impact, however, falls in varying degrees on the users. 
Users at the public clinics require much less compensation than at the public hospitals. 
This is probably due to the limited services offered at these facilities. For a subsidy 
of slightly less than 200 pesos, urban consumers get back on the same welfare level. 
Rural clinic users experience greater welfare loss for equal pricing (i.e. same prices as 
private facilities) at the clinic level and would, therefore, require a slightly higher 
subsidy to prevent the households from leaving the market. 
Equal pricing of public hospitals with private doctors, and one-third pricing at 
the clinic levels, is the worst position among three scenarios and require the highest 
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Table 4.9 
Estimates of Welfare Loss: 
Compensating Variation 
(Pesos Per Visit) 
Urban 
Public 
Scenario Clinics 
Scenario 1 0.00 
Scenario 2 _, 86.79 
Scenario 3 _, 65.46 
Rural 
Public Public Public 
Hospitals Clinics Hospitals 
-300.86 0.00 -361.61 
-694.79 _, 80.26 -638.08 
-444.85 -225.64 -301.98 
Scenario 1: Public hospital out-patient prices are 1/2 of 
private doctor prices 
Scenario 2: Public hospital out-patient prices equal to 
private doctor prices; public clinics charge 1/3 of private 
doctor prices 
Scenario 3: Public facilities charge the same rates as private 
doctors 
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compensation levels, especially among hospital users. As these compensation levels 
indicate the amount needed to keep current users in a position where they are assumed 
to be better off before the price change, the price of the alternative, i.e. dropping out 
of the market, is high for society. The lower compensation levels at price scenario 3 
indicates an adjusted welfare position and subsidies needed would be lower for those 
who can just as afford private market prices. 
These compensations payments are unlikely to be made. One can, therefore, 
view these income adjustments or subsidies, as a percentage of total household and non-
food budgets to yield insights into the burden of pricing reforms or the affordability of 
public facilities after some pricing reforms. Simplifying the pricing reforms into 
minimum price change (government hospitals charge one-half the price of private) and 
maximum price change (equal pricing with private facility), Table 4.10 shows the 
impact of these income adjustments on household budgets. Based on average household 
expenditures, we classify the users into three income groups. Minimum price changes 
translate to a reduction of 4.84 to 7.96 percent of household budgets; while maximum 
price changes would mean adjustments between 4.69 to 9.97 percent of household 
budgets. As a proportion of non-food budgets, the relatively well-off income groups' 
loss would comprise 8.66 percent compared to the relatively poorrr groups' loss which 
comprise 13.46 percent at the minimum price changes. Maximum price changes 
translate to higher levels of losses, with the subsidy needed falling at higher income 
levels. Should these subsidies not materialize, we can reinterpret these percentages 
as the proportion that households must pay out of their budgets in order to remain in 
the same welfare position as they were in prior to the price increases. 
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Table 4.10 
Compensating Variations As Proportion of 
Household Expenditures and Non-Food Budgets 
(Percent) 
As Proportion of As Proportion of 
Total HH Expenditures HH Non-Food Budgets 
Lowest Highest Lowest H.ghest Mean Incomes 
(Pesos Per Month) Price Change Price Change Price Change Price Change 
< 2,000 
2,000- 3,200 
3,300 - 5,000 
7.96 
5.3 
4.84 
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9.97 
4.69 
7.16 
13.46 
12.33 
8.66 
16.84 
10.92 
12.81 
Of course, our analysis assumes that the pre-price change welfare situation of 
individuals was preferred, such that compensation that is sufficiem for their new 
position, or brings them back to the pre-price change position, would be desirable. 
In the case of health care utilization, we cannot speak with confidence that this is so, 
without additional information on other health conditions in the area and medical 
opinion on the appropriateness of the level of care. The different responsiveness of 
different income groups to price changes showed that subsidies or compensation 
resulting from a price change would cause an income effect, such that a reversal from 
the present new position to the old one before the price change is unlikely to yield 
improved outcomes (GraveiJe and Rees, 1992; Just, et al., 1992). Since no 
compensation is deemed feasible to yield welfare-enhancing outcomes, then alternatives 
must be sought, particularly through risk-sharing schemes, to respond to price changes 
brought about by user charges in public facilities. 
4.5 Conclusions 
The health care demand model, following Gertler and colleagues' specifications, 
applied for the first time in the Philippines, showed that prices and income significantly 
influence demand for out-patient care. This finding contrasts with the widely-known 
study by Akin, et al. (1985), using Philippine household samples, which concluded that 
economic factors did not affect health care demand significantly. The strength of the 
Gertler model of health care demand lies in its consistency with utility maximization, 
enabling an empirical specification that captured the differential price response across 
income groups and provider types. The results showed that price increases are likely 
to lead to a greater than proportionate reduction in demand, especially for the poor. 
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Price changes in government hospitals are likely to have greatest impact on the poor. 
Inasmuch as the majority of government hospital users are not likely to be the very 
poor, careful targeting in pricing policies can allow public facilities to impose sliding 
fee schedules. The differing price elasticities suggest that price discrimination can yield 
desirable outcomes, especially if those with relatively price inelastic demand are 
charged fully, compared to those with relatively price elastic demands. 
That the poor were more price-sensitive than the rich was similarly observed 
by Ching (1992; 1995). But how the reaction to demand for a specific out-patient 
provider alternative would vary with changing prices of medical care across alternatives 
was not captured by point elasticity estimates undertaken by Ching (1995). 
Furthermore, the differential response by income groups to access time to providers 
has not been earlier estimated for the Philippines. This study e~timated differential 
time elasticities across income groups. The greater responsiveness of the lower income 
groups to price rather than time changes suggests that revenue increases from user 
charges should be directed, less at further building of public units to bring them closer 
to patients, and more towards improving efficiency in public facilities to lower prices. 
While user charges in public facilities are often justified to promote quality 
improvements (see for example, World Bank 1987), the Gertler model cannot make 
definitive conclusions regarding the effects of price changes on quality. Even as the 
price effects were modelled to be adjusted for quality, with quality incorporated in the 
health production function as attributes of both household and provider, the 
unobservability of quality does not measure the sensitivity of consumer demand to 
various quality of services. Therefore, the nature of quality improvements that 
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consumers are willing to pay for cannot be deduced from the model (Lavy and 
Germain, 1994). 
The feasibility of charging differently by income groups has been questioned by 
some authors (McPake, 1993; Gilson, 1988). In recognition of this problem, the policy 
options explored utilization, revenue and welfare effects of user charges in urban and 
rural areas, to provide alternative policy handles. The model used captured the 
differential impact of monetary and non-monetary access costs across income groups, 
where households located far from facilities were hypothesize to incur higher access 
costs, even if services were free. Time could serve as a rationing device in these 
cases. However, income was modelled as affecting utility through the consumption 
tenn, with the money and time price of medical care reflecting foregone consumption. 
Variations in demand through locational differences were therefore captured through 
differential access costs. Simulations showed that the rich were observed to be more 
sensitive to time, despite closer accessibility to facilities, reflecting higher opportunity 
costs of time. These results suggest that public facilities in centrally located areas 
could impose positive charges without fear of reduced utilization. In the urban areas, 
the simulations showed that price changes did not lead to over-all reduction in 
utilization. There appeared to be a shift in utilization from public to private facilities. 
But in the rural areas, price changes were likely to impact negatively on utilization. 
The demand function estimates were used to derive welfare effects in terms of 
willingness to pay or compensating variations. The study's estimates showed that if 
public hospitals' out-patient departments were to charge one-half the price of private 
doctors, the welfare loss would less than 10 percent of the household budget of the 
lower income groups. Households can be compensated for welfare losses arising from 
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the charges by improvements in services that will lower prices to keep welfare 
constant. Efforts must also be directed towards cushioning the financial loss through 
some risk-sharing schemes. Participation in such schemes should comprise 110 more 
than between 5 to 10 percent of household budgets, a proportion that may currently 
exceed household budgets for health care. Or alternatively, the public support needed 
for subsidies or assistance in risk-sharing schemes should amount to such levels. The 
Gertler model applied in this study could not assess differences in risk-taking 
behaviour and attitudes to risk by households, as the model abstracts from the presence 
of uncertainty, a major limitation in the light of the inherent characteristics of health 
and health care. 
Demand analysis provides only a partial perspective of the complex interactions 
in health care. This chapter explored household health-seeking behaviour and 
responsiveness to changes in prices. The policy suggestions that flow from it must be 
viewed within a broader perspective of the organization of the health care market. The 
feasibility of user fees, for example, cannot be directly gleaned from the estimates. 
But the den1and parameters can inform on the extent at which changes in conditions, 
which lead to price increases or other policy reforms, can shape the structure of the 
market in health care. This is the subject matter of chapter 6. Considerations of the 
structure of the market, however, requires information on the behaviour of the supply-
side and the nature of the cost structure of health services. This is explored in the next 
chapter. 
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Introduction 
Chapter Five 
Conditions of the Supply of Health 
Care in the Philippines 
This chapter examines the economic characteristics of the supply-side of health 
services in the Philippines. The chapter is divided into four parts: pan one sets out 
the framework for the analysis in terms of the theory of supply; pan two describes 
the distribution of health facilities, manpower, hospital equipment and assets 
throughout the country; the third part describes the organization of outpatient care; 
and the fourth part describes the data base and discusses the results of studies of cost 
functions and structural estimates of economies of scale and scope of hospital services. 
Since the ultimate objective of the study is to identify the structure of the health 
care market, this part of the study provides the supply-side parallel to the previous 
analysis of demand. The econometric estimates presented in this chapter rely on the 
results of studies from the PIDS-DOH programme earlier cited in Chapter 1. The 
results are compared with the findings from estimates of the hospital production 
functions in other developing countries. 
5.1 A Review of the Theory of Supply 
5.1.2 The Production of Health Services 
The analysis of supply focuses on the production of health care from the 
perspective of a 'firm'. Provider-firms, either physician clinics and hospital services, 
serve as basic units of analysis. This study examines supply-side postulates for hospital 
services, specifically their production and cost functions. Production occuring in 
physician clinics are presumed to parallel that of hospital production, albeit using 
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smaller amounts of inputs (Cullis and West, 1979). The analysis is simplified for the 
Philippines by the fact that most hospitals in the country began as single proprietorship 
firms, with the physicians as entrepreneurs, and largely remain so. This provides, 
for the analysis, what Gravelle and Rees (1992) call, 
... The essential feature of the 'classical firm' , .. a central figure, with whom all 
contracts are concluded, and who controls and directs in his own interests, 
subject to constraints arising out of the terms of the contract he has made 
(p.167). 
Supply-side analysis is an examination of production decisions within the given 
objective of minimizing costs. Cost-minimization as the objective function often needs 
to be qualified for health service firms. Some authors (Newhouse, 1970; Pauly and 
Redisch, 1973; and Harris, 1978) argue that providers pursue several goals. Newhouse 
( 1970) suggests that hospital decision-makers try to maximize a combination of quality 
and quantity of services provided; with the bias towards quality, especially as it 
involves investments in costly technology. Pauly and Redisch (1973) modelled the 
economic motivation of physicians as the maximization of their personal income, even 
in the context of hospital-firms for which they are neither administrators nor salaried 
personnel. This behaviour results in the "application of non-physician labour and 
capital in physician-income-enhancing ways, ... to lead to "too high" quality (Ibid., 
p.99). This same behaviour is likely to lead to "small sizes" among physician-firms. 
Harris (1976) expounded on the administrator-firm and doctor-firm dichotomy to 
explain the expansion of hospital size as part of the battle for 'defensive capacity 
margins'; enhancing utilization and quality (Cullis and West, 1979). Barnum and 
Kutzin ( 1993) cites that two-firm models may not be appropriate for many hospitals in 
developing countries where administration and service staff functions often overlap 
considerably. 
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These various perspectives' view on hospitals' production fu.Ix:tions as being 
shaped by multiple objective functions of major players, point to the issue of the 
control over the residual income or profit. However, given the nature of ownership 
of production facilities for hospital and physician-firms in the Philippines, single 
proprietorship offers the opportunity to examine profit-orientation as the main 
motivation. While private firms are often distinguished between profit and not-for-
profit organizations, no such distinction is made among health service firms in the 
Philippines. Single ownership implies that the physician-owner has direct control over 
the finn's residual income or profits, the excess of revenue after payments for inputs 
over and beyond returns for his or her own productive services. The framework 
provided by the traditional theory of the firm may be applicable. 
Under the standard framework, the firm's production function defines the 
technical constraints on production decisions; i.e. the maximum output that can be 
generated given the input combinations. The opportunities posed by technological 
developments determine the feasibility of providing or expanding the scope of services. 
Rapid technological developments are noted in the medical sector. The nature of the 
technology of hospital services in the country is briefly discussed in sub-section 5.2.3. 
The difficulty of measuring the ultimate products of health service firms: better 
health, prevent direct estimates of production functions (Phelps, 1992). Under 
organized settings, the improved health outcome arising form intervention or treatment, 
is not measured. The common approach is to examine the relationship of inputs to 
intermediate health service output, like number of discharges or hospital days, in terms 
of their costs. The analysis of 'cost functions' provide the basis for examining the 
efficiency of health services. An overview of hospital cost analysis is explored in the 
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next section. 
5.1.2 An Overview of Cost Analysis 
The structure of costs in the production of hospital services forms an imponant 
component of supply-side discussions. The studies explored here yield results about 
hospital behaviour and costs and provide information about the efficiency of hospital 
services in the country. 
An analysis of hospital costs yields estimates of the determinants of these costs, 
or the underlying production technology. The cost function shows the relationship 
between costs of hospital services and its outputs, input costs and quality of services. 
Cost functions are estimated with hospitals shown to minimize costs, with total, 
average or variable costs, serving as endogenous variables. Exogenous variables 
considered include input prices, hospital outputs, and other measures capturing capital 
stock and quality. Standard cost theory predicts that as outputs, inputs and quality 
increase, costs should increase. The positive relationship between costs and these 
determinants is self-explanatory. However, the relevant cost measure and the 
functional form needs to be clarified. 
Barnum and Kutzin (1993) reports that earlier hospital cost function studies 
(Anderson, 1980; Feldstein, 1968; Mann and Yett, 1968), have used average costs as 
the dependent variable, against a set of explanatory variables specified not from a 
structure based on theory but for convenience of estimation. Average cost formulation 
avoids the risk of heteroscedasticity. Heteroscedasticity is an estimation problem which 
occurs when there is non-uniform variance in error terms; for example, when the error 
term is correlated with hospital size. This problem appears in total cost formulations 
(Barnum and Kutzin. 1993). Recent estimates. however. use total hospital costs as 
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the dependent variable and avoids heteroscedasticity through the use of flexible 
functional forms for estimation. 
The work by Zingapan (1994) discussed in Section 5.4.2, uses total cost as the 
dependent variable and a Cobb-Douglas formulation and therefore encounters the 
problem of heteroscedasticity. The Cobb-Douglas formulation was also shown to be 
inappropriate to multi-product firms such as hospitals because the specification assumes 
specialised functions (Cowing and Holtman, 1983). Frank and Taube (1987), 
however, showed that the Cobb-Douglas model performed just as well as more 
complicated models. This chapter cites both Cobb-Douglas and flexible functional 
formulation applied to cost function analysis of Philippine hospitals. A translog 
production function model from the same data set was made by Alba and Bugayong 
(1993) where some 44 explanatory variables, including interaction terms, were used 
in an average cost formulation of the hospital cost function. This study's estimates of 
economies of scale and scope is presented in Section 5.4.3. 
The ultimate objective of estimating cost functions is to obtain information on 
the determinants of hospital costs and the importance of economies of scale and scope. 
Economies of scale (EOS) measures the effect on costs of an increase in output; given 
that output mix is the same while all inputs are allowed to vary. In this sense, EOS 
is technically a long-run cost concept given that the scale of operations can only be 
varied with time. Data limitations, however, allow only short-run cost function 
estimation. However, so long as the relevant cost function estimated is a variable cost 
function and a capital proxy (e.g. number of beds) is included in the independent 
variables, an index of long-run economies of scale can be derived from short-run 
variable cost functions (Barnum and Kutzin, 1993). What is being examined. 
171 
therefore, is the effects on costs of movements along rays from the origin in output 
space (Gravelle and Rees, 1992). An estimate of the index of ray EOS that is greater 
than one implies that economies of scale exist; if less than one, diseconomies exist. 
Given that hospitals are multi-product firms, economies of scope on the other 
hand can show whether it is cheaper to produce outputs jointly or separately. If joint 
production is less costly than separate production, then economies of scope are said 
to exist, and the estimated value should be greater than zero. If the output vector can 
be produced as cheaply in separate specialist firms as in multi-product firms then the 
estimated value would not significantly be different from zero and economies of scope 
can be said not to exist. As in the discussion on EOS, scope economies were 
expressed as a ray. 
A concern of this study is to determine whether public hospital costs respond 
to changes in output or input prices given that hospital budgets are fixed by budgetary 
allocations. However, budgetary allocations differ depending on the size of facilities, 
staffing patterns and nature of operations (primary vs. tertiary; teaching vs. non-
teaching). The hospital cost studies mentioned below (Section 5.4) take costs of public 
services to be endogenous. 
The next section examines the distribution of the resources of production, 
particularly facilities, manpower and equipment, to provide the context for the analysis 
of behaviour of firms in physician clinics and hospital services. 
5.2 Distribution of Health Care Inputs 
In the Philippines, the supply-side of the health care market includes not only 
public facilities but also numerous privately-operated health service facilities. 
pharmacies and health personnel. 
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5.2.1 Facilities and Beds 
Latest figures, for 1991, showed that there were 1,663 hospitals, of which 66 
percent were private and the rest public. Figure 5.1 shows the growth in the number 
of hospitals in the country. The growth pattern showed that two sectors appear to be 
substituting for each other. Where there is a rise in private investments, public 
investments fall and vice-versa. There was a plateau for private hospital investments 
before the 70s, while public hospital investments rose slowly. Private investments rose 
steeply after the 70s, until about 1977. Thereafter the pattern of private hospital 
investments wavered, reaching a peak in 1984 and has barely recovered since. 
Hospitals in the country are classified into three service levels: primary. secondary. 
and tertiary. The distinctions are based on bed capacity, personnel and service units. 
These are shown below. 
1. Primary hospitals- those with authorized bed capacity of 6-24; and with a minimum 
of a single physician for below 20-bed capacities and at least 2 registered nurses; 
rendering services in medicine, paediatrics, obstetrics and minor surgery. 
2. Secondary hospitals -those with an authorized bed capacity of 25 to 99 beds with 
additional personnel requirement of pharmacist, dietician and technician; rendering 
services in gynaecology, general surgery, and medical ancillary services such as 
radiology and laboratory. 
3. Tertiary hospitals- those with 100 beds or more with minimum seven full-time MD 
and 20 registered nurses; rendering services in the five sub-specialty areas above. 
Table 5.1 shows the distribution of hospital facilities across regions of the 
country. Public investments in hospitals are concentrated, at 52.5 percent of total, in 
secondary level facilities comprised mainly of district hospitals. The distribution of 
public hospitals in the national capital region(NCR) is biased towards tertiary facilities. 
large teaching facilities and specialty centres, which comprise the apex of the public 
referral system. It is observed that regions 9 to 12. the southern parts of the country. 
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Table 5.1 
Distribution of Licensed Hospitals, 1990 
By Category of Health Care, by Regions 
A. Distribution of Public Hospitals 
Regions Number of Hospitals Total Perce~ Distr1:J.t.ion 
Public 
Primary Secondary Teniary Primary Seconda-y Teniary 
1. llocos 6 17 7 30 3.9 58 63 
2. Cagayan Valley 10 21 4 35 6.5 7., 36 
CAR 6 21 4 31 3.9 7.1 36 
3. Central Luzon 6 37 8 51 3.9 12.5 7 1 
4. S. Tagalog 20 28 10 58 12.9 9.5 89 
NCR 2 9 28 39 1.3 3.1 250 
5. Bicol 16 22 6 44 W.3 7.5 54 
6. W. Visayas 12 29 9 50 7.7 9.8 80 
7. E. Visayas 14 20 7 41 9.0 6.8 6.3 
8. C. Visayas 12 29 7 48 7.7 9.8 6.3 
9. N. Mindanao 15 18 4 37 9.7 6.1 3.6 
10. C. Mindanao 17 18 8 43 1 1.0 6.1 7 1 
11. W. Mindanao 11 12 7 30 7.1 4., 63 
12. S. Mindanao 8 14 3 25 5.2 4.7 2.7 
Total, Public 155 295 112 562 100.0 100 0 100.0 
% Distribution 27.6 52.5 19.9 100 
B. Distribution of Private Hospitals 
Regions Number of Hospitals Total Percent Distribution 
Private 
Primary Secondary Teniary Primary Secondary Teniary 
1. llocos 38 22 6 66 6.1 6.5 4.5 
2. Cagayan Valley 30 11 1 42 4.8 3.2 07 
CAR 19 12 1 32 3.0 3.5 07 
3. Central Luzon 53 51 10 114 8.5 15.0 7.5 
4. S. Tagalog 51 59 19 129 8.1 17.4 14.2 
NCR 28 49 39 116 4.5 14.4 29.1 
5. Bicol 62 24 8 94 9.9 7.1 60 
6. W. Visayas 13 7 10 30 2.1 2.1 75 
7. E. Visayas 20 15 14 49 3.2 4.4 10 4 
8. C. Visayas 11 12 2 25 1.8 3.5 1.5 
9. N. Mindanao 33 14 2 49 5.3 4.1 1.5 
10. C. Mindanao 72 25 7 104 1 1.5 7.4 52 
11. W. M1ndanao 130 19 9 158 20.7 5.6 67 
12. S. Mindanao 67 20 6 93 10.7 5.9 45 
Total, Private 627 340 134 1101 100 0 100.0 100 0 
% Distribution 56.9 30.9 12.2 100 
Total, PHIL. 782 635 246 1663 
% Distribution 47.0 38.2 14.8 100 
Total Shares (%) Primary Secondary Teniary Over-all 
Public 19.8 46.5 455 338 
Private 80.2 53.5 545 66.2 
Soura Department o! Hpa't~ Ol!oce !or ~~p :a·s 
flopvlahon "-t :lA "-~<· Phd >';""t' Stats: ca Ypa't>.."'.'" 1993 
1 ~:' 
have a higher-than-average share (48 percent) in terms of primary facilities. Whilst 
secondary level facilities are more concentrated in the northern regions. No pattern 
can be discerned in the distribution of public tertiary facilities except for the high 
concentration in the NCR. 
However, in terms of the number of hospital beds, the public sector dominates 
the private sector in the two higher levels. Figure 5.2 shows that public beds 
overwhelm secondary private beds by nearly 73 percent. The numoer of public tertiary 
beds are about double the number of private tertiary beds. Griffin and Paqueo (1993). 
with access to time series data, observed that government beds have expanded while 
private beds have contracted. 
Private hospital investments on the other hand are largely concentrated in 
primary level facilities. Figure 5.3 shows that private primary hospitals out-number 
public primary facilities by a ratio of about 4: 1. Private investments are largely 
concentrated in small primary hospitals; and the least on tertiary facilities. At the 
secondary and tertiary levels, private facilities outnumber government facilities by a 
smaller fraction. Across the regions, private investments in hospitals are high in 
regions 3,4, NCR, 10 and 11. Private tertiary hospital investments in regions NCR, 
6 and 7 are about 2.5 times more than the national average distribution of private 
facilities. High shares of primary facilities are reported in the southern provinces. 
Nearly 43 percent of primary care facilities in the private sector are found in the 
farthermost southern regions of the country. That private sector activities are 
concentrated as smaller facilities is not surprising considering that they largely operate 
as single proprietorship or family-managed enterprises. Primary-level facilities are 
largely off-shoots of small outpatient clinics. Licensing standards are easily met by 
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husband and wife teams providing full-time services in medicine and nursing/pharmacy. 
Across regions, private investments in primary hospitals were concentrated in 
the southern-most regions of the country (Table 5.2). The pattern of private 
investments is directed at small facilities (below 25 beds-size facilities). Secondary 
and tertiary private investments were biased in the northern, relatively prosperous 
regions of the country. This pattern of distribution of private hospital investments 
provides the country with more dispersed health services; whereas the public sector 
shows a pattern of concentration. Fifty-five (55) percent of all public tertiary beds are 
in the National Capital Region (NCR); and 22 percent of primary beds are found in 
Region 9. 
Sufficiency in beds can be gleaned from bed-to-population ratios. Regional data 
shows that while on average there are 743 persons to a bed in the country, there are 
extreme variations across regions. While in the NCR and CAR, the population are 
fairly well-provided with beds, as shown by low population to bed ratios. At least six 
of the 14 regions have higher than national average ratios. High population to bed 
ratios in Regions 3 and 4, however are not really a cause concern considering that NCR 
hospitals are accessible by public transportation. The mean reported distance to private 
and public facilities in urban areas from the household survey sample, was around 20 
minutes. 
It has been suggested that the distribution of privatt hospital facilities, 
particularly primary hospitals, may be correlated with the pattern of Medicare 
reimbursement (Griffin. et al.. 1994). The authors have shown that higher than 
average reimbursements have been flowing to 16 out of 76 provinces. with the highest 
reimbursement claims found in regions 10 and 11. These two regions account for 32 
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Table 5.2 
Regional Distribution of Hospital Beds by Category 
and Population to Bed Ratios 
1990 
A Distrib ution of Public Hospital Beds 
Region Primary Secondary Tertiary 
1.11ocos 100 550 1,150 
2. Cagayan Valley 138 n5 800 
CAR 80 750 650 
3. Central Luzon 125 1,545 1,550 
4. S. Tagalog 235 1,025 1,750 
NCR 135 900 17,120 
5. Bicol 375 649 1,150 
6. W. Visayas 160 1,195 1,350 
7. E. Visayas 242 1,675 1,275 
8. C.VISByas 135 1,070 875 
9. N. Mindanao 715 750 600 
10. C. Mindanao 250 1,010 1,000 
11. W. Mindanao 135 350 1,000 
12. S. Mindanao 325 525 450 
Total, Public 3,150 12,769 30,720 
% Distribution 6.8 27.4 65.9 
e o· 'b · t P · 1stn ution o nvate H itaiBed ospr s 
Region Primary Secondary Tertiary 
1.11ocos 497 756 466 
2. Cagayan Valley 376 213 100 
CAR 396 496 243 
3. Central Luzon 608 1,158 780 
4. S. Tagalog 620 1,416 1,494 
NCR 463 1,703 8,232 
5. Bicol an 781 505 
6. W. Visayas 244 250 1,545 
7. E. V118yas 556 418 1,896 
8. C.Visayas 104 330 225 
9. N. Mindanao 425 386 125 
1 0. C. Mindanao 1,160 763 625 
11. W. Mindanao 2,657 840 1,180 
12. S. Mindanao 1,206 762 469 
Total, Private 10,189 10,272 17,885 
% Distribution 26.6 26.8 46.6 
Total, PHIL. 13,339 23,041 48,605 
% Oiatribution 15.7 27.1 57.2 
Total Bed Shares (%) 
Public 23.6 55.4 63.2 
Private 76.4 44.6 36.8 
lcuc• o..--oiHNt\ a.. ... ....,.. 
,...._ lllfOA·...O. ~--~~y_,_, 
Total Pop llation Percent Distribution 
Public: to Bed 
Beds Ratio D.,· ... Tertiary 
···-}' ____ ,. 
1,800 637 32 4.3 3.7 
1,713 2,073 4.4 6.1 2.6 
1,480 n4 2.5 5.9 2.1 
3,220 1,925 4.0 12.1 5.0 
3,010 2,746 7.5 8.0 5.7 
18,155 437 4.3 7.0 55.7 
2,174 1,799 11.9 5.1 3.7 
2,705 1,993 5.1 9.4 4.4 
3,192 1,439 7.7 13.1 4.2 
2,080 1,469 4.3 8.4 2.8 
2,065 1,529 22.7 5.9 2.0 
2,260 1,553 7.9 7.9 3.3 
1,485 3,003 4.3 2.7 3.3 
1,300 2,439 10.3 4.1 1.5 
46,639 1,302 100.0 100.0 100.0 
100.0 
Total Population Percent Oisbibution 
Private to Bed 
Beds Ratio Primary Second~_ Tertiary 
1,719 667 4.9 7.4 2.6 
689 5,154 3.7 2.1 0.6 
1,135 1,010 3.9 4.8 1.4 
2,546 2,435 6.0 11.3 4.4 
3,530 2,341 6.1 13.8 8.4 
10,398 762 4.5 16.6 46.0 
2,163 1,808 8.6 7.6 2.8 
2,039 2,644 2.4 2.4 8.6 
2,870 1,600 5.5 4.1 10.6 
659 4,636 1.0 3.2 1.3 
936 3,374 4.2 3.8 0.7 
2,548 1,378 11.4 7.4 3.5 
4,6n 953 26.1 8.2 6.6 
2,437 1,301 11.8 7.4 2.6 
38,346 1,583 100.0 100.0 100.0 
100.0 
84,985 
100.0 
Over-ell 
54.9 
45.1 
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percent of private primary hospitals in the country. Reimbursement claims from the 
16 regions, from the private portion of Medicare- SSS, exceed the membership base 
by value-to-population ratios between ranges of 1.09 to 4.66. The average 
reimbursement value to population ratio for the country as a whole is only . 80; without 
the high-claiming regions, the national average drops to .65. This pattern suggests that 
the Medicare system may be a vital source of financial viability for some private 
facilities. 
5.2.2 Health Manpower 
Table 5.3 shows that the population is fairly well-covered by nurses, physicians, 
midwives and the least by dentists. Their distribution across the country also indicates 
that the NCR has the most favourable population to personnel coverage followed by 
other fairly well-off regions in the country. Table 5.4 further shows that while nearly 
two thirds of the population are found outside Manila and the nearby Southern Tagalog 
provinces, a third to nearly half of health personnel are located in it. Midwives fonn 
the key staff at village level. The latest estimate showed dentists to be most 
concentrated, at 65 percent, in Metro Manila and environs, a reverse of trends more 
than ten years ago. Reyes and Picazo (1987) estimates showed that the majority of 
physicians (58 percent) were in the private sector and about 38 percent were employed 
by the Department of Health. The balance were found in schools and other 
government services. The government employed slightly more than half of the 
nurses and two-thirds of the midwives. Most dentists are in private practice. 
More recent estimates by Gonzalez, et al. (1994), using the Medicare data 
showed that there were nearly 8,580 general practice physicians or about 38 percent 
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Table 5.3 
Population Per Health Manpower* 
By Region, 1987 
Regions Physician Nurse Midwife 
1 2,806 1,907 3,222 
2 4,703 2,959 3,408 
3 3,812 3,092 4,093 
4 3,833 3,655 4,9n 
5 5,005 3,437 4,183 
6 4,673 2,902 4,526 
7 2,747 2,508 3,991 
8 5,674 3,169 3,060 
9 8,703 5,725 4,371 
10 3,764 2,575 3,175 
11 4,098 2,829 4,267 
12 4,244 3,071 2,939 
NCR 1,256 1,319 4,167 
Phil, Total 3,135 2,559 3,926 
Dentist 
15,088 
19,241 
10,718 
13,495 
31,096 
39,413 
32,941 
33,433 
28,877 
47,096 
24,743 
40,029 
2,533 
10,799 
* Health Manpower includes public and private health 
personnel affiliated with hospitals and health centers 
Reference: Reyes and Picazo. 1989; Table 3 
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Table 5.4 
Distribution of Selected Manpower in Manila and 
Southern Tagalog Region Relative to the Rest of the Country 
Various Years 
Study Percent of Population 
Manila & Elsewhere 
S.Tagalog 
Ph~sicians 
Assoc. of Phil. Medical Colleges Survey, 1970 23.0 77.0 
National Economic & Development Authority, 197 4 24.2 75.8 
National Economic & Development Authority, 1977 24.6 75.4 
Philippine Institute for Development Studies, 1987 25.9 74.1 
Nurses 
Assoc. of Phil. Medical Colleges Survey, 1970 23.0 77.0 
Philippine Nurses Association, 1980 25.1 74.9 
Philippine Nurses Association, 1987 25.9 74.1 
Philippine Institute for Development Studies, 1987 25.9 74.1 
Midwives 
National Manpower Survey, 1973 23.7 76.3 
Philippine Institute for Development Studies, 1987 25.9 74.1 
Dentists 
National Manpower Survey, 1973 76.3 
Philippine Dental Association, 1988 23.7 74.0 
Reference: Reyes and Picazo, 1989. Table 3. 
lSJ 
Percent of Manpower 
Manila & Elsewhere 
S.Tagalog 
45.9 54.1 
40.1 59.9 
39.2 60.8 
32.0 68.0 
51.7 48.3 
42.7 57.3 
40.3 59.7 
34.0 66.0 
25.6 74.4 
22.4 77.6 
35.9 64.1 
65.4 34.6 
of total manpower. The next biggest group of specialists are obstetricians (5 percent), 
followed by paediatrics and internal medicine specialists. This suggests that there was 
a strong primary care sector, which given the largely preventable nature of diseases 
commonly reported for the country (as shown in Table 2.5) may be appropriate. In 
the absence of other measures of health needs, a direct comparison with the health 
conditions and the distribution of health specialists cannot be made. However, these 
estimates are from the Medicare accreditation list. Higher-level specialists were 
unlikely to benefit from Medicare, and hence would not seek accreditation. 
The numbers of health personnel is attributed to the conditions of medical 
education in the country; and movement of personnel to overseas jobs. There are 27 
medical schools. Nearly all of these are private. These schools admit some 4,400 
new enrolees each year. The medical schools have a national association which sets 
quotas for freshmen enrolment. The Development Academy of the Philippines (DAP, 
1993) estimates that there are about 3,000 new physicians licensed each year, of which 
about 400 are lost annually to overseas employment or permanent emigration. Nursing 
schools start with approximately 21,000 freshmen enrolment each year. On the other 
hand, 6, 000 nurses are lost yearly to overseas employment or emigration. There are 
far fewer dentists enroling each year, averaging 2, 700; about 1 ,400 enter the 
profession and only about 220 are lost to overseas work (Rodriguez, et.al., 1994). 
5.2.3 Medical Equipment and Other Assets 
Investment in physical capital other than beds is critical in health care given the 
rapid technical change that takes place (Phelps, 1992). Having noted the relative ease 
with which private primary facilities are set up by husband-wife teams or single 
medical proprietors. the extent of investments in fixed assets is of particular interest. 
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An asset is considered to be a fiXed asset, and therefore involving fixed costs, when the 
costs incurred are independent of the scale of production. Considerable fixed 
investments, however, have the character of sunk costs which may serve to deter 
potential competitors from entering the market. Sunk costs are costs which cannot be 
recovered on exit. Sunk costs are incurred for investments that "produce a stream of 
benefits over a long horizon and can never be recouped" (Tirole, 1992; p.308). The 
more specific an asset is to a function, the more likely it is that an asset is sunk. 
Market structure analysis posits that the extent to which costs are "sunk" determine 
the structure of a market. 
Table 5.5 shows that compared to public facilities, private medical 
facilities have considerably less capital investments and assets, just barely nine percent 
of the assets of the public sector. The low level of fixed assets in private medical 
facilities indicates that entry is unencumbered by huge investments, allowing many 
small facilities to operate side by side. 
A closer examination of capital expenditures (Table 5.6, previous page), from 
primary- source data, shows that investments in vital medical equipment vary by size, 
measured in terms of bed-capacities. Only a third of primary hospitals and less than 
20 percent of government facilities surveyed had x-ray or ECG machines. Yet, these 
facilities are allowed to perform minor surgery and general medical, paediatrics and 
obstetrics procedures. At the secondary hospital level, where general surgery. 
laboratory radiology and emergency outpatient services can be performed, not all 
facilities had X-ray or ECG machines that support the performance of such functions. 
X-rays machines were more common in public than private facilities, but ECG is more 
common among private secondary hospitals than public secondary hospitals. Tertiary 
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Table 5.5 
Average Book Value of Fixed Assets 
Public/private Med:cal, Dental and Other Hea~h Services 
in the Philippines 
as of Dec. 31, 1988 
(in Thousand Pesos) 
!Public 
Land 487 
Bldgs., Structures & lmprov'ts 2935 
Transport, Equipments 119 
Machinery and Other Equipt. 1304 
Other Fixed Assets 598 
I Total 5443 
Source. 1988 Census of Establishments 
Reference: S. Zmgapan, 1994. p.7,8 
Table 5.6 
Bed and Equipment Profile 
Government vs. Private Hospitals 
Selected Provinces, 1991 
I Bed Size and Equipment I Public 
1. Prima~ Hosertals 
Ave. No. of Beds 16.72 
Percent with : 
X-ray 16.67 
EGG 16.67 
Ultrasound 0.00 
MRI/GT Scan 0.00 
2. Secondary Hospitals 
Ave. No. of Beds 55.92 
Percent with : 
X-ray 92.00 
EGG 48.00 
Ultrasound 12.00 
MRI/GT Scan 0.00 
3. Tertiary Hosertals 
Ave. No. of Beds 441.61 
Percent with : 
X-ray 100.00 
EGG 88 89 
Ultrasound 72.22 
MRI/CT Scan 1 1 .1 1 
Sourclt ~Baste Data [)()H-PIOS Hosp•t.a1 Ao..,rnrstrato"' SuNe'; 
A.l•,.nce S Zangapan, 1~ p ,~ 
I Private 
8 
131 
10 
347 
10 
so5 I 
!Private 
17.07 
39.29 
39.29 
0.00 
0.00 
32.40 
86.49 
78.38 
24.32 
0.00 
149.63 
100.00 
90.00 
90.00 
30.00 
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facilities have full complement of X-ray machines; but only 90 percent had ECG and 
ultrasound faci I ities. But 30 percent of private facilities reported ~fRllCT Scan 
equipment compared to 11 percent in public tertiary facilities. 
The extent of capital investment is determined as much by the nature of diseases 
presented at health facilities as by the availability of financial resources. As shown by 
earlier tables on health status (Table 2.4 - 2.5) as well as hospital discharges (Table 
2.9), the majority of complaints were communicable diseases which are largely 
preventable. Their diagnosis would probably not require the latest most expensive 
medical equipment. From table 5.6, however, there are nearly as many tertiary 
hospitals with MRI or CT scan equipment, as there are primary hospitals with X-ray 
or ECG machines, and more than double the proportion of secondary public hospitals 
with ultrasound. 
This trend of investment in relatively advanced medical equipment an1ong 
tertiary facilities may imply the presence of non-price competition amongst hospitals. 
The nature of competition in hospital services is discussed further in the next chapter. 
Having modern equipment attaches some status or pre,stige to the facility, 
notwithstanding the costs of these inputs (Lee, 1971 ). The consumers themselves 
caru1ot fully judge service quality and, therefore, may use proxy variables such as 
modern diagnostic equipment. Hospital investment patterns reflect this presumption of 
consumer behaviour. Competition in the level of medical equipment among hospitals 
is assumed to drive costs up, increasing the price of medical care. 
A profile on financing sources of capital expenditures by the private sector tends 
to confirm the limited capacity for expansion in the private sector (Table 5.7). The 
majnritv ( 66- 99 perl'l'nt) of those who made capital expenditures the year before the 
187 
Table 5.7 
Financing Sources for Private Hospital Capital Expenditures 
Selected Provinces, Sample Hospitals 
(Percent of Hospitals)* 
Source of Financing Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Borrowings 0.00 11.11 10.00 
Internal Savings 71.43 66.67 90.00 
Donations 14.29 5.55 10.00 
Tax Exemptions 0.00 11.11 0.00 
* reporting capital expenditures (a year before the survey): capital expenditures include 
machineries and other equipment, transport and related equipment, land, 
additional beds 
Source: PIDS-DOH Hospital Survey 
Reference: S Zingapan. 1994 .. p.7 
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survey, had used internal savings to finance these expenditures. Those who borrowed 
from formal financial, as well as informal financial institutions, were reported by 
Zingapan ( 1994) to pay between 10 to 27 percent in interest. The utilization of internal 
savings reflects on the way that most of these hospitals started out, as family practices, 
and shows that expansion has not very much altered the family-style management 
structure (Griffin, et. al. , 1994). 
Donations comprise the next common source of financing, especially for 
primary hospitals. Tax exemptions (applicable to imports; local purchases are subjected 
to 10 percent value-added tax) were made use of by some secondary hospital facilities. 
By law all imports by private primary and secondary hospitals are granted duty-free 
privileges. Tertiary hospitals do not enjoy this privilege as they are largely treated as 
for-profit institutions. However, educational institutions are accorded tax-free 
privileges. This loophole gives the incentive to these private tertiary hospitals to open 
a medical, nursing or midwifery school to avail themselves of these tax privileges 
(Griffin, et.al., 1994). There is no data on the number of such institutions but this is 
a widely observed practice. 
5.3 Private Out-patient Services 
5.3.1 The Organization of Private Outpatient Services 
The private out-patient care consists of two main types of practice, distinguished 
by the location of practice: hospital-based and independent clinic practice. 
In hospital-based practice a physician is offered space in a building adjacent to 
a hospital The main advantage of hospital-based arrangements is the privilege to 
adntit patients to the hospital. The offer generally forms part of an offer or invitation 
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to serve as consultant to the hospital. It is largely made on l'Ie basis of personal 
relations with hospital owners or through other persons known to them. The 
physician may pay rent plus an initial amount of practice rights. In some cases, these 
rights may form a basis of equity rights or ownership shares. especially for corporate 
hospitals. Physicians refused to divulge the amounts they had to pay to start-up 
hospital-based practices (Kraft, personal communication). 
This personalistic basis of access to hospitals with high initial costs, appears 
to be similar to what Honigsbaum (1979) described to be the pattern in Britain before 
the National Health Service (NHS) was set up. Social class largely determined hospital 
access and choice of career. To quote: 
... To reach the pinnacle of the hospital world before 1948 one had to go 
through a long. largely unpaid, apprenticeship and not many medical students 
could afford it. This was enough to keep the consultant class small and 
exclusive. Those who could not finance the process had to become GPs and 
that led them to regard the hospital world as something separate and distinct 
(p.318). 
Self-regulatory practice by the professional groups, as shown in Chapter 2, Section 
2.3.2, limits the number of specialist training posts. Specialist training from 
accredited hospitals provides the entry point for hospital access. But specialists 
themselves. given the self-referring pattern of health seeking behaviour in the country, 
rna\ also practice independently. 
Hospital-based practice is advantageous to the physician as it provides him with 
a hase to earn income. Hospitals are highly visible places and therefore accessible. 
People often say they have been to the hospital when in fact they used a private clinic 
m or adjacent to the hospital. Hospitals. on the other hand. would find such 
arrangement iJeal as it may maximize use of services and enhance their reputation 
which depends upon the phy~ic ians they attract to hold offices in the premi~es and to 
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serve as hospital consultants. As in the North American setting, cited by Evans 
(1983), physicians are 
"private businessmen who bring in the hospital's patients .... physician and 
hospital are incompletely vertically integrated, with objectives that partly 
overlap and partly conflict, and with the power to influence each other's 
behavior directly rather than through arm's length exchange(p.66). 
The second type of out -patient practice is non-hospital based or m an 
independent set-up. General practitioners are mostly found in this type of independent 
arrangement, where they live and practice closer to communities and/or near a 
hospital. Often, the place of practice is also the residence. This is how most small 
hospitals started. They start with a few beds and then expand. In small towns, 
physicians may integrate and operate a pharmacy in their practice. Although 
considered unethical in statutes of the medical profession, their presence in small 
towns are often justified by consumer demand. Patients cannot choose the hospitals 
they want except in cases of emergency. Physicians can only refer patients to hospitals 
where they have admitting privileges. For the patient, the choice of physician is also 
a choice of hospital. Those in independent practice, without visiting rights to 
hospitals, have to refer a patient to a consultant in the hospital before a patient can be 
admitted. In smaller cities and towns, open staffing is more common where 
independent specialists have access or visiting rights in private hospital facilities. 
Being known to the hospital owner or membership of a professional body is a minimum 
requirement for this arrangement. GPs usually have freer access to public hospital 
facilities. Although initially they have to provide credentials to the hospital chief. 
It is not uncommon to find specialists with hospital affiliation also having an 
independent practice in some other place. It is fairly common for physicians to hold 
multiple clinics and hospital affiliations. From a sample of 383 physician interviews. 
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conducted by Kraft and Limpiado (1994), 49 percent reported having a single practice, 
while 48 percent reported having two to three clinics. Of the sample, nearly half (48 
percent) reported hospital-based practice while the same number reported independent 
practice. One-fourth of the sample had a combination of hospital and independent 
practice. In an analysis of the productivity of physicians, Kraft and Limpiado (1994) 
observed no differences in productivity, as measured by the number of outpatient 
patients seen in a week, between physicians maintaining single or multiple clinics 
(Table 5. 8). However, marked differences were observed in the number of inpatient 
cases seen in a week and the number of hospital affiliations. Those with five 
to eight hospital affiliations see more (nearly 1.5 times more) patients than those with 
just one or two affiliations. Hourly productivities in hospital-based clinics appear to 
be higher than independent clinics but the latter spent longer in their clinics and see 
more patients. 
Kraft and Limpiado (Ibid.) observed that hours spent in a week in all clinics 
seem to decrease as the level of development of the region increases. And that the 
number of patients seen per hour is higher in richer areas, reflecting higher hourly 
productivities. That physicians in poorer regions work more hours than their 
counterparts in Metro Manila indicate several considerations. Either there is a trade-off 
of income for leisure, resulting in a backward-bending supply curve for labour as 
incomes increase, so that in richer areas physicians spend less time in clinics. Or 
physicians in richer areas delegate tasks to assistants; this maximizes their patient load 
and at the same time increases hourly productivity. Kraft and Limpiado's initial 
observations supported the latter supposition that higher hourly productivities are 
coincidental with higher non-physician costs. 
192 
Table 5.8 
Productivity of Physician Practice 
Ave. No. of Hours spent Patients per 
Patients per week hour 
Per Week 
Clinic Practice: 
Number of Clinics 
One 58.8 30.4 2.3 
Two 55.3 30.9 2.4 
Three 60.6 29.8 2.8 
Four 57.8 38.3 1.5 
Hospital Practice: 
Number of Hospitals 
One 7.5 9.1 1.4 
Two 8.2 8.9 2.1 
Three 10.8 16.3 1.1 
Four 10.3 12.7 1.1 
Five 11.3 6.3 2.3 
Eight 12.0 8.5 2.1 
Type of Practice: 
Hospital-based 30.1 17.7 2.6 
Independent 49.5 29.4 2.2 
Ave. Usual Fee (Pesos) 
Hospital-based 103.2 
Independent 62.1 
Source: DOH-PIDS Outpatient Clinic Survey 
Adapted from Kraft and Umpiado, 1994. Tables 2.1-2.3 
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5.3.2 Pricing in the Out-patient Sen·ice 1\larket 
The first two columns in Table 5.9 show a profile of pricing in out-patient 
practice. The range of fees varies by region, specialty, and type of clinic. The richer 
the area, the higher the fees. The range in fees is widest in surgery. followed by 
obstetrics-gynaecology. General practice offers the narrowest price range. 
Independent clinics appear to be cheaper than hospital-based clinics. The third column 
in the table indicates that, on the whole, physician put substantial mark-ups. i.e. the 
proportion of fees which more than covers costs, on their charges. Figures above one 
show that average charges are more than double the non-physician service costs. 
Mark-ups are 
highest for those with 6-10 years practice and those in hospital-based practices. The 
latter is likely because a higher proportion of patients are from the middle-income 
groups. 
The perception of doctors as to the income class of their patients is shown in 
the middle columns. This assessment is important in so far as pricing decisions of 
physicians are based on this perception (Table 5 .I 0). Some 74% of sample physicians 
reported that economic status of patients figure prominently in their decisions as to the 
pnce. The nature of complaint or illness figures next in the pricing calculus of 
physicians. 
An indication of the market structure and the extent of competition can also be 
gleaned from table 5. 9. Nearly 40 percent of physicians interviewed consider the fees 
of other doctors in their price-setting. Pricing behaviour is more extensively discussed 
in the market structure analysis in Chapter 6, Section 6.3.3. 
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Table 5.9 
Outpatient Care Practice Profile 
1992 
Ave. Ave. Mean Pro rtion of Patients 
Min. Max. Ave. Usual Fee/Non- Low Middle H1gh 
Fee Fee Physician Costs\ 1 Income Income Income 
Pesos Pesos 
Re ion 
II Cagayan Valley 28.10 67.00 0.90 57% 31% 
VII Central Visayas 44.70 94.20 1.26 51% 38% 
X Northern Mindanao 47.90 78.70 1.21 46% 4{)0~ 
National Capital Region 74.40 125.20 1.38 38% 50% 
Specialty 
General Practice 34.20 66.00 0.95 61% 27% 
Internal Medicine 75.00 122.50 1.85 36% 49% 
Obstetric-Gynecology 67.60 119.40 1.59 35% 55% 
Pediatrics 60.40 107.10 1.32 41% 47% 
Surgery 66.80 125.70 0.93 42% 44% 
Years of Practice 
Below 5 Years 50.90 87.00 0.96 50% 39% 
6-10 Years 65.60 112.00 1.52 38% 50% 
11-15 Years 63.90 110.80 1.45 39% 48% 
16-30 Years 52.57 91.63 1.40 46% 40% 
Beyond 30 Years 72.50 131.65 0.91 52% 32% 
T e of Clinic 
Hospital-Based 75.80 136.80 1.49 35% 52% 
Independent 46.30 78.70 1.15 51% 37% 
1/ Non·phy~1c1an costs include ex~nd1tures lor rent, supplies, drugs. repa1rs, compensation for ass1stants. hcenses, insurance, utilities and other OY"erheads 
Sourc~ DOH·PIOS Outpat1~nt Clin1c Survey 
Adapted from· Kraft and Limplado, 1994, p 34 
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5.4 Costs and Efficiency of Hospital Senices 
This section presents the results of studies on cost functions of hospital services 
in the country. The discussion is structured in such a way that the data set used and 
estimating method is described: followed by a discussion of the results of these studies. 
The section ends with a brief discussion comparing the results with hospital cost 
analysis undertaken in other countries and the limits of these studies. 
5.4.1 Hospital-level Data Used 
The data used in the studies reported below were from the Survey of Hospitals 
and Hospital Administrators of the Philippine Institute for Development Studies -
Department of Health (PIDS-DOH). A description of the data set is discussed in 
Appendix 1, and a more complete description of the data set is made in Zingapan 
(1994). The regression estimates discussed in Section 5.4.2. are from a sample of 65 
hospitals with complete information out of the total 159 facilities which responded to 
the survey. 
All hospital-related information, such as information on costs. patients served, 
wages, case mix, insurance support and subsidies received (if any), and others, refer 
to the year previous to the survey. 1991. The survey was conducted in the latter part 
of 1992 and the annual reports for the previous year are usually completed by June of 
the following year. Average fee estimates, i.e. average fees for discharges or out-
patient contacts, were not directly lifted from the survey but were generated from the 
re\'enue information from two major services. out-patient and admissions/discharge 
departments. and di,·ided hy the number of patients reported for each service. Out-
patient departments include ancillary services. 
Total operatin~ L'l)sts were estimated to be the sum of all expense-,, including 
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Table 5.10 
Physician Bases For Setting Fees 
Percent of Respondents 
Bases 
Economic Status of Patients 
Depends upon Illness 
Fee Structure of Other Doctors 
Predetermined Fee Structure 
Relationship with Patient 
Room Accomodation 
Self-Structured Fee 
Cost-of-Living/Operational Expens 
If patient has health insurance 
Source: DOH-PIDS Outpatient Clinic Survey, 1992 
Reference: Kreft and Umpiedo, 1994, p.32 
% Respondents 
74.45 
40.66 
39.01 
29.12 
20.88 
20.88 
20.05 
18.41 
17.86 
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depreciatio~ interest, maintenance, and transportation. Average wage figures reflect 
the amount paid for salaries and wages divided by the total medical and non-medical 
full-time staff. 
'Beds' refer to the actual number of beds (which may not coincide with the 
authorized bed capacities). The variable is used to represent a fixed input. 
A case mix measure used was the ratio of the total number of surgery patients 
to the total number of patients reported by the hospital. Zingapan (1994) did not 
provide any explanation for this split. But the case mix measure can provide an 
indication of the types and complexity of cases treated in hospitals. 
Data referring to characteristics of the population outside the hospital, t.e. 
average physician fees, average out-patient fees, other hospitals' bed capacity, average 
household expenditures, and other municipality-related information were estimated from 
other PIDS-DOH databases. These data sets include the Household Survey and the 
Out-patient Clinics (OPC) survey. Municipal average fees for physicians, for example, 
used the OPC survey which reported fees charged by physicians for in-patient visits, 
distinguished by type of accommodation of patients. 
A discussion of measurement problems is made in the context of the 
interpretation of results. Section 5.4.5 discusses some of the limitations of the works 
cited here. Descriptive statistics on the variables used are shown in Appendix 6. 
Table 5. 11 shows the distribution of hospitals by ownership in selected regions 
of the country. Private ownership comprised 63 percent of the sample, followed by 
public ownership. Majority of private hospitals were managed as single 
proprietorship. Although a growing number of private hospitals were being managed 
as corporations. Such management structure makes the application of the single 
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Table 5.11 
Ownership and Nature of Organization of Hospitals 
Sample Hospitals from Selected Provinces 
Nature of Region 
Ownership 2 7 
A. Private 
Single Proprietorship 29 15 
Partnership 0 0 
Corporation 1 14 
Missionary /Religious 0 2 
Civic Organization/ 0 0 
Foundation/Cooperatives 
B. Public 
National/local Gov't 34 27 
Government Corporation 0 0 
Total 64 58 
Source: DOH-PIDS Hospital Survey 
Reference: S. Zingapan, 1994, p.10 
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10 NCR Total Percent 
54 44 142 39.4 
0 1 1 0.3 
8 56 79 21.9 
4 2 8 2.2 
2 1 3 0.8 
32 32 125 34.7 
0 2 2 0.6 
100 138 360 100 
decision-maker in standard econonuc theory more straig!ttforward. Single 
proprietorship is to be expected for the primary level operations which we have noted 
to feature most prominently in the private hospital sector. 
5.4.2 Determinants of Hospital Costs 
A study on hospital cost function using a sample of Philippine hospitals is 
pioneered by Zingapan ( 1994). The study estimates a total cost function for public and 
private hospitals using a Cobb-Douglas formulation. The model is specified as 
follows: 
where: 
C: total annual operating cost of the hospital 
D: total annual discharges (inpatient) 
0: total annual outpatient visits 
W: total average monthly wage of hospital personnel 
B: total bed capacity 
S: ratio of total Surgery Department patients to total patients 
E: dummy variable indicating presence of X-ray/ECG/ultrasound/CT scan/MRI 
u: error term 
In ( ) : variable expressed in natural log 
The equation was estimated simultaneously ustng three-stage least squares 
technique (3SLS), for government and private hospital samples. As shown in standard 
econometrics textbooks (see for example Greene, 1990; Kennedy, 1992) simultaneous 
equation models can be expected to yield biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. 
The problem of bias occurs when repeating the procedure would not yield close 
parameter values; while, the problem of inconsistency refers to the bias not getting 
any smaller with increases in the number of observations. The problem may be 
compounded by inherent characteristics of Cobb-Douglas formulations which make 
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restrictive assumptions when applied to hospital functions. Cobb-Douglas specifications 
assume the following with respect to the form of technology: a) !hat cost-minimizing 
levels do not depend on the level of output; and b) constant returns to scale, where a 
percentage change in inputs results in an equal percentage change in output (Frank and 
Taube, 1987). A Cobb-Douglas specification therefore assumes complete 
specialisation, a restriction that is inappropriate given the multiple products of 
hospital firms (Cowing and Holtman, 1983). These restrictions yield problems of 
identification, where restrictions on simultaneous equations model to 'identify' it, can 
raise doubts on the structural parameters (Kennedy, 1992). The use of 3SLS as the 
estimating technique is generally believed to yield consistent and more efficient 
estimators (Ibid.) 
The results are shown in Table 5.12. A "Chow" test was undertaken to 
confirm that the regression made on the two sample sets yielded parameter estimates 
that were significantly different from each other. The cost function model explains 
85 percent of the variations in hospital costs for both public and private facilities. 
These r-squared values compare favourably to the health services cost function analysis 
on Kenya by Wouters (1993). Using a similar Cobb-Douglas formulation, Wouters' 
estimates showed higher (.91) r-squared, suggesting correlation among independent 
variables (an estimation problem known as multicollinearity). This is a common 
problem for Cobb-Douglas models, as well as for cross-section data (Kennedy, 1992). 
The dependent variable, total operating costs, included all hospital expenses for 
personnel, supplies, utilities, depreciation, interest, rental, repairs and maintenance and 
other costs normally incurred. The results showed that hospital services appear to be 
driving hospital costs. The coefficients for in-patient discharges were significant for 
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Table 5 12 
Cost Functions for Sample Hospitals 
1992 
Function: Cobb-Douglas Production Function 
Dependent Variable. Ln (Total Cost) 
!Independent Variables Description 
Constant 
Discharges 
Out-patient Visits 
Wages 
Beds 
% Surgical Patients 
Log of Total In-patient Discharges 
Log of Total Out-patient Visits 
Log of Ave. Monthly Wages 
of Personnel 
Total No. of Hospital Beds 
Surgical Patients as A Proportion 
of the Total No. of Patients 
Government 
Coefficient T-Values 
5.8646 2.09* 
1.1048 3.20* 
0.3598 2.11 * 
-0.1447 -0.53 
-0.336 -0.96 
0.8309 0.36 
Equipment (= 1, if hospital reports having X-ray, 
and other diagnostic eqpt. incl. MRI) 
R- Squared 
Number of Observations 
* Significant at .05 
Estimates of Marginal Costs (Pesos) 
In-patient Discharges 
Out-patient V1sits 
Source: Zingapan, 1994. 
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0.8494 
33 
3,015 
222 
Private 
Coefficient T-VaLJe 
10.0276 1.29 
1.2557 2.49* 
-3.0618 -1.98 
1.8477 2.67* 
1 .5339 2.43* 
-4.982 -1.46 
1.9397 1.64 
0.8448 
34 
1,458 
0 
both public and private hospitals; while the coefficient for out-patient visits ts 
significant only for government facilities. A percent change in in-patient discharges, 
increased costs by 1.10 and 1.25 percent, for public and private hospitals, respectively. 
The negative relationship between out-patient visits and hospitals costs. although 
insignificant, suggests two things: a) collinearity between the two hospital outputs; b) 
measurement problems on the number of out-patients. Out-patient care in private 
facilities are hard to track since there are no separate out-patient departments, unlike 
in hospital facilities. These problems were encountered throughout by Zingapan for 
private out-patient estimates. 
No other variables appear to be statistically significant for the government 
hospital model. Private hospital total costs appeared to be positively influenced by 
'average personnel wages' and hospital size, measured by the 'number of beds'. Both 
variables were significant and may suggest that private hospitals can reduce costs by 
reduction in these inputs. The effect of the number of beds on costs was interpreted 
by the Zingapan ( 1994) as: 
... (implying) that private hospitals may be over-capitalized, i.e. their capital 
stock may be too large given their output levels (Wagstaff and Barnum, 1992). 
The literature on hospital investments in the U.S. suggests that this pattern 
could be expected from an industry where non-price competition is prevalent 
(p.40). 
Larger private hospitals were, therefore, likely to charge higher fees to cover 
the higher costs of additional beds. Given that personnel and beds are inputs to 
hospital production, the greater increase in costs arising from an increase in inputs also 
signify private sector diseconomies. The issue of economies is explored in more depth 
in the Alba and Bugayong ( 1994) study which is examined in the next section. 
The inclusion of the ratio of surgery patients was meant to ;;ontrol for case mix. 
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Facilities which have more use of surgery were likely to incur higher costs. There 
was no variation on this variable between public and private hospital facilities and the 
results showed that case mix did not significantly affect hospital total costs. The 
broad aggregation may, however, not have fully captured the way hospitals, public and 
private, handle their cases. Further disaggregation, even on the basis of common 
causes of admission like deliveries, for example, may have shown some variation. But 
as Alba and Bugayong (1994) noted in their use of the same data set, too may empty 
cells precluded further disaggregation into other service departments in hospitals. 
The 'equipment' dummy variable was included to represent the quality of 
hospital provision. The failure to further disaggregate the basic equipment (i.e. x-ray 
machines) from the prestige equipment like CT scan and MRI may explain the lack of 
impact of the 'equipment' variable on costs. The 'equipment' variable was not 
included by Zingapan in the government cost function to improve estimates for the 
other equations in the simultaneous system. 
Estimated marginal costs in the bottom part of the table reflect the measurement 
error in the private out-patient model. For in-patient discharges however, the higher 
estimated marginal cost of a discharge from public hospitals compared to private 
hospitals, suggests inefficiencies in public hospital operations. Public hospitals are 
generally larger than private hospitals. Zingapan argued that the high cost of 
additional patients in government facilities was due to the larger in-patient load of 
government hospitals relative to private hospitals. That this load was not reflected in 
the case mix variable again suggests that case mix may be insufficiently represented by 
the proportion of surgery patients over total patients, and that other indications of the 
types of patient cases handled. may be necessary. Literature in other countries shows 
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that public hospital facilities treat more serious cases than private facilities (Newbrander 
• 
and Parker, 1992; and Bennett and Tangcharoensathien, 1993). 
The zero marginal cost for private out-patients may also be related to the lack of 
significance of the variable in the estimates. This was attributed by Zingapan (1994) 
to the fact that there are no distinctly out-patient services rendered in private hospitals. 
In public hospitals there are separate out-patient departments handling a flow of 
patients either referred from other lower units of the public health hierarchy or walk-in. 
Out-patient services in private hospitals, on the other hand, are rendered through 
doctors' clinics situated in the hospital which function independently of hospital 
operations. Patients coming in for out-patient visits are passed on to the clinics. This 
may not be an entirely satisfactory explanation since out-patient visits were estimated 
from the output not only of out-patient departments but from other ancillary services 
(radiology, laboratory). The records in these services would show whether the tests 
were made for out-patients or in-patients. There appears therefore to have been a 
measurement error in the private hospital cost function model. 
5.4.3 Economies of Scale and Scope 
The other hospital cost function estimates in the Philippines utilized the same 
dataset as Zingapan's but used a different specification. Alba and Bugayong (1994) 
estimated a transcendental logarithmic (translog) hospital variable cost function. 
Translog estimates differ from Cobb-Douglas formulation by not imposing restrictive 
assumptions on substitutability of inputs, and is therefore considered to be more 
consistent with theoretically derived estimates (Cowing and Holtman, 1983). Alba and 
Bugayong were therefore able to make more detailed breakdowns of personnel inputs 
and types of facilities. Their study also provides the first estimate of economies of 
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scope and scale, using Philippine hospital samples. Variable costs were defined as 
the sum of hospital expenditures on labour or personnel services as well as drugs and 
medical supplies. Other expenses such as utilities, repair and maintenance, 
transportation and communication were not included as they were considered as part 
of fixed costs. The number of hospital beds was used as proxy for fixed inputs. 
Table 5.13 shows average variable cost simulations by Alba and Bugayong 
( 1994), using the estimated parameters on economies of scale and scope. These 
parameters were applied at the means of sub-samples for four types of facilities and 
for public and private hospitals. The share of drugs in variable costs hovered between 
44 to 55 percent, with the balance representing the combined share of personnel. The 
nearly-even share of these two main types of inputs in variable costs does not support 
what is generally observed for developing countries where lack of availability of drugs 
would be more the norm (Mills, 1994). However, averaging may have masked the true 
differences. 
The highest drug share was reported in tertiary teaching facilities. Drug costs 
comprised a larger share in private facilities than public facilities. The low shares of 
drugs in primary and secondary facilities cost functions support the view of poor 
quality in these facilities. The availability of drugs is a commonly used proxy for 
quality of health services, albeit, an unsatisfactory one (Wouters, 1993). The literature 
on user fees shows that drug availability is critical to quality perceptions of consumers 
and that the imposition of fees in public facilities is acceptable if these fees are used 
to improve quality. the latter meaning more drugs made available (Litvack and Boddart. 
1994; Mwabu and Mwangi, 1989). 
Estimates of the cost shares of personnel showed that the highest difference 
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Table 5.13 
Translog Estimates of Average Variable Cost Function 
Evaluated at Means of All Values 
T ranslog Cost Estimates of: 
Economies of Scale 1 
Economies of Scope /a -.20282 
Predicted Variable Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Cost Share of Medical Residents 0.1033 
Cost Share of Nurses 0.1377 
Cost Share of Other Medical Personnel 0.1605 
Cost Share of Non-Medical Personnel 0.1797 
Cost Share of Drugs 0.4402 
Output Elasticity of Variable Costs (IP) -0.0906 
Output Elasticity of Variable Costs (OP) 0.5026 
Capital Elasticity of Variable Cost (Beds) 0.3728 
Index of Ray Scale Economies (Min.) 2.5626 
Index of Ray Scale Economies (Mean) 1.5225 
Index of Ray Scale Economies (Max.) 1.5266 
Index of Scope Economies -0.2768 
aJ Wald Test shown not significantly different from zero. 
Source Alba and Bugayong (1994), Table 4 
Non-Teaching 
0.1262 0.1421 
0.1406 0.1558 
0.1402 0.0885 
0.1645 0.1062 
0.4372 0.4979 
0.0946 0.1832 
0.4453 0.5408 
0.4572 0.5311 
2.1535 1.9217 
1.0053 0.6477 
0.8533 0.1530 
-0.0247 0.0155 
Tertiary Public Private 
Teaching 
0.0851 0.1441 0.1154 
0.1422 0.1556 0.136 
0.0725 0.1114 0.1127 
0.1090 0.1408 0.1346 
0.5584 0.4591 0.4910 
0.1955 0.0371 0.1420 
0.5589 0.5308 0.4988 
0.4657 0.5104 0.4508 
0.9235 7.3955 3.0411 
0.7082 0.8621 0.8571 
0.6111 -0.9580 0.3998 
0.0361 -0.0315 0.0149 
between public and private hospitals was reported for the cost share of medical 
residents. The cost shares of higher level personnel was higher in non-teaching 
tertiary facilities. Cost shares of nurses were much higher in public than in private 
hospitals, and formed the next biggest cost item in tertiary facilities. The high cost 
share of nurses in higher level facilities may reflect the standard licensing regulations 
which specify the number of staff for every service level offered. Although one 
cannot prejudge the appropriate factor mix as they vary across countries and hospitals. 
staffing patterns can serve as an indicator of hospital performance (Barnum and Kutzin, 
1993). Low-level staffing. as shown by high cost share of non-medical personnel, was 
highest in primary and secondary hospitals reflecting the low level of resources used 
per patient. Although it is generally held that higher level facilities offer better quality 
services, without information health outcomes for each facility type, one cannot 
directly deduce the quality differences in these facilities. 
Estimated elasticities of variable costs reflect the changes in variable costs 
arising from changes in hospital outputs and capacity (i.e. number of bed proxy). That 
these output elasticities were found to be low can be interpreted as the relative 
unresponsiveness of variable costs to small increases in outputs. But this appears to 
be contrary to findings by Zingapan, shown in Table 5.12. which showed hospital 
services to be driving total costs up. That Zingapan observed the significant 
relationships through a simultaneous system. with the hospital outputs estimated 
endo~enouslv, mav sug~est that hospital services, at least for in-patient services. may 
.._ , ... ..... .... 
be endogenous. That is. the number of in-patients is determined from within the 
hospital function. The Alba-Bugayong model may therefore suffer frL)Ill a 
misspecification problem. Or the problem may be due to an omitted variable error. 
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Cowing and Holtman (1983) who used similar translog estimat~s, had a variable on 
'the number of admitting physicians'. Cowing and Holtman found a significant 
influence of their estimates, suggesting that doctors "can over-use services or generate 
demand for services" ( 1983: 646). 
In terms of the cost curves, the authors concluded that hospitals were operating 
at the decreasing portion of their average variable costs curves. A doubling of in-
patient discharges would increase variable costs by only 3. 7 percent in public facilities 
and 14.0 percent in private facilities. While a doubling of out-patient visits would lead 
to a 53.1 and 49.8 percent increase in variable costs of public and private hospitals, 
respectively. Tertiary teaching facilities were more responsive than other facility-types. 
An increase in hospital capacity by doubling the number of beds increased costs 
by 51 and 45 percent for public and private hospitals, respectively. The low 
responsiveness on variable costs of capacity expansion in primary-level facilities could 
explain the growth of private primary facilities. Alba and Bugayong noted that the 
positive relationship between capital intensity and variable costs may not be an 
important concern compared to the greater issue of whether improvements in 
technology result in enhanced capacity to prevent deaths and improve treatment. 
Without a variable to capture case mix in their model, the answer is precluded. The 
exclusion of a case mix variable was shown by Feldstein ( 1984) to result in 
underestimates of returns to scale. 
Index of scale economies could capture whether doubling of outputs influence 
costs. Increases in the number of beds in primary facilities, even given their 
maximum capacities, appear to be warranted. A smaller scale for teniary non-
teaching facilities appears to be more efficient. Economies of scale of public facilities 
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were near to one, signifying nearly constant returns to scale; i.e. costs did not vary 
with upward or downward scaling of all inputs. Private facilities enjoyed economies 
at lower capacity levels, with the economies declining as capacity was expanded. 
Economies of scale estimated by the authors for the whole sample showed that hospital 
operations exhibited constant returns to scale: suggesting that small operations were 
just as efficient as large hospital set-ups. Caution is advised, however. in interpreting 
the results since long-run behaviour was inferred from short-run data and fixed cost 
was proxied by beds and no other fixed investments. 
Estimates for the whole sample showed that index of economies of scope were 
insignificantly different from zero. Offering out-patient and in-patient services jointly 
were not any cheaper than offering these services singly. Economies of scope 
simulations suggest that combining out-patient and in-pa~ient services yield 
diseconomies for primary and secondary facilities. and for public facilities. Combining 
these services bring about slight increases in expenditures in private and tertiary 
facilities. Again caution must be made in drawing conclusions from these results for 
reasons closely related to case mix. Broad aggregation of hospital output into out-
patient and in-patient services fails to capture the multi-product scope of hospital 
activities. i.e. emergency room care, maternity care, etc. 
5.4.4 Comparison of Philippine Cost Function Estimates with Other 
Countries' Estimates 
The two studies cited showed that hospital costs in the country were largely 
driven by inputs and hospital services. although in varying degrees between public and 
private facilities. t-.targinal cost estimates showed that private facilities were more cost-
efficient providers for in-patient services. !\o direct conclusion could be made for out-
patient sen·iL·es because of differences in organization which has not been captured 
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because of measurement error. Private hospital sector costs appeared to be sensitive 
to increases in wages and beds. the two areas where substantial non-price competition 
is expected to take place (Robinson, 1988). 
Barnum and Kutzin (1993) summarized a set of cost studies in\·olving four 
developing countries and observed constant or mildly diminishing returns to scale, 
especially for large hospitals. An observation noted to be true for industrial economies 
as well. Alba and Bugayong (1994) showed that, for the Philippines, diseconomies 
(index less than 1) were generally observed for simulations on tertiary teaching 
facilities, which are generally large facilities. The pattern in scope economies in China 
and Colombia, as examined by Barnum and Kutzin ( 1993), was also mirrored in the 
Philippines. Positive scope economies experienced by private and tertiary facilities 
were so slight that the combination of outpatient and inpatient services appeared to be 
inefficient, as they were for smaller and public facilities. This ohservation appears to 
find support from evidence in the U.S. as cited by Barnum and Kutzin. Wouters 
( 1993). on the other hand, observed constant returns to scale for out-patient services 
and increasing returns to scale for in-patient care in Kenya. No scope economies 
between out-patient and in-patient services were observed. 
The weak scope economies prevailing for public and private facilities, and in 
larger or smaller facilities argues for further investigation, one which perhaps 
disaggregates primary level facilities between public and private as well as between 
types of control of public facilities, i.e. national or local government. This would 
require larger samples than the present database can accommodate. Highly aggregated 
data leads to over estimation of the hospital capacity (Joskow. 1973). Cost beha\iour 
was I ikely to change with time and the economic relationship embodieJ in the~~: 
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estimates will have to be revisited. For example, changes in the management structure, 
in terms of a wider ownership base like a corporate set-up or public listing may alter 
the scale and scope of operations as additional capital entails expansion. 
5.4.5 Limits of Hospital Cost Function Estimates in the Philippines 
The studies of Zingapan (1994) and Alba and Bugayong (1994) presented in 
this chapter comprise the initial hospital cost function studies in the Philippines. It 
represents both the traditional (Cobb-Douglas functions) and advanced (translog flexible 
functional forms) methodological approaches to cost function analysis. The complexity 
with which these estimates have been made masked methodological and measurement 
issues cited above. But the underlying production function or the technological 
relationship transforming inputs into outputs remains unknown. Since these cost 
functions assume that cost-minimization behaviour is given as a restriction, such 
behaviour is no longer the interest of empirical investigations. Market structure 
analysis in the next chapter is useful in this context. Using the same work by 
Zingapan, one can gain information from the behaviour of prices and the extent of 
competition and/or contestability. Whether this cost-minimization assumption is 
validated can be gleaned from market structure analysis. 
The paucity or problems with the data reflect the early stage of the studies. 
Without the adequate capture of case mix and quality, cost function estimates, however, 
need to be interpreted with caution. The extent to which the evidence may guide policy 
was limited by insufficient variables to capture quality and the complex nature of 
hospital activities. Given the nature of discharges in Philippine hospitals which were 
dominated by communicable. infectious and maternity cases. case mix in term of 
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outputs of obstetric or diagnostic laboratory units could be investigated. Further 
aggregation would allow comparisons to be made between non-hospital and hospital 
care for certain of these health conditions and service departments. 
Quality, measured by equipment, was also inadequate due to the lumping of 
sophisticated MRIICT scan equipment with basic X-ray machines. Personnel ratios can 
inform on quality; although they may not necessarily coincide with patient valuations 
(Phelps, 1992). Composite measures of quality, as suggested in Wouters (1993) and 
similar to the quality measure developed for the health care demand model in Chapter 
4; along with diagnostic-related group analysis of hospital treatment episodes 
(Soderlund, et al., 1995) can be explored for further work in hospital cost studies. 
5.5 Conclusions 
The supply-side of the health sector in the Philippines showed a mixed pattern 
of capacities and dispersion. While public hospital facilities were largely (52 percent) 
medium-sized facilities, with beds between 25 and 99, private facilities, on the other 
hand, were dominated (57 percent) by small. primary facilities. While private 
facilities con1prised a larger share (66 percent) of the total number of hospitals. public 
beds exceed the private, at 55 and 45 percent. respectively. In terms of distribution 
across the regions, the National Capital Region had a larger share of beds in both 
public and private facilities. But the dispersion of primary private facilities show a 
curious pattern. with nearly half ( 49 percent) of primary beds found in the regions 
down the southern portion of the country. This pattern has raised concerns that this 
may be attributed to the reimbursement system of \kdicare as higher reimbursl.'ment 
claims were alsn uncnvered in these areas 
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Health manpower profiles, on the other hand, showed that the population to 
nurses and midwives ratios were favourable compared to physicians. The population 
was generally underserved by dentists. The geographic distribution of the health 
manpower showed that more physicians were found operating outside Metro Manila 
and its environs, than were dentists or nurses. 
The profile of assets and technology in hospital facilities reflected that public 
facilities have considerably more assets than private facilities. Details from the hospital 
survey, however, showed that investments in vital medical equipment varied by size 
of facilities, with private investments in this equipment exceeding public investment. 
But the lack of full complement of vital equipment like X-ray and ECG in secondary 
facilities raises questions about the quality of these facilities. More private tertiary 
facilities reported having the relatively costly MRI/CT scan, than private secondary 
facilities reported having an ultrasound. 
The profile of out-patient provider practice showed that there appeared to be a 
mutually self-supporting pattern between private practitioners and hospitals whereby the 
latter provide facilities for independent practice by physicians. This landlord role for 
hospitals made out-patient practice in the private sector relatively independent, albeit 
restrictive to those who can afford the initial practice rights and to those with personal 
connections. Hence, hospital-based practices were relatively more expensive, seeing 
less patients and catering more to the upper income groups. Although price 
discrimination in terms of the economic status of the patient was more widely reported 
by out-patient provider. 
The picture for the usual hospital in the Philippine is a for-profit, single 
proprietorship or family corporation. With clearly defined property rights. the 
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question is now whether behaviour in these firms are consistent with profit or cost-
minimizing behaviour. 
The examination of the cost structure of hospitals suggested that hospital 
services and input costs determined the total costs of hospitals. The lack of significance 
of other variables, especially those representing case mix and quality, demonstrated 
the specification and measurement problems in estimating hospital cost functions. The 
difficulty was further highlighted by economies of scale and scope estimates to 
determine efficiency of hospital production. The reported estimates suggested that costs 
changed in the same proportion as outputs. Having less or more outputs, or having 
small or large operations, did not influence the structure of hospital costs. Economies 
of scope estimates reported here also showed no cost advantage for combining in-
patient with out-patient services. 
These issues highlight the complexity of hospital operations that pose a 
methodological challenge. Yet, the sophistication with which most of these models 
were estimated suggests that the picture thus presented can sufficiently guide policy. 
One difficulty is that these hospital models were framed in a static manner and 
therefore ignore the dynamic changes in outputs given the rapid changes in inputs, 
especially technology. The extent to which health care supply-side behaviour is 
sensitive to elements in the market structure, i.e. pricing behaviour, competition or 
concentration, is made in the next chapter to determine the efficiency or cost-
minimizing features of the health care market. A more complete picture, which 
combines supply-side considerations with the demand side, provides a coherent picture 
of the health care market in the context of market structure analysis. 
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Chapter Six 
The Structure of the Health Services Market in the Philippines 
Introduction 
Earlier chapters on demand and supply have identified the degree to which 
demand and supply-side behaviour responds to incentives in the market. What remains 
to be done in this chapter is to identify the structure of the market in which such 
behaviour is manifest. Critical to understanding market structure is the knowledge of 
the market shares of firms, the role of competition and the nature of pricing. 
Knowledge of these elements provides an opportunity to examine the tenets of industrial 
economics, particularly contestability analysis, for the insights it may shed on health 
care market structures. 
The chapter is divided up as follows. The first part presents an overview of 
market structure analysis, emphasizing the tenets of the theory of perfectly contestable 
markets (PCM). The second part presents the methodology used to analyze the 
structure of the market. The third part presents the empirical results. The fourth part 
examines whether the market structure identified can be described as a contestable 
market. 
6.1 An Overview of Market Structure Analysis 
6.1.1 Market Structure Perspectives and Contestability Analysis 
The standard approach to the analysis of the market or industry structure is 
examines the size distribution of firms in an industry or across the market. The critical 
element of the analysis is the number of firms. The empirical task is directed at 
establishing the market shares of firms and examining for the degree of concentration 
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or competition. A single measure or index is derived to embody this distribution of 
frrms and this is used as an exogenous variable to examine the influence of structure 
on firm behaviour and market performance. Differences in performance measures like 
pricing. efficiency, innovation and profits are evaluated against a set of factors which 
include the index of market structure. external and internal conditions (Shepherd. 
1990). 
Expressed in a functional relationship. the study of market structure IS 
modelled, in the mainstream approach as (Ibid .. p. 7): 
Performance = a function of (Structure. Behaviour, 
Internal Organization. and External 
Conditions) 
Mainstream industrial organization is viewed to be "primarily about internal market 
conditions: i.e. the degrees of actual competition and monopoly among firms already 
in the market" (Shepherd, 1984; p.574). 
The theory on perfectly contestable markets (PCM), on the other hand. 
considers potential entry as a more decisive element of market structure and not market 
shares, nor the market's internal structure nor the number of firms. The external 
conditions of potential entry are considered to influence internal market performance. 
It does not matter whether there is only one firm or a few firms as the threat posed by 
potential rivals will make them perform in an optimal way. akin to beha\·iour under 
competitive conditions. Potential entry is the main determining element to hoth 
structure and performance. 
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Under PCM, the structure of industry is endogenous 1• In contrasting the new 
theory with the mainstream approach, Baumol (1982) describes the difference as: 
.. .In the older theory, the nature of the industry structure was not normally 
explained by the analysis. It was, in effect, taken to be given exogenously, 
with the fates determining, apparently capriciously, that one industry will be 
organized as an oligopoly, another as a monopoly and a third as a set of 
monopolistic competitors ... The new analyses are radically different in this 
respect. In our analysis, among others, an industry's structure is determined 
explicitly, endogenously, and simultaneously with the pricing, output, 
advertising and other decisions of the firms of which it is constituted. This, 
perhaps, is one of the prime contributions of the new theoretical analyses (p.3). 
6.1.2 The Basic Tenets of Contestability Analysis 
A perfectly contestable market is "one into which entry is absolutely free, and 
exit is absolutely cost less" (Ibid., p.3). The crucial assumption that provides a standard 
for market behaviour is that of hit-and-run entry and exit which arises because of the 
absence of sunk costs. The ability of the entrant to assess the profitability of entry is 
unrestricted since this entrant is placed in a symmetrical position to the incumbent in 
terms of production technique, regulatory conditions and product quality. There is no 
cost disadvantage, therefore, to a potential entrant. The potential entrant can also 
expect no immediate price response from the incumbent. Since entry is free, an 
incumbent cannot prevent an entrant from entering by responding immediately in terms 
of price adjustments. Accommodating retaliatory response from incumbents would not 
fulfil the condition of 'frictionless' or 'free entry'. But in any case it may be possible 
for potential entrants to enter into long-term contracts with customers before entry, 
protecting it from any incumbent price response (Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 
1This claim has not been accepted by some authors. Shepherd ( 1984, p. 578) states that 
this claim suggests an "unfamiliarity with the literature ... Extensive research has sought to 
show how scale economies do influence structure; in shon, to make structure endogenous to 
a full analysis." Man in ( 1993) cites a large empirical literature that endogenizes market 
structure. 
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henceforth BPW, 1988). 
The price of the products sold by incumbents serves as the yardstick by which 
a potentia] entrant can assess profit opportunities. With prices serving as relatively 
fixed parameters, if these prices present opportunities for profits, then entry will be 
induced until such a point that competitive pricing, i.e. where P = MC and zero 
economic profits prevail. A necessary condition for equilibrium in a PCM is 
sustainability. A sustainable structure is defined as a configuration which (BPW, 
1986; p. 341-342): 
... affords no profitable opportunities for entry by potential entrants who regard 
incumbents' prices as fixed (for a period sufficiently long to make C ( ... ) the 
relevant flow-cost function for an entrant). Equation omitted 
Sustainability as an attribute of contestable markets implies that prices are such 
that there are no excess profits in the industry to invite entry into the market. That 
economic profits be zero applies even if the market is oligopolistic or monopolistic. 
To wit (Ibid., p.4): 
In sum, in a perfectly contestable market any economic profit earned by an 
incumbent automatically constitutes an earnings opportunity for an entrant who 
will hit and, if necessary, run (counting his temporary but supernormal profits 
on the way to the bank). Consequently, in contestable markets, zero profits 
must characterize any equilibrium, even under monopoly or oligopoly. 
The strength of the potential entrant in determining market outcomes lies in the 
premise that entry involves zero or low sunk costs, i.e. investments are recoverable, 
or reversible upon exit. Therefore, in the absence of concerns on the magnitude of 
investments, discussions on collusion or other strategic behaviour are assumed away. 
In the words of the originators (BPW et al., 1986): 
... no role is played by the sunk costs, precommitments, asymmetric information 
and strategic behaviour that characterise many real markets and that are the 
subject of much penetrating current research in industrial organisation. With 
irreversibilities and inducements for strategic behaviour assumed away. industry 
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structure in perfectly-contestable markets is determined by the fundamental 
forces of demand and of production technology (p.339). 
Demand is considered only in so far as it defines the size of the market, i.e. that 
level of demand where prices are at the neighbourhood of average costs (Spence, 1983; 
p.988). This presents a theoretical advantage to the theory of PCM. To quote 
Baumol and Lee ( 1991): 
... contestability facilitates the construction and analysis of economic models in 
many of the ways (and for the same reason) that perfect competition does. The 
reason is that contestable markets impose prices rather than demand curves on 
firms. This fact permits the analytic simplification of dealing in parametric 
prices without injection of the complications that arise in taking demand 
functions into account in an analysis of the behavior of the firm (p.3-4). 
As to production technology, economies of scale or capital intensive methods, 
do not necessarily correlate with sunk costs. This facilitates the generalizability of the 
theory of PCM to market configurations where increasing, decreasing or constant 
returns to scale may be the norm. In addition, sunk costs are shown not to correlate 
with fixed costs (BPW, 1982; p.288). This does away with a significant entry barrier, 
fixed costs, considered in mainstream industrial organization analysis. 
Aside from precluding excessive profits, PCMs are also characterized by the 
following attributes which highlight its welfare properties (Baumol and Lee, 1991, p.3): 
1) absence of any sort of inefficiency, e.g. technical, allocative or X-inefficiency, in 
production at industry equilibrium; 2) in cases where the market contains two or more 
sellers, a contestable market requires that the price at which a product is sold is equal 
to marginal cost as required in first-best Pareto optimality; and 3) absence of cross-
subsidy or predatory pricing. The first two are straightforward. Inefficiencies 
increase costs and constitute an invitation for entry by an entrant who can minimize 
on these costs. Pricing below or above marginal costs, where there is more than one 
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seller, presents opportunities for undercutting the incumbent in prices (by producing 
one more or less unit) and in profits which further serve as opportunities for hit-and-
run entry. 
Predatory pricing sees the incumbent finn adopting a price entailing a deliberate 
sacrifice of profits, to either drive out a rival or prevent entry, for the much bigger 
reward of profits once the objective has been attained. With excessive profits 
precluded by zero costs of entry, predatory pricing becomes unattractive. Cross-
subsidy on the other hand entails that low prices in one product line are offset by 
higher prices in another product line of the same firm. To quote Baumol and Lee 
(Ibid.): 
... cross-subsidy permits the entrant to profit by stealing the incumbent's 
profitable markets away, sharing with customers of those products part of the 
supplier's earnings previously going into the cross subsidy (p. 6). 
These welfare outcomes, therefore, present contestable markets as attractive, 
with the results attainable by the mere threat of potential entry. These results hold 
regardless of whether the industry structure is a natural monopoly, a perfectly 
competitive industry or oligopoly behaving competitively. For, as developed more 
formally in BPW (1982; 1988), equilibrium is sustainable in these structures. 
Monopoly and oligopoly do not necessarily result in welfare losses. Once it is 
established that a market is contestable, the invisible hand can hold sway, extending 
the merits of perfect competition beyond its usual boundaries (BPW, 1986; p.333). 
Where unsustainability may be the norm, decision-making guided by the price 
system will be infeasible. The structures that may apply, pertain to cases of panial 
monopolies and/ or monopolistic competition, characterized as Chamberlinian 
structures. Partial monopolies allow the cross-subsidy pricing (cited in the immediate 
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quotation above) and are, therefore, unsustainable. In monopolistic situations, where 
prices are set on the basis of anticipated price reactions of rivals, and therefore result 
in higher tangency equilibria and prices, profitable entry opportunities are presented. 
This, therefore, does not represent equilibria in contestable markets. 
Failure to establish contestability does not lessen the power of the theory. As 
Baumol and Lee (1991, p. 7) stated: 
Note, however, that the analytical power of the theory does not depend on the 
ubiquity of contestability; indeed, its policy lessons apply primarily to industries 
that are not contestable, whose regulation can be aided by contestability theory, 
which provides norms of behavior to which the regulated firms can reasonably 
be held. 
By accommodating configurations other than just perfectly competitive markets, 
the theory of PCM provides a wider scope for policy. Its broadening of the policy 
options for the more complex and realistic structures underpins the theory's 
achievement. The study of contestable markets is, therefore, a search for the 
'disciplining eJement', if established, in market allocations. 
In summary, the conditions establishing the presence of c'"'ntestability involve: 
a) zero or low sunk costs; b) symmetric position between incumbent and potential 
entrant; and c) no immediate price response from the incumbent. Frictionless entry 
will yield optimal outcomes that are predicted as follows: a) efficient prices assuring 
firms of financial viability; b) equilibrium yields least-cost minimizing behaviour; and 
c) sustainability with firms making zero economic profits; i.e. there is no other 
investment that presents positive profit opportunities. 
The extent to which the health care market in the Philippines can be assessed 
10 terms of such conditions is made following the presentation of the empirical 
estimates. 
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6.2. Methodological Issues and Approach Used 
This section describes the approach used by contestability analyses to identify 
the market structure. The second part discusses issues related to defining market 
boundaries in health care. The over-all approach used in the empirical portion of the 
chapter ends this section. 
6.2.1 Determining Market Structure Using Contestability Analysis 
Shepherd (1984) noted that "Baumol et al offer virtually no tests and no 
concrete design"(p.582). However, the determination of structure, as discussed in 
Baumol (1982), proceeds in two steps. The first step involves determining what 
structure can produce a given output vector of a given industry efficiently or in a least 
costly manner. In what is viewed as a normative step, if efficiency entails that the 
industry output vector is small compared to cost-minimization output levels of the most 
efficient firn1, then the structure will be characterized by few firms. The second step 
involves investigating when market pressures will lead towards such efficient 
equilibrium structure. The transition to the second step is described by Baumol (Ibid.) 
as follows: 
The transition toward the second, behavioral, stage of analysis is provided by 
the observation that the optimal structure of an industry depends on its output 
vector, while that output vector in tum depends on prices charged by its firms. 
But since pricing depends on industry structure, then we are brought full circle 
to the conclusion that pricing behaviour and industry structure must be 
determined simultaneously and endogenously (p. 7). 
Given an endogenous format for determining structure, the output vector 
which minin1izes total costs at equilibrium must, therefore, be the only structure 
consistent with industry equilibrium in the long run. For Baumol (Ibid.), this makes 
... the second stage of the analysis of industry (turns out to be) a sham. 
Whatever industry structure was shown by the first normative portion of the 
analysis to be least costly must also emerge as the industry structure selected 
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by market behaviour ... No additional calculations are required by the 
behavioural analysis. It will have been done in the normative cost minimization 
analysis and the behavioural analysis is pure bonus (p.7). 
An examination of prices in health services in the Philippines can, therefore, 
be expected to inform on the structure of the industry, following contestability 
theory's endogenous format described above. High price-cost margins provide an 
indirect test of the nature of sunk costs; i.e. "high sunk costs limit exit and entry, 
permitting high price-cost margins" (Shepherd, 1984; p. 583). 
6.2.2 Defining Market Boundaries in Health Care 
Market structure analysis begins with a definition of the market boundaries. 
There are two dimensions to defining these boundaries: the delineation of the product 
type and identification of the geographic area or location. Health services in general, 
and hospital services, in particular are complex organizations. Anti-trust literature, 
however, has shown that market boundaries can be delineated in the hospital sector. 
The nuances and difficulties in defining hospital markets have been reviewed 
extensively in Morrisey, et al.(l988) and Zwanziger et al.(1994). The former article 
explores the ways anti-trust guidelines in the United States can apply to the hospital 
market. The latter article, on the other hand, proposes a method to refine anti-trust 
approaches to facilitate selective contracting of providers by HMOs. 
The criterion for determining the boundaries of the product market, 
substitutability of demand or supply, can be used to determine the nature of sunk costs 
in health care. Two services are considered substitutable in demand on the basis of 
the cross-elasticity of demand between them: the extent to which consumers are able 
to switch to substitutes for that good or service in response to a price increase. The 
results reported in the Chapter 5 show that the demand for out-patient care in 
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government hospitals and clinics and private providers are considered close substitutes. 
The extent to which this is so for hospital services does not appear as straightforward. 
Zwanziger et al.(1994) has shown that substitutability from a demand 
perspective is akin to asking whether individual services in hospitals are substitutable 
in treatment. That this concept is of limited application to hospital services can be 
described through an example. Normal delivery and abortion, if viewed from patients, 
are different products. Surgery and chemotherapy may be substitutable for particular 
treatments but requiring different personnel and equipment; but they can be 
considered as the same product in the market for cancer treatment (Ibid., p.431). 
SubstitutabiJity in supply would be a concept closer to the concern m 
contestability analysis as it refers to the extent to which providers can enter the market 
or expand output. Baumol, et al's analysis follows the assumption of competition 
models in which products from different suppliers may be viewed as homogenous. 
From the supply perspective, the focus is on the degree to which treatments can be 
performed with the same inputs of personnel and equipment and the degree to which 
such inputs can be shifted from one service to another. Using this criterion, 
Zwanziger et al. notes the following (Ibid., p. 437): 
Many hospital services do not require highly specialized equipment and/or 
training. In some cases a hospital need only have a physician on its staff in the 
appropriate specialty, a modest amount of equipment required by the specialty, 
and properly trained support staff to be capable of providing the service. Given 
these resources and the attendant equipment and training, entry into most 
disease-specific markets would be low-cost (Baumol, 1982). Such ease of entry 
suggests that a hospital that is currently the "monopoly" provider of narrowly 
defined service could not, based on supply substitutability, hold this monopoly 
long if the prices it charged were excessive, as long as the other local hospitals 
have the appropriately trained physicians on their staff and the necessary 
equipment. 
Given the information provided earlier on the nature of hospital discharges 
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reported across size categories of hospitals (see Chapter 2, Table 2.14,), the leading 
causes of discharges are similar and largely relate to infectious/ communicable diseases 
and deliveries. Deliveries, for example, comprise 40% of tertiary hospital cases but 
could be done in lower level facilities or even at home. These health conditions 
would not require high-technology equipment and highly specialized personnel. In this 
sense, there is potentially easy entry into hospital services. 
The geographic area or location is another dimension to delimiting market 
boundaries. It is important for estimating market shares and the extent of competition 
in a market. Two empirical studies on hospital competition estimated the geographic 
boundaries using zip code areas. Melnick and Zwanziger (1988) combined both 
political boundary and shipment-based approaches. This procedure was also applied 
by Robinson, et al. (1991) to a regional data in the U.K. A patient's origin data from 
a central information source (Health Facilities Commission for the California study and 
NHS data for the U.K. study) captured the extent of "export" or "import". A market 
area for a hospital may be considered so if it contain at least 40 percent of the 
hospital's discharges. A competitor was considered if at least 3 percent of its 
discharges were drawn from at least one of the zip code areas' (ZCAs) served by 
another hospital. 
The estimates of market structure of hospital services in the Philippines reported 
m this chapter are based on household survey responses to hospital use (defined as in-
patient care for more than 8 hours). Hence it captures where patients go to. There 
was no data available on where patients came from based on hospital admissions. The 
political boundary used is the province. Such boundary is expected to overstate the 
degree of competition for anti-trust purposes (Zwanziger, et al.. 1994. p.432). 
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However, patient preferences and the degree to which choice is limited to certain 
localities are issues in themselves. 
6.2.3 Over-all Approach 
The empirical investigations, in this chapter, used various data sources and 
methodologies, to establish the market structure of health care in the Philippines. 
Estimates of market shares of hospital facilities, using data from the household survey 
used in the demand analysis, were made using an adaptation of the Hirschman-
Herfindahl Index. The second part, of this section, presents regression estimates on 
hospital outputs from the same Zingapan (1994) study cited in Chapter 5. The 
emphasis of the discussion is on the nature of the market, and whether hospital outputs 
are influenced by price and/or the number of firms in the market. Contestability 
analysis posits that the determination of price, outputs and market structure is 
simultaneously and endogenously determined (see quote, p. 223 above, from Baumol, 
1982); and therefore, no a priori assumption is made on the direction of causality. 
This implies that output levels and prices can indicate what the market structure is, and 
vice versa. The regressions on hospital outputs also serve as parts of a simultaneous 
system of equations to provide price and cost estimates to infer, given the limitations 
of the model and the data, the market structure in health care. The regressions on 
outputs, rather than prices, were largely dictated by data limitations. 
The last portion of the empirical work examines pricing behaviour. The extent of 
price discrimination is examined for Metro Manila physicians' cnarges for in-patient 
consultations, using market research data. Hospital pricing behaviour, using the 
results of Zingapan's multi-equation regressions, is presented. Information on pricing 
behaviour. culled from various studies on other sectors in the health care market. is 
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also presented to identify the structure of the health care market. 
6.3 Empirical Analysis 
6.3.1 The Extent of Competition I Concentration in the Hospital Market 
in the Philippines 
After identifying the market boundaries, market structure is estimated using an 
adaptation of a widely-used index, the Hirschman-Herfindahllndex (HHI). The index 
is estimated by summing-up the squares of the market shares of all firms, in this case, 
hospitals, in the area. HHI figures fall between 0 and 1, with 1 signifying extreme 
concentration. Because of the household sample base, the measure shown below is 
a modification of HHI since only the market shares of the top-three hospitals which 
most households reportedly used were included. What the measure of concentration 
has captured is the extent to which a particular hospital faces competition, from the 
perspective of patient choice. Weighing the index by the proportion of total users for 
each category over the number of reporting households in the area gives a measure of 
the degree of competition. 
The results are shown in Table 6.1. Hospital markets in the Philippines are 
shown to be competitive, to the extent that there are, from the patient's perspective, 
many firms to choose from. The highest index of concentration was .36 for the most 
far-flung province in the sample. The concentration index for public hospitals appears 
to be slightly higher than for the private hospital market, suggesting that public 
hospitals may have a large share of the market in areas where private investment may 
be lacking. Weighing the index to control for public-private preferences, showed that 
the top three hospitals hardly constituted a significant presence as the index was hardly 
nudged. e.g. rounding-off to the nearest point would yield closely similar amounts. 
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Table 6.1 
Market Concentration of Top Three* Hospitals 
By Type of Hospital, in Survey Areas 
1992 
Areas/ Name of Hospitals Share of Market Concentration Degree of 
Top Three Share Index** Competition*** 
Metro Manila/Public 35% 49<>~ 0.01 
Metro Manila Private 26% 51~o 0.00 
Region 2 
Cagayan/Public 82<>A> n% 0.12 
Cagayan/Private 80% 23% 0.01 
Ouirino/Public 100% 80% 0.26 
Quirino Private 100% 20% 0.04 
Region 7 
Cebu/Public 63% 45% 0.03 
Cebu/Private 56% 55% 0.03 
Bohoi/Public 65% 65% 0.06 
Bohoi/Private 78% 35% 0.03 
Region 10 
Misamis Oriental/Public 68% 54% 0.10 
Misamis Oriental/Private 82% 46% 0.04 
Surigao/Public 82% 89% 0.36 
Surigao/Private 100% 11% 0.01 
* the top three hospitals reported used in a household survey 
**the closer to 1 the more concentrated; closer to 0 less concentrated; 
estimated as sum of the square of individuals shares of hospitals in top 3 
••• concentration index* market share (following Melnick and Zwanziger, 1988) 
Source of Data: first four columns: DOH-PIDS Household Survey 
Other Hospital Information: DOH-PIDS Hospital Survey 
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0.005 
0.002 
0.096 
0.003 
0.208 
0.008 
0.015 
0.018 
004 
0.009 
0.055 
0.016 
0.322 
0.001 
No of Hospr.al Total AuthorizE 
Be(; CapaciTy 
39 18'. 2 
116 8682 
14 748 
16 240 
4 160 
0 0 
21 2045 
25 1718 
11 492 
20 609 
10 580 
13 426 
9 445 
3 60 
This signifies that consumers are faced with a range of choices. 
The method is not perfect. Estimates, using more centralised data bases, such 
as that using a sample of hospitals in the West Midlands in the U.K., showed three-
quarters of hospital samples operating in a competitive environment (Robinson, et al., 
1991). That the analysis might overstate the degree of competition is attributed by the 
authors to the high level of aggregation in the use of the district as the unit of analysis; 
and to the service unit analyzed - general surgery. The use of provincial boundaries, 
in this Philippine patient hospital choice samples, may have broadened the market 
unrealistically if one considers that hospitals may consider as their competitors only 
those within their immediate vicinity. On the other hand, using the province as the 
geographic unit may still be too small an area as some households can cross seas to get 
to the best metropolitan hospitals. In Quirino, for example, there appeared to be no 
private hospitals at the time of the survey, but there had been private hospital use. 
Presumably the named hospitals are located in the nearest capital in the region. For 
Surigao, while there are three private hospitals, the named hospital for the majority of 
users is a private hospital in Cebu. Without data at a more disaggregated level, like 
districts and/or service categories in terms of primary, secondary or tertiary, which 
can capture localized preferences and probably narrow the extent of the market, the 
table must be interpreted with caution. In addition, patient choices did not specify 
hospitals chosen by type, complaint or the nature of services used. Hence, the 
overstatement of the degree of competition. 
However, the pattern of ownership and distribution of hospital facilities does 
indicate that the small size of most private facilities results in the facilities being more 
widely dispersed. as the table suggests. Hospital planning information shows that 86 
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percent of the population are within 17.5 kilometres (10.85 miles) of DOH hospitals 
in 1989. In municipality terms, 80 percent of municipalities are within that access 
boundary to public hospitals. Primary hospitals are allowed licenses within 15 Ian. 
radius of one another (9.4 miles) in urban areas. The private and relatively low-cost 
nature of hospital investments would support a more dispersed distribution. 
Information about choices of location by physicians in the United States, for example, 
showed that locating in a small town was economically justifiable, depending on one's 
specialization (Newhouse, et al., 1982). The diffusion of specialists followed the 
population distribution pattern. Where specialists were scarce, there would be 
convergence on large, urban centres. However, primary care specialists (i.e. internal 
medicine, obstetrician-gynaecologists, etc.) tended to have wider market areas and were 
likely be found in small towns. Hospitals, especially primary hospitals, are likely to 
be set-up, not by general practitioners, but, by more multi-product primary care 
specialists which allows for greater substitutability in supply, serving wider markets. 
What the measure of concentration in this section has captured is the extent to 
which a particular hospital faces competition in the eyes of the patient. Whether the 
number of firms or local competition influence hospital outputs is now examined. 
6.3.2 Role of Competition in Hospital Services 
Whether the presence of other facilities affect hospital behaviour can be gleaned 
from the regressions made by Zingapan (1994) on hospital output measures, i.e. in-
patient discharges and out-patient contacts. While Zingapan interpreted these estimates 
as demand for hospital services, that were used to estimate the price estimates shown 
later, these dependent variables can also be interpreted as output or performance 
measures for hospitals. This interpretation allows the examination of market structure 
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issues, i.e. role of competition or prices in determining output. 
The results, reproduced in Tables 6.2 and 6.3, show the determinants of 
hospital performance, for in-patient and out-patient services respectively. The 
functional relationships are shown as follows (Zingapan, 1994, p.26): 
hospital in-patient discharges model: 
+ v; 
hospital out-patient contacts model: 
where: 
Pd : average fee per discharge 
Pk : average fee per out-patient contact or visit 
I : total number of persons in the province with health complaint 
OB : total bed capacity of other hospitals in the municipality 
OP : average hospital out-patient fee in the province 
F : average fee charged by physicians per hospital in-patient episode 
in the municipality 
M : average support value per insured patient of the hospital 
X : average annual household expenditures per province 
V, e : error terms 
The descriptive statistics are provided in Appendix 6. The model explains the 
behaviour of in-patient services in government facilities better than the behaviour of 
private faciJities. at 86 and 68 percent respectively. and to a much lower extent for out-
patient services. The out-patient model captured private hospitals' perfonnance weakly, 
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Table 6.2 
Measure of Hospital Performance 1: Total Discharge 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Total Discharges) 
Independent Variables Government Private 
Constant 
Fee Per Discharge 
Ln (Illness incidence in Province) 
Bed Capacity of other Hospitals 
in the Municipality 
Total number of Hospital Beds 
Ln (Doctors' average fee) 
8.2696 (7.27)* 7.0656 (2.04) 
0.0032 (4.11)* -0.0003 (-2.58)* 
0.2004 (2.68)* -0.1454 (-0.41) 
-0.0002 (-3.50)* -0.0001 {-1.24) 
0.0126 (6.12)* 0.0213 (4.70)* 
0.3999 (-2.38)* 0.0478 (.0844) 
Ln(Support value per insured patien -0.3344 ( -4.91) * 0.3591 (3.00) * 
Fee Per outpatient Visit 0.0095 (1.12) -0.0143 ( -2. 79) * 
Equipment 0.3188 (1.36) 0.8914 (1.40) 
Ave. Household Expenditures -7.7623E-08 (-.89) 5.7071 E-08 (.30) 
A-squared 0.8550 0.6822 
Number of Observations 33 32 
* Significant at .05 level 
Source: Zingapan (1994), p. 42 
2]] 
Table 6.3 
Measure of Hospital Performance 2: Outpatient Visits 
Dependent Variable: Ln {Outpatient Visit) 
Independent Variables Government Private 
Constant 2.7782 10.0709 
(1.3} (5.89)* 
Fee Per Discharge 0.0016 -1.4641 E-05 
(2.11 )* (-0.35) 
Ln (Illness Incidence in Province 0.5007 -0.0898 
(3.24)* ( -0.49} 
Ave. Outpatient Fee Per Provine -0.0026 -0.0898 
(-0.86) (-1.96) 
Total Number of Hospital Beds 0.0043 0.0084 
(0.92) (2.74)* 
Ln (Doctors Average Fee) 0.0441 -0.1039 
(0.12} (-0.37} 
Fee per Outpatient Visit -0.0421 -0.0074 
(2.14)* (-2.36)* 
Equipment 0.6792 1.1573 
(1.42} (2.43)* 
Ave. Household Expenditures 4.7716E-09 1.5516E-08 
(0.03} (0.16) 
A-squared 0.7742 0.2949 
Number of Observations 33 32 
* Significant at .05 level 
Source: Zingapan (1994), p.45 
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at 30 percent compared to 70 percent of public hospitals' out-patient outputs. The 
models comprised part of a simultaneous system which included the cost function cited 
above, in p. 195, and the price estimates to be shown in the next section. Therefore, 
the econometric problems related to the cost function estimates, in Section 5.4.2, apply 
to these estimates as well. As part of a simultaneous equation system, 
misspecification of system affects estimates of all structural parameters (Kennedy, 
1992). Furthermore, the estimates may suffer from multi-collinearity, where the 
variables on the right hand side may be closely correlated leading to bias and 
inconsistent estimates. The results, therefore, must be qualified in the light of these 
difficulties and should at best be interpreted as providing indications of the actual 
patterns. 
There are two concerns which are captured in these estimates: 1) the role of 
own-prices; and 2) the role of the number of other suppliers, or extent of competition, 
on hospital discharges. The role of actual competition is, therefore, examined in the 
context of hospital operations. 
6.3.2.1 Role of Prices of Services on Hospital Performance 
The extent to which hospital outputs are responsive to 'own-price' reflects on 
the nature of competition. The same tables 6.2 and 6.3 show that prices, or fees per 
discharge, are significant for both types of facilities albeit in only slight degrees, three 
points from the decimal. But the sign in the relationship is in the opposite direction 
registered for public and private facilities. The higher the fees per discharge the 
higher the reduction in the number of discharges for private hospitals; while the 
number of discharges from government facilities increased with higher charges. 
Zingapan ( 1994) observed that the positive relationship between price and government 
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hospital discharges appear to make sense only within the context of the price-quality 
relationship. Higher prices may serve as proxies for quality from the patient's 
perspective. The extent to which this is so cannot be fully ascertained given the lack 
of significance of the quality variable, 'equipment' or the presence of basic (X-ray) and 
sophisticated (MRI/CT scan) equipment, in the government equation. But this failure 
to find a significant link with the 'equipment' variable may be due to the lumping 
together of basic equipment with a sophisticated and costly one (Zingapan, Ibid.) 
The support value per insured patient, measured as hospital receipts from 
compulsory and private insurance divided by total number of insured patients, also 
showed opposing influence on the number of discharges between private and public 
facilities. Higher support value increased private hospital in-patients, while higher 
support value decreased public hospital discharges. Zingapan (Ibid.) observed that 
insurance coverage for diagnostic services and medicines facilitated their increased use, 
possibly shortening lengths of stay (LOS) in private facilities, "allowing the hospital 
to treat a greater number of cases"(p.43). The negative influence of insurance on 
government discharges, on the other hand, was attributed by the author to increased 
lengths of stay in public facilities not only because of the insurance coverage but also 
because of the lack of available drugs and shortages may induce such long stays. This 
interpretation, however, should be treated with caution as there is no empirical suppon 
to link LOS with insurance. A study on hospital demand, using length of stay as the 
dependent variable in an ordinary least-squares regression, there was no significant 
relationship between insurance and length of stay (Bautista. 1994 ). And the suggestion 
on over-capitalization made earlier in Section 5.4.2, does not suppon the implication 
that private facilities suffer from over-crowding, preventing them from treating more 
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cases, with or without insurance. An alternative interpretation would be that the 
institutional element introduced by the support from insurance provides further 
substantiation to the price-quality interaction in government facilities. In so far as a 
higher support value decreases the price for the patient, a negative relationship for 
government means that an increase in support value would drive total discharges down 
in government facilities as opposed to private facilities. Those with insurance are likely 
to prefer private facilities which are perceived to be of higher quality. 
The results also show that private facilities respond to price competition. 
'Own-price' variables are significant, and in the expected direction (negative), for 
both in-patient and out-patient outputs. With the variables, 'number of hospital beds' 
suggesting size and the 'equipment dummy' being positive and significant for out-
patient services in private facilities, the suggestion is that size and equipment in private 
hospitals attract out-patients. Therefore, expansion and enhancements of hospital 
facilities in terms of equipment, may serve as proxies for quality and can, therefore, 
serve to attract more out-patient contacts for private hospitals. Zingapan (1994) 
interpreted the 'equipment' and 'number of beds' variable together to suggest demand 
inducement for out-patient contacts in private facilities. An alternative interpretation, 
however, is that the significance of 'own-price', 'equipment' and hospital size 
variables for the private out-patient outputs suggests that both price and non-price 
competition may be operating. With the coefficients of these non-price variables, both 
singly or combined. exceeding the coefficient of the 'own-price' variable, non-price 
competition appears to prevail over, or swamp, price competition. Noether (1992) 
showed similar tendencies in U.S. hospital samples and observed that the strength of 
each type of competition cannot be firmly established. 
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For cross-price effects, a higher fee for an out-patient visit is likely to lead to 
a decline in total discharges in private facilities; and an increase in-patient fees can lead 
to an increase in the number of out-patient visits in government hospitals. This 
suggests a potential for some cross-subsidization in the internal OtJerations of hospital 
services, particularly in public services. 
6.3.2.2 Actual Competition and Hospital Outputs 
For in-patient services in Table 6.2, the variable 'bed capacity (number of beds) 
of other hospitals in the municipality' is used as an indication of the actual competition 
faced by the hospitals. It is significant only for government hospitals and the 
influence is negative. An expansion or increase of other facilities in the area would 
lead to a slight decrease (. 0002 percent reduction for every 1 percent increase in 
municipality beds) in the number of public hospital discharges. If non-public facilities 
were available, public hospital discharges would slightly decline. Competition does 
not appear to be an important factor in explaining the number of private hospital 
discharges. Zingapan (1994) explained that this may be due to significant collinearity 
between the variable 'number of beds in other hospitals' with the 'discharge fee' 
variable. 
'Actual nun1ber of beds', a measure of size and capacity of the hospital, 1s 
significant for both government and private hospitals. The greater the number of beds, 
the higher the number of discharges. This raises the old question about demand 
inducement; i.e. have a bed and it will be used. While the 'illness incidence' variable 
is significant and positive for government facilities, it appears to be insignificant for 
private facilities. An increase in 'illness incidence in the province' increases total 
discharges in public facilities, but is of no importance for private facilities. 
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Zingapan reported making alternative estimates usmg 'illness incidence in the 
municipality' instead of province provincial incidence but did not find different results. 
It appears that "only market factors are relevant in rationing private hospital services" 
(Zingapan, 1994; p.44). This suggests that private hospitals can generate demand, not 
related to population needs. 
The variable 'doctors' average fee', defined as the average fee of physicians in 
the municipality where the hospital is located, weighted by the type of hospital 
accommodation of patients, is likely to cause a decline in public hospital admissions 
but would cause no significant effect on private hospitals. Zingapan (Ibid.) observed 
the following: 
The negative relationship supports the notion that hospitals serve as workshops 
of physicians, the latter being the gatekeeper or the agent who finally 
determines whether patients could purchase hospital services (Pauly and 
Redisch, 1973). Furthermore, given that government-employed physicians are 
not supposed to charge their patients, the regression result seems to suggest that 
government hospitals are in effect open-staffed facilities, i.e. these are also used 
as work settings of private or fee-charging physicians. On the other hand, 
private hospital admissions seem unresponsive to physician fee patterns but this 
could be due to the significant collinearity between this variable and hospital 
fees. If private hospitals are also owned by physicians, hospital bills could 
likely include professional fees (p. 41 ,43). 
Following this argument, if government physicians can charge, they might act 
as 'agents' preventing admissions, for admissions are likely to increase their 
government work-load without any increases in renumeration. Alternatively, one can 
interpret this finding within the nexus of market structure analysis. The variable 
'average doctors' fees' in the municipality can also serve as a market structure proxy. 
Textbook economics show that competition results in lower prices. The higher the 
prevailing doctors· fees in the municipality, the less competitive the market. A 
negative coefficient for this market structure proxy in government facilities suggests 
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that the higher the average doctors' fees (the less competitive the market), the lower 
the number of in-patient discharges in government facilities. A corollary of this is that 
the more competitive the market, as suggested by lower doctors' fees, the higher the 
number of discharges in government facilities. Competition, therefore, appears to 
promote inducement in the use of in-patient government facilities. 
The out-patient model did not incorporate a variable to capture the extent to 
which the number of out-patient providers affect the number of out-patients' contacts 
in private hospitals. This may probably account for the low r-squared in the model. 
This would be a more difficult data to collect given the private and atomistic nature of 
independent physician-firms which offer out-patient services. Again we can use the 
variables, 'average doctors' fees' in the municipality and 'average out-patient fees in 
the province', as proxies for the extent of competition, with higher average fees in the 
municipality likely to indicate a more concentrated market. The variables are not 
significant for either facility-types for out-patient outputs. For Zingapan (1994), this 
implies "the presence of 'captive markets' for both facilities ... however, price may be 
a poor indicator of competition" (p.45). This view is confirmed by the strength of 
non-price competition in out-patient contacts earlier cited (Sec. 6.3.2.1). This finding 
suggests that market structure, proxied by the prevailing prices in the area, does not 
appear to influence supply-side behaviour for hospital-based out-patient services. 
6.3.3 Pricing in Hospital and Other Health Care Services 
Pricing behaviour indicates market structure in general. The extent to which 
prices can provide insights into the type of market structure in health care in the 
Philippines is discussed in two ways: firstly, the extent of price discrimination ; and 
secondly, the extent to which prices reflect costs. 
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6.3.3.1 Price Discrimination 
One pricing behaviour in which physician-firms and hospitals are widely known 
to practice is price discrimination on the basis of income. Such an approach is 
described by Earl (1995; p.195-196):2 
This sort of pricing method has often been employed by doctors in situations 
where people are both poor and sick and neither private insurance nor a welfare 
state to pay for their health care: a monopolistic medical practice in a small 
town would tend not to milk the local community for every cent possible but 
make a reasonable living by charging the rich more to cross-subsidize their 
treatment of the poor (p. 195-196). 
Table 6.4 shows the extent of price discrimination, from private market 
research data (shown in Dela Paz-Kraft, 1994), by specialty, for in-patient care 
consultations. For in-patient care, consultation fees vary depending on the 
accommodation of the patients. Private accommodation ranges from double occupancy-
rooms (semi-private) to suites where amenities are similar to those of better hotels. 
The current 1992 prices show that consulting fees increase with more expensive 
accommodations. Across specialties, minimum fees do not show large differences; but 
for maximum fees, general surgery fees are higher than the other specialties. 
It is noted, however, that the case mix is not captured in the data and may 
therefore, bias the results. As lower income groups are likely to stay in wards, and 
represent more severe cases, then prices may reflect intensity of care by the physician. 
2The nature of price discrimination in medical care was discussed in a seminal anicle by 
Kessel (1958). The work expounds on how price discrimination by doctors, i.e. scaling of 
fees by income of patients, describes the behaviour of a discriminating monopolist. Yet 
competition among doctors, as predicted in standard economics textbooks to be in pursuit of 
their own interests, would tend towards the establishment of uniform prices for identical 
services. The failure to achieve such outcome is largely seen in tenns of the control 
mechanisms (against price-cutting) imposed by organized medicine on its members. A 
critique of the work is made by Ruffin and Leigh (1973; cf. Foley, et al .. 1981). Arrow 
(1963, p.957). however. does not believe that the scale of profit maximizing motive in price 
discrimination is convincing. 
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Table 6.4 
Extent of Price Discrimation 
In-Patient Consultation Fees 
(1992 Pesos) 
S ecialization 
All Practitioners 
Minimum Fees 
Maximum 
Average 
General Surgery 
Minimum Fees 
Maximum 
Average 
Pediatrics 
Minimum Fees 
Maximum 
Average 
Obstetrics-Gynecology 
Minimum Fees 
Maximum 
Average 
Source of Basic Data: 
Ward 
30 
600 
185 
50 
500 
198 
100 
300 
168 
80 
250 
157 
Semi-Private Private Regular 
Room Suite 
30 50 50 
800 1000 2000 
254 254 546 
100 100 100 
800 1000 1500 
280 411 599 
100 150 200 
400 700 1000 
224 347 500 
100 150 200 
380 750 1100 
221 315 417 
Wyatt Survey of Physician Fees, reported in Dela Paz-Kraft (1994}, Table 19 
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The ability to charge different buyers different prices is the essence of price 
discrimination. Gravelle and Rees (1992) pointed out the following: 
It is a practice which could not prevail in a competitive market because of 
arbitrage: those offered lower prices would resell to those offered higher prices 
and so a seller would not gain from discrimination. Its existence therefore 
suggests imperfections of competition ... (p.274). 
The statement needs to be qualified for health care as there is no re-sale market 
given that the output is often embodied in patients (Roberts, 1991). However, the 
ability to price discriminate in health care reflects more on the ability to segment the 
market through product differentiation. Kessel ( 1958) describes the extent of 
differentiation in health care as: "each buyer of medical services that are produced 
jointly with hospital care constitutes a unique separable market" (p.21). 
Differentiation refers to the distinction made between goods on the basis of the 
characteristics of the good, like quality, location, time, etc. This leads to the 
segmentation of the market on these product characteristics and the formation of 
'market niches' (Tirole, 1992). The prevailing practice of price discrimination is, 
therefore, likely to lessen the competitive tendencies in the health care market. 
6.3.3.2 Prices and the Market Structure 
Prices indicate the structure of the market. The ability to charge high prices reflect the 
degree of market power enjoyed by firms. Table 6.5 shows pricing behaviour in 
hospital services in the Philippines. For hospitals, Zingapan's (1994) pricing 
estimates are presented. Statistical estimates of prices of in-patient care formed part 
of the simultaneous equation model, where prices first appeared as exogenous 
determinants in the cost and hospital services or demand functions (shown in p. 195 
and p. 226, respectively). Prices, as instrumental variables in a simultaneous equation 
system, were modelled to vary with the same variables in earlier equations, along with 
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Table6.5 
Estimates of Market Power: Philippines 
I Facil~ /Service Variable 
Hospitals \1 Inpatient Discharges: (Pesos) 
Profit Maximizing Mark-Ups 
Net tncome Maximizing Fee 
Fees Per Unit of Service 
M.ginal Costs 
Per Unit Fees as Prop. of Marginal Cost 
Fees as Prop. of Net Income Max'z Fee 
Insurance \2 Non-Benefit Costs as % of Contributions 
Medicare (annual ave.) 
Private Insurance Cos. 
Drug Companies \3 
Total Average Mark-up (%) 
Break-down of Mark-Ups 
Operating Expenses (%) 
Profits(%) 
Taxes(%) 
Physician-Firms \ 4 Ave. Usual Fee Over Non-Physician Costs 
General Practice .95 
lntemal Medicine 1.85 
Ob-Gyn 1.59 
Pediatrics 1.32 
Surgery .93 
Notes: 
1/Fees, Marginal cost, profit maximizing income 
estimated simultaneously using 3-stage least squares. 
Public 
Domestic 
Source of Data: Hospital Administrators Survey, PIDS-OOH Project 
2/Non-benefit costs estimated as residual 
after deducting gross losses from gross premiums; 
annual average from 1981-1989 
Source of data: Annual Reports to the Insurance Commission 
3/Ma.rk-ups estimated as percentage increase a firm 
imposes on top of what it spent for producing 
Its products. Based on analysis of 1983- 1986 averages from 
financial statments filed with the Securities Commission by 39 drug firms. 
4/Non-physician costs include expenditures for rent, 
aupplies, drugs, repairs, compensation of assistants, 
licenses, Insurance, utilities, and other overhead expenses. 
Source of Data: Outpatient Clinic Survey, PIDS-OOH Project 
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Referel.ce 
Private Zingapan, , 994 
(31 1) 3,448 
3,185 4,907 
215 1,692 
3,015 1,459 
0.07 1.16 
0.34 
Gamboa et al .. 1 993 
4.2 
35.46 
Foreign Bautista, 1992 
43 132 
87 53 
8 29 
4 16 
Kraft and Umpiado, 
1994 
the inclusion of subsidies per bed for government facilities, and a ratio of insurance 
patients to total patients to serve as identifier for consistent esti~tes. 
Estimated in-patient prices as a proponion of marginal costs were shown to be 
.07 and 1.16, for public and private facilities, respectively. This indicates that fees 
per unit of service in the public sector did not recover the marginal cost of providing 
them; while, fees in the private sector more than doubly compensates (116%) for the 
marginal cost of provision. Profit-maximizing mark-ups estimated from econometric 
analysis showed high three-figure mark-ups for the private sector and negative for the 
public sector. Fees per patient-service, however, comprised only 34 percent of net 
income maximizing fees in private facilities. This implies that current fees in private 
facilities do not reflect what they could be if firms behaved in an income-maximizing 
way. If market power is not used to extract profits, as the figure suggests, then price-
cost margins may reflect inefficient, non-cost minimizing behaviour. 
The picture for the other components of the health sector; i.e. health insurance, 
drug companies, out-patient clinics, also confirmed the prevailing pattern of mark-up 
pricing. Although the analysis of these other components of health services are panial 
analysis, the picture in general for the Philippines is one where firms enjoy tremendous 
market power as signified by the price-cost gaps. The measures, as a result of 
averaging, may however, mask differing operating environments. Problems related 
to cost estimates, cited earlier in Sections 5.1.2 and 5.5, in Chapter 5, may under-
estimate costs which may lead to overstating the price-cost gaps. 
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6.4 Implications for Contestability 
From a perfect competition model, these prices reflect 'market power'. The 
ability to charge prices higher than marginal costs provides an indication of 
monopolistic tendencies in the market. The excess of price over marginal costs in 
private hospital facilities, as well as high returns relative to costs in other health 
services in the market, indicate that health service firms in the Philippines have 
monopolistic features. Combined with the market shares information which suggested 
competitive elements, the structure that can most usefully describe the Philippine health 
care market appears to be monopo1istic competition. 
To follow through the predictions of contestability theory, the following 
questions can be asked: 
a) Do these pnces reflect stable efficient prices necessary for financial 
viability? 
b) Will the market settle towards cost-minimization in the long-run? 
c) Do these prices result in profits that are sustainable such that incumbent 
firms will be 'whipped' into behaving by a potential entrant? 
The information from price-cost margins alone suggests that profit 
opportunities exist; violating condition (c) above. Positive mark-ups provide 
inducements for entry to other firms. The unsustainability of mark-up prices, given 
that "firms earn non-negative profits at higher costs than necessary" (BPW, 1988; p. 
351). makes the approximation of contestable markets' efficiency performance 
doubtful. That another firm can come in to duplicate the product already in the 
market, such that it can charge at a lower price and gain a share of the market, and 
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with existing firms not expecting to respond immediately, provides opportunities for 
profit for the potential entrant. 
The prediction of cost-minimization (condition b above) may not be fulfilled, 
g~ven the market structure of health care in the Philippines. In monopolistic 
competitive structures production may not occur at minimum average cost point, 
implying that there may be persistent excess capacity, i.e. expansion of output possible 
to lower costs, in the market. With frictionless entry, a more efficient firm can come 
and offer a product at lower price. While the original conceptualisation of 
monopolistic competition, following Chamberlin (1933), showed convergence of the 
market towards sustainable conditions, i.e. non-zero profits (Tirole, 1992), Baumol 
et al. (1982) argues otherwise: 
... such a position cannot be an equilibirium in a contestable market. A entrant 
can closely or exactly duplicate the product design of the firm depicted, and 
enter at a lower price ... there exists (temporarily) profitable entry opportunities, 
so 'high tangency equilibria' cannot be equilibria in contestable markets 
(p.332). 
Profits, serving as inducements for further entry, are likely to persist given the 
nature of differentiation or market segmentation as described in the previous section. 
However, differentiation results in products not exactly duplicated; in which case, the 
potential entrant is unlikely to charge lower prices, and the disciplining element 
provided by potential entry does not apply. Martin (1993) noted that "the theory of 
contestable markets does not apply where products are differentiated" (p.310), as it is 
actual competition rather than potential competition that drives towards efficient market 
outcomes. Differentiated markets would not threaten incumbents even if entrants 
charged slightly lower prices. 
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Moreover, the fulfilment of the prediction on stable efficient prices (condition 
c) may not be true for the health care market, as prices in medical care provide a 
different signal. The price-quality interaction in health care suggests that lower prices 
may be associated with poorer quality. For this same reason, incumbent prices are 
likely to be adopted as market differentiation in health care makes direct comparisons 
of outcomes unlikely. And retaliatory pricing may be unlikely to occur for the same 
reason that lower prices will be perceived to be low quality. These considerations 
suggest that there is stability in the health care market; but such a stability does not 
converge towards zero profit, efficiency outcomes. 
6.5 Conclusion 
Policy reforms in health care have increasingly looked towards market 
mechanisms to bring about greater efficiency and therefore release more resources for 
health care provision .. Contestability theory provides a basis for broadening the 'sway 
of the invisible hand' by positing that potential entry is a more decisive element of 
market structure; and that one firm or few firms can still perform in an optimal way, 
akin to behaviour under competitive conditions, so long as the conditions of entry 
remain open. The analysis in this chapter has shown that contestability analysis may 
have limited applicability to the health care market in the Philippines, in the light of 
the institutional arrangements in the health sector. The structure, exemplified by the 
health care market in the Philippines, which contain both competitive and monopolistic 
elements, does not appear to provide the conditions that potential competition is 
sufficient to discipline markets towards efficient performance. Potential entry as a 
behavioural postulate appears limited for it masks institutional and behavioural elements 
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that appear far more prevalent and enduring in health care. 
In the context of the analysis on demand, supply, and regulatory structures, the 
nature of costs do not just relate to the 'sunk' and the nature of technology. Cost 
function analysis, cited in Chapter 5, showed that the market structure in the 
Philippines, does not appear to be determined by production technology, as 
economies of scale appeared to be constant. Nor can it be attributed to superior 
technology, as economies of scope were found to be weak. Following Shepherd 
(1984), price-cost margins suggest the existence of substantial sunk costs. There 
appeared to be relative ease of entry implied by supply conditions that showed 
numerous, small providers in the private sector; and that despite the dominant presence 
of government, market shares' estimates did not support a concentrated market. The 
private sector operated as independent firms, in single or small hospitals, or operated 
as single-proprietorship firms with low assets. The pattern of growth and dispersion 
of the private sector appeared to have been encouraged by the fee-for-service system 
of health care financing. 
A low demand responsiveness, as shown by the relative inelasticity of demand, 
suggests that consumers do not respond instantaneously to changes in prices. This 
relative inelasticity of demand underpins the position of providers in the health care 
market. The analysis on the regulatory framework suggests that self-regulation by the 
providers enhance asset-specificity at the occupational level, that is, at the level of entry 
to the medical profession. The relative ease of entry, suggested above, may relate 
to the practice market; and therefore masks the nature of costs for firms entering the 
health care market. 
These costs may be attributed to the 'friction' created by the asymmetrical 
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position of participants (consumers, providers and government), arising from the 
difficulties of measuring outputs, outcomes and the quality of care. The conditions 
of supply and demand and the nature of financing and regulations suggest that 
uncertainties and information asymmetries are prevalent in the country's health market 
and give rise to the persistent asymmetry between the distribution of resources and 
health care needs in the country. A further examination of the consequences of these 
asymmetries for the organization of health care can move the analysis to an 
examination of the nature of transaction costs, following the lines of theorising by 
Williamson (1975). For consumers, the costs of illness comprise not just direct fees 
but also access costs and the consumption of other goods. The entry and exit costs 
engendered by self-regulation also comprise such costs. The incentives provided by the 
direct link between financial outlays in health care and provider incomes create 
incentive problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. For institutional payers, like 
insurance schemes, the need for close monitoring increase the costs of insurance, 
leading to inadequate insurance coverage, and therefore, imperfect health care markets. 
Further work can explore these issues. 
The last chapter concludes the study and highlights the st"Jdy's limitations and 
implications for further work and policy. 
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Chapter Seven 
Discussion and Conclusion 
An analysis of the structure of the health care market has not been adequately 
examined in the context of a developing economy, much less analysed from an 
economic perspective. In the light of recent legislative and policy initiatives which 
have the potential of bringing about major transformation in the health sector in the 
Philippines, an analysis of the market structure in health care was undertaken. 
This chapter discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the empirical anlyses 
undertaken in Chapters 3 to 6 and indicates the areas for further research. The chapter 
concludes with the implications, derived from an over-all perspective of the study's 
findings, for health policy reforms in the Philippines. 
7.1 Discussion, Limitations and Further Considerations 
The study attempted to contribute to research on the economics of health care 
by an analysis of the behaviour of a developing country's health care market. This 
included an exploration on the basic conditions of health financing, demand and 
supply, and an examination of market structure issues, particularly market shares, the 
nature of competition and pricing in the Philippine health care system. The analysis 
undertaken was largely exploratory: drawing upon recent theoretical analyses, utilising 
original data sets to derive economic (including welfare) parameters on equity and 
demand, assessing recently available econometric analyses on Philippine hospitals, and 
providing a developing economy perspective to the emerging discussions on market 
structure or industrial organization of health care. 
The structure of the Philippine health care market was shown to have a weak 
demand side. adequate health delivery infrastructure characterised by inefficient cost 
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structures, and widespread cost-price margins. These characteristics, combined with 
a ~thin market' arising from the lack of ability to pay under a fee-for-service financing 
system and inadequate insurance coverage, suggest market and institutional rigidities. 
The findings impJy that competitive market reforms aJone are unlikely bring about 
desired health care provision and market outcomes, viewed in terms of improved heaJth 
conditions, reduced inequities and enhanced efficiency. These findings, however. need 
to be qualified by the limitations of the approach, data and methodological problems 
which are discussed in detail below. The discussion includes some suggestions on how 
the analysis can be pushed forward by further work. 
The Financing of Health Care in the Philippines 
The analyses described in chapter 3 bring together recent available information 
and analysis on health care financing, utilising various data sets, to provide a 
background on the efficiency and equity of the heaJth financing system in the country. 
The analysis of the pattern of health care expenditures showed that household budgets 
comprised the largest source of health care spending, with government budgets steadily 
declining. A comparison of expenditure trends with other countries showed that the 
country's level of health care spending appear to be correlated with its relative position 
in health and economic development in the Southeast Asian region. 
An analysis undertaken using matched data sets of family tncome and 
expenditures survey with the national heaJth survey, the first of its kind in the country, 
showed that concentration curves of standardised heaJth status and household health 
care spending were both skewed, with the latter being more so, in favour of the upper 
income groups. The extent of the skewness, however, needs to be qualified in the 
light of the limitations. discussed in the text. of the measure of heaJth status used and 
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the limitations of household expenditures data sets. When a better data set can be made 
available, ideally from a single source, further work can be directed towards 
estimating the indices for inequality of health status and spending, controlling for other 
health conditions, and weeding out collinearity of health status measures with household 
wealth and access to health facilities. 
It was argued that the extent to which third-party payments for insurers can be 
an influential force in the country~s current health system is limited under the present 
organizational framework. From a general assessment of the private health insurance 
sector in the Philippine (Chapter 3), it was shown that the problems could be attributed 
to factors coming from outside the health sector as well as within: from a lack of 
information about market potential, rigidities in capital markets, and from the 
affordability of health insurance premiums, with additional loading (shown in table 
6.5) by insurance companies to premiums to secure them against what they perceive 
to be high risks. There is very limited information available on the private health 
insurance sector in the country. This probably reflects the limited impact of the sector 
on the organization of health care. Insurance companies were shown to be performing 
a minimal underwriting role in the health care market by undertaking purely financial 
intermediation functions (Sec. 3.4). Newly-organized health maintenance organizations 
(HMOs), on the other hand, did not appear to provide a serious alternative to private 
indemnity insurance companies, because of higher premiums, limited provider base, 
geographic concentration and provider or corporate origins. Further work can 
examine the determinants of the pattern of growth of the companies against industry 
and macroeconomic developments, as well as health care costs. 
The analysis of the compulsory health insurance programme (Sec. 3.5), 
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Medicare, showed it to have limited coverage (covering less than one-fifth of the 
employed population), to be biased towards support for hospital care and to offer low 
support values (paying for a maximum of less than 50 percent of actual hospital bills). 
The fee-for-service system that prevails, with Medicare paying benefit ceilings with no 
restrictions on fees charged to patients, has engendered an 'entrepreneurial' health 
system, and provided incentives for the proliferation of private primary hospitals. 
Weak monitoring systems have prevented Medicare from checking opportunism and 
lack of purposeful management and planning has prevented the use of the funds· 
potential to influence the health system towards efficient and equitable health care 
provision. Alternative systems of provision, with Medicare contracting with HMOs, 
did not veer away from the fee-for-service orientation, and the financial risk remained 
unequally shared between providers and patients, insurers and providers and hospitals. 
A more analytical examination of Medicare claims data, if these were to be more 
widely available, would allow estimates to be made of the costs of transactions and 
the welfare loss from opportunism. 
The background information on the equity and efficiency of the financing system 
provided in Chapter 3 was supported by empirical analyses, in Chapters 4 to 6, which 
explored the the determinants of demand and supply to gain an understanding of the 
market structure in health care. Aside from the explorations on market behaviour, 
policy concerns of generating more resources for health care by imposing direct charges 
and efficiency improvements, have been directly addressed by the empirical analyses, 
The Conditions of Demand 
The analysis of health care demand developed in Chapter 4, utilised a model 
patterned upon that used by Gertler and colleagues ( 1990; 1987) whose specifications 
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represent a significant advance from previous consumer health care choice modelling 
(Bitran, 1988). A study on health care demand in the Philippines by Akin, et al. 
( 1985) had been influential in earlier advocacy of user charges. Subsequent analysis 
for the country can, therefore, be viewed as a contribution to the on-going debate. 
Given the equity concerns raised by the policy on user charges, the analysis in chapter 
4 captured the differential responsiveness to price and access costs across income 
groups. The findings suggest that equity concerns can be addressed by price 
discriminatory policies that impose positive charges to those whose demand is relatively 
inelastic, and that fees generated can be directed not so much to bring facilities closer 
to patients, but for cross-subsidising and/or improving services to make them affordable 
to the lower income groups. 
One of the model's strength lies in its consistency with a stable utility 
maximising framework; allowing simulations to be made for welfare parameters which 
have not been previously applied to Philippine data. Welfare effects, measured through 
compensating variation estimates, showed that households needed to be paid amounts 
ranging from 7 to 10 percent of household budgets to remain as well off after the 
imposition of fees in public facilities as before the change. With this amount unlikely 
to be provided from current household and public budgets, given the trends in health 
care spending, yet, with the amount needed falling below what is currently being paid 
for the annual premium payments for Medicare, a programme can be designed to pool 
risks across households. 
However, the robustness of the estimates, with high confidence intervals noted 
for the economic/consumption variables, belies several complex issues in consumer 
choice which have been abstracted from the model to make it empirically tractable. 
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Issues related to data problems and statistical bias, as well as concerns on the 
assumptions of the model, can be raised. These issues are discussed below. 
Firstly, the analysis was based on survey data, where the sampling unit is the 
household. The unit of analysis was the individual, although homehold characteristics 
were shown to affect choice. Individual and household characteristics were viewed 
interchangeably, following a similar approach in human capital theory (Becker 1975). 
A bias in the error terms that might be introduced by a clustering of some individuals, 
given the same characteristics of the households they belong to, was shown to have 
a negligible effect (Section 4.3.20. 
Secondly, data limitations also dictate that some imputations were made for 
some variables, thereby lessening the variations and weakening their effects. The 
problem relates, for example, to severity and opportunity costs of time estimates. The 
concept of severity, relevant to the decision-making process, should be an ex ante 
evaluation. It was not possible for the survey data to capture this. For the survey, like 
most survey material, relied on a description of events that already occurred. Severity 
may have been confounded with other household characteristics like wealth, or by the 
nature of medical treatment received, and thus, weakening its influence on choice. 
The simultaneity of severity with income, with a severely ill patient likely to have 
reduced income, was considered in the discussion (Section 4.3.2) to create a 
downward impact on estimated price and income effects. 
On the other hand, imputing wages for all as weights for the time costs 
estimates, implied that zero opportunity costs were not possible, an assumption that 
may not be appropriate given widespread unemployment and the debilitating effects of 
some illness. The weak time elasticity compared to price elasticity estimates for the 
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lower income groups may have been influenced by this problem. But the findings on 
demand for public clinics confirm similar results by Acton (1975), whereby, for those 
services charging relatively lower, if not zero prices, non-monetary access costs would 
be more important determinants of choice. While the results of the analysis have 
shown that indirect access costs deterred upper income groups more than lower income 
groups, one cannot presume that access costs would be higher in rural areas, despite 
the distance, because of wage effects. The model did not directly capture the 
interaction between income and geographic location. If income was shown to vary 
directly with a specific geographic attribute of the alternatives, the income effects 
would be likely to be on the lower side of the true effects. 
Thirdly, this problem of the interaction between income and geographic effects 
may also be related to the limitations posed by the manner in which quality was treated 
in the model. While the model's consideration of quality as unobservable is ingenious, 
given well-known limitations of exogenous treatment of quality (Wouters, 1991; Bitran, 
1988), the extent to which quality and geographic location of facilities may be 
correlated was not considered. The quality-adjusted price estimates simply assumed 
that facilities that had higher prices (urban) were of better quality than lower-priced 
(nearer) facilities. The extent to which nearer facilities may be preferred because of 
quality attributes of the facility is not considered in the model. Sampling bias may 
also have had an effect on the results, given the relatively higher proportion of urban 
households compared to rural households. Further work can look into the observable 
quality attributes of facilities and the sensitivity of consumers to different quality-types, 
similar to the analysis undertaken in Lavy and Germain ( 1994). 
Fourthly. the Gertler model used for the analysis of out-patient choice. 
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considered only patient-initiated visits. The descriptive analysis showed that 67 
percent of households reporting the consultations to be their first visits and slightly 
more than one-fourth (26%) reporting consultations as follow-ups. The model did not 
distinguish between discretionary and follow-up demand; a limitation that could dampen 
the income and price effects, as other factors like supplier inducement may be 
operating. 
Lastly, the abstractions of the model from uncertainty raise questions about its 
ability to illumine actual conditions. There are two levels of uncertainty. The first 
uncertainty relates to the randomness of illness; while the second type of uncertainty 
relates to the structure of information: on knowing not only the type of treatment 
needed but also the quality of that treatment. The Gertler model may be viewed as 
incorporating the first type of uncertainty, only in so far as uncertainty of demand is 
related to health need, proxied by age and severity. Age was weakly and negatively 
related to private doctor demand; while positively and strongly related to public doctor 
demand. This suggests that the demand for out-patient care may reflect a different risk 
assessement in the sense that older people, with possibly more serious complaints, 
would choose public over private care. 
The second type of information-related uncertainty is just gaining attention in 
the literature, and is associated with studies on the demand for health insurance 
(Feldman and Dowd, 1993). McClellan (1995), following Keeler's (1995) 
conceptualisation, showed that price elasticity estimates "depend substantially on the 
nature and magnitude of uncertainty" (p. 242). Incorporating uncertainty implies for 
further empirical work, including information-related ·nuisance parameters', to prevent 
bias (McClellan, 1995). The type of health plan can capture the extent to which 
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uncertainty, and therefore, price effects, may be minimised. The issue cannot be 
addressed, however, by the available data, as there were no repons of health insurance 
coverage for out -patient care from the survey. 
From the perspective of market structure analysis, the demand parameters 
estimated in chapter 4, provide vital information on the structure of the demand, and 
its responsiveness to market or price conditions. When viewed alongside the 
information on cost structures, the estimated parameters can provide insights into the 
extent to which textbook predictions on the effects of market structures in health care 
can be realised. 
Supply-Side Conditions 
The analysis of supply focused on the production of health care from the 
perspective of a 'firm'. Due to data limitations, hospitals served as the basic unit of 
analysis, although a brief description of the organization of out-patient clinic care was 
presented. The study examined the efficiency of hospital services from the behaviour 
of their cost structures. Although the hospital survey used in the analysis was 
undertaken at the same time as the household survey and in the same study sites, due 
to technical considerations, the household survey did not directly trace reported out-
patient utilisation by households to the sampled hospitals. Moreover, the mutually-
supportive relationship between private practitioners and hospitals, whereby the latter 
served as landlords for practitioners, made distinctions between private and hospital 
practice indistinguishable from the household perspective. Therefore, no direct 
analytical inference can be made to link the out-patient choice to the hospitals included 
in the supply analysis. However, the analysis on hospitals can be viewed as a 
counterpart to the demand analysis on out-patient care to the extent that the hospitals 
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in the Philippines are largely out-patient facilities. The reponed mean in-patient 
discharges for hospitals in the sample comprised only 18% of out-patient contacts. 
The analysis in chapter 5 reponed on two pioneering studies on hospital cost 
analysis of Philippine hospital samples. The secondary analysis cited for tbe supply-
side regressions showed that the cost structures of public hospital facilities were 
determined largely by the services, in-patient and out-patient, offered; while private 
hospital cost structures were determined by personnel costs and size. The lack of 
significance of other variables, especially those representing case mix and quality, 
demonstrated specification and measurement problems. 
Compared to private facilities, higher marginal cost estimates for public 
facilities suggest inefficiencies. The results from the regression estimates cited were 
misleading on private out-patients as given the organization of care in private facilities. 
Out-patient services may not have been adequately captured as some services may be 
conducted independently of hospital facilities, in physician offices located in the 
hospital. Despite the multi-product characterisation of hospital firms, the studies only 
presented a hi-product hospital providing in-patient and out-patient services, which 
did not provide insights into the extent to which the two services in private facilities 
may also be correlated. A funher aggregation of cases, for example, can provide 
insights into some cases where out-patient services may prevent in-patient care, or in-
patient care may be substituted for out-patient care. Further work can therefore look 
into diagnostic categories of outputs. 
Hospital cost structures did not appear to vary with size or scope of facilities; 
an observation which suggests that efficiency may depend on other factors not captured 
by traditional economic models. One difficulty is that these hospital models were 
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framed in a static manner and therefore ignored the effects of dynamic changes in 
inputs and technology. Moreover, the omission of variables that capture provider 
influence and the inadequate and ill-defined measures of quality and casemix could have 
affected the predictive capacities of the models. 
Despite these limitations, Chapter 5 showed that the results and the attendant 
methodological problems were not unique to the Phlippines. Country studies reviewed 
by Barnum and Kutzin (1993) showed similar results; and, further highlighted the 
constraints posed by the data, given the nature of record-keeping in developing 
countries. 
The supply-side analysis has been limited by data access, and therefore. only 
an analysis of secondary materials has been undertaken. But subsequent work could 
address the methodological issues raised and examine more thoroughly the production 
function for private out-patients, incorporating its organizational features, like the 
number of consultants in various specialties, which are likely to affect the flow of out-
patient services provided in hospital facilities. With better data, further aggregation 
by type of specialty cases, in both public and private hospital facilities, can be made. 
Such an analysis could capture more appropriately the multi-product nature of hospital 
firms. Further work can also explore provider influence on hospital cost structures in 
order to capture market elements impinging on hospital behaviour. A preliminary 
exploration on aspects of the market structure made in Chapter 6 of this study provides 
suggestions for further analyses. 
Market structure analysis 
The analysis of market structure, discussed in Chapter 6, showed that 
monopolistic and competitive elements were both operating in the market for health 
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services in the Philippines; and together, these features are unlikely to bring about a 
fulfilment of contestability theory's prediction that ensuring freer entry or enhancing 
potential competition will be sufficient to bring markets towards efficient performance: 
that is, cost minimization, prices equal to marginal or average costs and zero economic 
profits. The extent to which the market structure of health care in the Philippines may 
embody the potentials of a competitive or contestable market was examined through the 
following: a) market shares were estimated for hospitals at the aggregate level using 
a modified Hirschman-Herfindahl index; b) the nature of this competition was 
examined, by secondary analysis, in terms of how hospital service outputs were 
determined by the number of other firms in the market, prices and other hospital 
characteristics; and c) pricing behaviour was examined in terms of price 
discrimination and the relationship of prices to costs was compared to infer the extent 
of 'provider power'. 
With no single data base available, the market structure issues were explored 
using various data sources. Market shares analysis was undertaken from the patient 
choice data for a hospitalisation episode, using the same household survey used in the 
demand chapter. The broad aggregation of hospital services and the use of provincial 
boundaries may have overstated the extent of competition found. 
The regressions of the determinants of the hospital service outputs were part of 
the system of equations used in the cost function estimates cited in the supply chapter. 
The weak influence of prices, vis-a-vis other factors, in determining hospital out-patient 
and inpatient outputs, may be due to data limitations. Data on prices or fees. used in 
these estimates, were either averaged for all services, without distinguishing by types 
of conditions or complaints, or lifted from revenue data of departments and divided by 
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the number of patients served. Revenue figures may correlate with size and out-
patient fees may correlate with inpatient fees, thereby causing coJlinearity which may 
have minimized the impact of the price variables on output. 
A comparison of prices and costs from the hospital analysis showed that cost-
price margins were present, indicating a monopolistic feature of the market, as well 
as inefficient, non-cost minimizing behaviour. This was supported by further evidence 
on the extent of mark-up pricing for other components of the health sector, that is, 
insurance, drug companies, and physician practice. Data limitations prevent a direct 
comparison of estimated prices with actual prices. There is no single price posted for 
procedures in Philippine hospitals. Inpatient prices are based on the type of room 
accommodations, thus determining the prices of other services, from auxilliary 
services to physician fees. This suggests that future work can improve on the 
estimates cited here by incorporating better measures capturing case mix, other 
measures of size, amenities and organization of care. This would warrant a larger data 
base than is currently available. Or smaller surveys could be undertaken using case-
base analysis to provide better indications of cost and pricing behaviour. 
7.2 Summary of Over-all Directions for Research in the Philippines 
Given the limitations of the current data available, the analysis of market 
structure was largely exploratory and approached from a partial view provided by 
demand and supply parameters, as well as indicators of market structure behaviour 
inferred from market shares, output and pricing behaviour of hospitals. With better 
data, a market equilibrium analysis could have been made. Future work can move 
further ahead of the analysis undertaken in this study, by providing more robust links 
between demand, supply and the financing aspects of the health care market. Funher 
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work can use the information on the responsiveness of health care demand to link the 
structure of information with search costs in a pluralistic market - a line of inquiry 
pursued by Sattherthwaite ( 1979). The estimates on economi~s of scale and scope 
cited in this study can serve as springboards to examine the effect of demand 
uncertainty on cost structures of hospital facilities; expanding on work by Gaynor and 
Anderson ( 1995), to explore implications for hospital efficiency. Regulations were 
also viewed, in the study, as passively underpinning the market. Further work can 
incorporate market structure, the uncertainty of demand, financing and regulatory 
variables into cost function estimates of specific services. 
The study has highlighted the conceptual and methodological difficulties 
impinging on the economic analysis of the health care market. Further work could 
consider the empirical and theoretical issues, cited in the separate chapters above, as 
starting points, given better data and improved estimating techniques. Market 
structure analysis from an industrial organization framework presents an emerging 
research area in the light of quasi-market reforms. The analysis of the Philippines' 
health care system has shown that restrictive assumptions on zero sunk costs, 
symmetrical behaviour and frictionless transactions, as proposed by contestability 
analysis in Chapter 6, do not provide appropriate yardsticks to analyse a health care 
market. The behaviour of costs appeared to be defined less by production and sunk 
costs, as by costs associated with information asymmetry and 'friction' arising from 
opportunism of health care agents. An analysis pursued along these lines can examine 
the degree to which health service institutions, i.e. from physicians and their networks 
to regulators, use their position to gain a dominant presence in health market 
transactions. amidst relatively weak demand and regulatory responsiveness, and could 
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provide more powerful insights than an analysis that merely address the technical 
barriers to entry. Moreover, a more holistic picture of the analysis of health care in 
the Philippines can explore the extent to which the structure of information in the 
market alter the nature of agency in health care and the implicit and explicit contracts 
engendered. For example, the formation of relational contracts between patients and 
providers, between providers and insurers, as well as the network of providers with 
govermnent bodies, can be examined for their implications for the structure of the 
health care market and consequences for welfare. 
7.3 Implications for Health Policy Reforms in the Philippines 
The focus of the analysis on market structure in health care provides a coherent 
framework to view the policy directions that can strengthen the legislative initiatives 
towards fulfilling their potential for inducing system-wide reforms in the health sector. 
As the decentralisation and the national health insurance laws have transformed the 
functions of the Department of Health from direct delivery of services towards 
planning and financing, a framework for reforms is needed. Health policy reforms 
in the country should move beyond administrative tinkering of the health system and 
push towards addressing resource mobilisation and improving the equity and efficiency 
of the health care market. Towards this end, the market structure framework, which 
focuses on the importance of entry, conduct and performance of the market, points 
to three areas for considerations· for policy reforms, namely: a) access; b) agency: 
and c) coordination. 
Enhancing Access 
The limited extent to which competition can bring about desired market 
outcomes highlighted the importance of enhancing access to the muket, not only from 
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the supply-side, but from the demand side. This study proposes that a demand-based 
perspective should be used as a starting point for health policy reforms in the country. 
The initial conditions for reforms in the Philippines should begin by examining the 
access for patients. The empirical analyses on financing and demand showed that 
health care demand was the weakest component of the health care market. Even with 
adequate infrastructure (which 71 percent of households viewed to be adequate), access 
remains a problem, especially as such access is determined by one's income. For the 
majority of the Philippine population, the ability to pay for health care, given the price 
and organization of medical care, constitutes a main deterrent for entry. Therefore, 
the process of enhancing entry by consumers can best be seen as part of an over-all 
initiative of enhancing the system of rights and choices in society to include the poor 
and marginal members of the community. 
Moreover, the evidence on the differential responsiveness of demand and 
willingness to pay across income groups, examined in Chapter 4, can be used to 
explore different affordability levels for risk-sharing arrangements. Active fund 
management and health information/ education programmes by the consumer/ 
community organizations can provide the conditions for more responsive or elastic 
health care demand. This entails that a system of signalling the relative scarcities and 
surpluses in resources must be put in place. Government services may have to reflect 
closely their costs of provision and correct for inefficiencies. 
For the demand-side to have an impact on health sector reforms, it must be felt 
as a critical mass, as an organized voice. Given the nature the regulatory framework 
in health care in the Philippines, the transition towards such a provider payment 
system is likely to be met with strong resistance from providers and their professional 
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networks as the status quo (the fee for service system) insulates them from risks. 
Hence, the need to create an organized 'voice', on the demand-side, to push for 
reforms. Collective action from the demand-side should seek to shape the distribution 
of benefits and costs, in the country's 'marketplace'; not just in health care services, 
but also seek to influence the policy process. The Local Government Code, one of 
the legislative initiatives discussed in the Introduction (Chapter 1), which decentralised 
the health services, placing it in local authorities' control, presents a potential for the 
exercise of 'voice', particularly in the representative bodies instituted to provide 
oversight of the health sector at local level. The composition of the health boards, 
which agree on budgets and programmes in the local health sector, needs closer 
scrutiny. 
The process of institutional change entails bargaining; an exchange amongst 
organized bodies to change the 'rules of the game'. Many studies (Abel-Smith, 1992; 
Barnum, et al., 1995; World Bank, 1987; WHO, 1992), as well as empirical 
investigations on the U.S. experience (Melnick and Zwanziger, 1988; Culyer and 
Posnett, 1990) have shown that more active contracting arrangements with providers, 
rather than one of paying on a fee-for-service basis, provide the best opportunities for 
controlling health care costs and enhancing provider accountability. Therefore, for 
recent health policy initiatives to realise greater efficiency in health services and re-
distribution of resources and access for the poor, a stronger demand side is a 
necessary condition for refonns. 
Enhancing Agency 
Perfect agency implies that there is a coincidence of objectives and preferences 
among agents in a transaction (McGuire et al.. 1988). An agency problem exists, 
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however, because of the uncertainty and the asymmetric information among agents. 
From a framework (discussed in Section 1.4.2) which viewed exchange to comprise 
three markets: 1) in health services, where a physician/provider firm-patient 
relationship prevails; 2) in regulations, where political decision-making is an exchange 
between interest groups and government bodies; and, 3) in insurance, where third party 
payments alter behaviour of patients and providers, the nature of the agency problem 
in the Philippine health care market was brought out. Market structure analysis 
showed that health service transactions would not be appropriately characterised as 
'arm's length' transactions, given the prevalence of cost-price margins, suggestive of 
'market power' (shown in Table 6.5). Descriptive analyses in chapters 2 and 3 suggest 
that such anticompetitive behaviour is not likely to be limited to the health service 
markets, but may be found in the regulatory and insurance markets as well. The 
analyses did not test for the causality: whether market power is a derivative or the 
source of asymmetries in the other markets; but policy implications can be derived 
from the analyses which showed the areas where the agency problem may lie. 
An analysis of the regulatory framework (Section 2.3) showed that a major 
source of the problems determining bureaucratic interactions in the Philippines has 
been the commitment capacity of public and private contracting parties. The inability 
of goverrunent to make credible commitments stems from the multiple sources of power 
in the legislature and bureaucracy, cumbersome bureaucracy and limited resources that 
result in payment delays in public-private contracts, and weak enforcement 
capabilities. Private sector commitment capacity, on the other hand, was also shown 
to be a problem, given a rent-seeking orientation, weak accountability, as well as 
concerns that the ability to win contracts were often based. not on track-record. but 
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on political connections. Enhancing commitment credibility in the public sector is an 
over-all concern and one in which the solution may largely lie outside the health sector. 
Contestability theory posits that the ability for potential entrants to 'discipline· 
incumbents rests on the ability of entrants to take a share of the market and 'run', if 
need be, given zero sunk costs. The analysis on the regulatory framework in Section 
2.3.2 suggest that 'exit' is a negligible concern among professional self-regulation. 
compared to the bias for mandatory restrictions on entry through licensing and 
certification. A first step is to set up credible institutions to facilitate exit: a grievance 
and complaints committee similar to, but possibly with a wider rtmit than the General 
Medical Council in the U.K. (with wider scope to cover institutional competence as 
well as practitioner competence) . A re-examination of the entry and exit rules, needs 
to be made to provide adequate signals of quality and consumer protection and not just 
mechanisms for cartelized-control over the system. 
For the insurance market, the passive role of third party payers in the 
Philippine health care market suggests that insurers do not play a significant role in the 
health care market, influencing provider and consumer behaviour, unlike their 
counterparts in the U.S. Although this passivity appears to be reminiscent of health 
care in the U.S. before the 1980s (Culyer and Posnett, 1990). The continued survival 
of the traditional indemnity insurers, despite a small demand base because of prevailing 
low incomes, appear to stem not only from skimming the low risk corporate markets, 
but also from financial intermediation undertaken through diversified operations. The 
conditions in the U.S. (Ibid.) which gave rise to insurers having the most impact on the 
market in health care: tax relief on premiums, spiralling health care costs due to the 
pace of technology and changing demographics. do not appear to be warranted in the 
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Philippines at present. However, the conditions that prevent the formation of a 
national health insurance programme in the U.S. (Rotham, 1993}: absence of middle 
class coalition towards such policy, entrepreneurial character of the medical profession, 
voluntarism or employers taking the slack in provision, appear to be present in the 
Philippines, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
For state and private health services, enhanced agency may mean greater 
availability of a basic core of services at the primary level facilities and better quality 
of services. Human resource development programmes can improve staff morale, 
boost clientelism (responsiveness to clients' needs) and counter slack. Quality could 
be enhanced by agreements on standards of good practice, protocols for case 
management, activities that are directed at greater standardisation of practice to 
improve quality and lessen uncertainties that lead to high costs of care. 
Improving Coordination 
Coordination means bringing the various agents in the market together not only 
to lower the 'friction' from transactions, but also to address market failure. In the 
context of equity concerns for lower income groups' needs, described in the context of 
the government's health policy objectives (Chapter 2), coordination also means 
directing public and private resources towards their needs. The suggestion about 
enhancing organizations of consumers and communities through collective action could 
facilitate coordinating functions for government, as such groups could serve as 
intermediaries through which individual needs could be articulated. 
The evidence from market structure analysis (Chapter 6) showed that efficiency 
and cost-minimizing behaviour cannot be ensured by freer entry and large numbers of 
providers. With relatively weak monitoring systems amidst a rent-seeking orientation 
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from agents (Chapter 2), a major coordinating concern is that many of the health care 
activities in the country occur outside of centralized control; out there in the market 
in small, atomistic transactions between patients and doctors, as well as vertically-
integrated hospital arrangements, and nmnerous other medical sector firms (as shown 
in Chapter 6). To regulate the market structure in the Philippines. the government 
requires access to information. For government policy-making and regulatory 
functions, the government's capacity to make the 'regulated' disclose information may 
not be reliable, as the 'regulated' have no incentive to provide it (LeGrand, 1991). 
The government could, however, use its delivery activities to generate information, 
on prices and cost-effective mechanisms, that could be used to compare with the private 
sector and hence track the performance of the health sector. Joint information 
gathering could be undertaken, with private providers induced to participate by on-site 
installation of systems to improve their operations. For government and private 
bodies, investments in information systems are needed. Through stronger 
decentralised structures, an information network could be set up at local level, 
involving public and private providers and insurers. 
For most consumers, acquiring information on prices and quality occur through 
informal channels. Improving information channels could enhance access to the 
system. Knowledge of prices in government and private services through some 
disclosure rules could lead to over-all transaction efficiency. Pharmacies, for example. 
are required to post generic prices alongside brand prices to better inform consumers· 
Hospitals may be required to have posted prices. closely hewed to costs than to 
amenities. 
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The market perspective of the study provides useful insights for the 
transformation of planning functions towards perfecting coordination in the health care 
marketplace. The study has shown that while health care can be considered a 
commodity in a private-orientated system such as in the Philippines, the public good 
characteristics of health care cannot be ignored, specifically its non-exclusionary and 
merit features which characterise health prevention programmes. These programmes 
are normally vertically integrated programmes in the Deparment of Health and were 
not discussed in the thesis which was concerned with health services. It is in 
reconciling the public-private attributes of health care that poses the challenge for to 
health service providers and for policy. Recent policy reforms in quasi-market 
framework highlight that the question is no longer one of whether to regulate or not; 
nor just simply a choice between public or private provision. Inadequate information 
on costs, quality and the specific links between health activities and health outcomes, 
have limited the ability of dichotomous market and government approaches to bring 
about desired health sector objectives. The policy issue appears to boil down to how 
private decision-making could incorporate public goals. And how public health care 
institutions could be made responsive to patient and community health needs. 
Hopefully, the concerns and the analyses made in the study can contribute towards a 
greater understanding of the competence of markets and agents to assist policy in 
determining that the choice is one that achieves a better distribution of benefits for 
society; with the costs more equally shared. 
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Appendix 1 
A Description of the Data Bases Used in the Study 
1.1 Description of the National Data Base 
There are two data sets that are periodically collected by the National Statistics 
Office (NSO) which provide the benchmarks for national estimates of employment, 
expenditures, incomes and income inequalities, and other socio-economic measures. 
These are the Integrated Survey of Households (ISH) and the Family Income and 
Expenditures (PIES). The 1987 National Health Survey (NHS), also conducted by the 
same agency, was undertaken as a "rider" to the ISH. 
Integrated Survey of Households (ISH) 
Conducted yearly and during the four quarters of the year, the core module of 
the survey was the Labor Force section, often described interchangeably as the Labor 
Force Survey (LFS). This module involved the collection of data on demographic and 
socio-economic characteristics. Specifically, the ISH was designed with the following 
objectives: 1) to gather, process and analyze data on the labor force, the employed and 
the unemployed, and their characteristics; 2) to gather, process and analyze data on 
other socio-economic characteristics of the household. 
The sampling design of the ISH was the same as that used by the PIES. 
Provinces, cities and special areas served as the domain of the surveys; i.e., sampling 
was done at each level. Premiere cities for example Angeles, Bacolod, Davao and 
Cagayan de Oro, were treated in much the same way as provinces. Metro Manila 
areas, i.e. Manila, Pasay, Quezon City and Caloocan, were also treated as separate 
domains, with a special sampling scheme applicable to the exclusive villages in Makati. 
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Utilizing a two-stage cluster sampling design, sample barangays served as the 
primary sampling units and the sampling 'frame utilized for surveys done in the '80s 
was obtained from the 1980 Census of Population and Housing. Households comprise 
the secondary sampling units. In selecting the primary sampling units, barangays in 
each sub-domain were arranged by population size in descending order to form strate 
of approximately equal sizes. Secondary sampling units were selected systematically 
with random start. 
During selected survey rounds, rider questionnaires on special topics were 
included, under separate instructions. The National Health Survey (NHS) of 1987 was 
carried out as a "rider" to the third quarter round of the LFS. The same sample 
households and survey design were utilized for both surveys. 
National Health Survey (NHS) 
The 1987 NHS was the third in a series of nation-wide health surveys in the 
Philippines. The NHS provided information on the level and frequency of morbidity 
and mortality in the population, practices, attitudes and use of various health and 
nutrition services. The 1987 NHS was a joint undertaking between the Department 
of Health and the National Statistics Office, with the NSO serving as the lead agency. 
The development and preparation of the questionnaire and tabulation plans were made 
by the DOH, in coordination with an inter-agency committee, while the field 
operations, processing and tabulation of data were done by NSO. 
The survey covered some 18,500 households. 
Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES) 
Data from the FIES provided information on family income and family living 
expenditures and other related information affecting income and expenditure levels and 
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patterns in the country. Related information such as family size, occupation. age and 
educational attainment of the household head and housing characteristics were also 
included. 
The sample households covered in the FIES survey were the same sample 
households interviewed in the July 1988 and January 1989 rounds of the LFS. The 
same sampling design is adopted, as discussed above. Some 19,897 sample households 
were interviewed. 
PIES household samples were interviewed in two separate operations, July 1988 
and January 1989, using the same questionnaire. The reference consumption period 
for all food items uses the "average week consumption"(in contrast to the "past week" 
reference in the 1985 PIES). "Past month consumption" is used for fuel,light, 
transportation, communication, personal care and effects. All other expenditure 
groups, including medical care use "past six months" as reference period. 
Matched Data Sets 
Given this information, the matching of data sets was technically feasible. 
However, for data processing and publications, these data sets have not been presented 
as combined. A critical information was the household control number which matches 
at the regional level. Given the broad reference month used for medical care, the LFS 
data for 1987 can therefore be used; providing the common link between the FIES to 
the NHS. 
Another consideration for matching was that the reference base should be 
household information. Beyond the household, NSO puts in raising factors to its 
provincial and national estimates. Inasmuch as the concern was with household-level 
use of health care services. the data was associated with a particular household. This 
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was with exception to the price data. Price data for hospitals and other medical 
services or goods were gathered from regional level data. 
The NHS provided useful information on the utilization of various health care 
services by households. However, socio-economic data on households was limited. 
Hence the need for matching with the LFS. However, the income of households was 
reported in the NHS and all other occupational data used that of the LFS. 
While the PIES was fairly comprehensive with socio-economic data and 
expenditures and income, occupational and wage profile from LFS is fairly 
straightforward. 
This study represented the first known attempt to match PIES with LFS and 
LFS with NHS. 
1.2 Description of the Primary Data Set 
The data base for the analysis on household out-patient provider choice utilized 
a household survey which formed part of a comprehensive research programme 
involving surveys on health service facilities and financing insitutions. The household 
survey was conducted under the auspices of a Department of Health (DOH)-
commissioned study with the Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS). The 
over-all project was expected to gather baseline information on health and the behaviour 
of households, providers and financial institutions to support health financing reforms. 
From hereon, the primary data set will be referred to as PIDS-DOH data base. 
The household component of the bigger project (which included hospitals and 
private practitioners surveys) was handled by this author. The surveys were conducted 
professionally by a market research group, Trends, and supervised by the Department 
of Biostatistics of the University of the Philippines' College of Public Health. A full 
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description of the survey process is contained in Mendoza (1992). The principal 
investigators or authors had joint supervisory functions over the survey process. 
Ownership of the data rested jointly with the authors and with PIDS and DOH. 
The surveys were conducted between July - November, 1992. 
Sampling Design for the Household Survey 
A household survey was conducted in four regions of the country, namely: 
Regions II, VII, X, and the National Capital Region. A multi-stage sampling was 
used. The regions were chosen on the basis of socioeconomic conditions (GDP, 
population and health indicators and facilities), encompassing a poorer region (Region 
II), middle to upper (VII and X) regions, and a metropolitan area (NCR). Within each 
of the regions (except NCR), two provinces were selected as sample sites, again, 
representing a poor and an economically progressive area. In the NCR, study sites 
chosen were more widespread across cities and towns based on population weights 
used by the National Statistics Office (NSO). 
After the provincial selection, cities or municipalities were stratified within 
the province according to the category of hospitals located (primary, secondary and 
tertiary) , as well as ownership (public private). From the city or municipal levels, 
barangays (villages) were drawn by first stratifying them according to the following 
categories: 
-barangays in cities 
-barangays in municipalities with government hospitals 
-barangays in municipalities with private hospitals 
-barangays in municipalities with no hospitals 
Thereafter, the household selection process followed after determining from 
293 
local authorities the most recent count of the number of households in the barangay and 
an ocular survey to determine boundaries. Households were randomly selected. Every 
fourth house after the random start is included in the study. The respondents were 
household heads or their spouse. For validation purposes, questions related to specific 
details of illness or use of facility (i.e. hospitalization) were asked of member-user for 
every 1Oth household. 
A total of 2, 800 households were covered by the survey. 
The questionnaire covered the following areas: 
1) basic household information; 2) household conditions; 
3) employment; 4) income and expenditures; 5) health status of family members: 
self-reported illness, disability, chronicity, mortality; 6) family health service use: 
consultations (past four weeks), hospitalizations (past 12 months). usual source of care, 
source of care for prenatal and immunizations; 7) health care financing data : 
membership/participation in schemes, 8) knowledge, attitudes and practicies; 9) work 
environment; and, 10) time allocation. 
Sampling for the Facility Surveys 
Two types of facility surveys were conducted: hospitals and out-patient clinics. 
The respondents in these surveys were hospital administrators and providers, 
respectively. Information from annual reports and/or other hospital files were also 
examined. Some questions for the out-patient providers were gleaned from clinic staff. 
after provider authorization. 
Chapter 5 and 6 of this study cited the analysis which used the PIDS-DOH 
Hospital Survey. The hospital survey included 160 hospitals selected by strati fed 
random sampling design using proportional allocation. The stratification was based on 
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ownership: public and private; and on facility categories: pnmary. secondary. 
tertiary. 
The out-patient clinic survey, briefly cited in Chapter 5, was conducted using 
stratisfied cluster sampling. Five areas of specialisation were targetted: internal 
medicine, pediatrics, obstetrics, surgery, and general practice. Hospital and non-
hospital based clinics were considered. Non-hospital based clinic interviews were 
conducted in the barangays where the household survey was conducted. Hospital-based 
out-patient clinics were conducted in tertiary and secondary hospitals included in the 
hospital survey. Providers were sorted by area of specialisation and in each hospital. 
2 providers were interviewed from each area of specialisation. The targetted sample 
size for out-patient clinic interviews was 400. 
References: 
0. Mendoza, 1992. "Conceptual Framework and Sampling Design of Each of the 
Priority Areas of the PIDS-DOH Project'' 
National Statistics Office, 1988. Family Income and Expenditures Survey 1988, 
Philippines. 
, 1987. Labor Force Survey: Integrated Survey of Households, 
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Philippines. 
, 1988. National Health Survey 1987, Philippines 
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Appendix 2 
Formula For Standardization of Health Status 
This study's examination of the distribution of health, using self-reponed health 
complaint by im:ome group, necessitated a methodology that attempts to remove the 
collinearity of demographic variables, age and sex, with income. Age and gender may 
be associated with income and the reporting of morbidity and the utilization of health 
care relative to morbidity. Following O'Donnell and Propper (1989), this study 
used a direct age/sex standardization technique . In the case of the distribution of 
illness or morbidity, it was carried out by calculating the number in each income group 
who would report morbidity if that group had the same age/sex distribution as the 
whole sample. The formula used is as follows, 
where: 
bijk 
age group 
'("I '("I biJk (ni ... xn.Jk) 
"' ·.i-1 k--J n .. k N ~J 
- number of individuals reporting morbidity in the i'11 income group. jm 
and klh sex. 
1\jk - number of individuals in the ilh income group, jlh age group and Iclh sex. 
- number of individuals in the ilh income group. 1\ .. 
n 'k 
.J 
N 
Reference: 
number of individuals in the jlh age and ~ sex group. 
= total number of individuals in the sample. 
o. O'Donnell and c. Propper, 1989. Equity and the Distribution of ~ational Health 
Service Resources. Suntory Toyota International Centre for Economtcs and Related 
Disciplines, Welfare State Programme Discussion Paper No. 45. 
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Appendix 3 
A Model of the Choice of Out-patient Provider 
A.l Behavioural Model 
Chapter 4 of this study applied a health care demand model for the Philippines 
using the theoretical and empirical specifications attributed to Gertler, et al. ( 1987) and 
Gertler and van der Gaag (1990). The model of demand for out-patient health care 
services used a framework in which utility depends on health and on the consumption 
of goods other than medical care. Within this framework, an individual must decide 
to seek medical care if an illness is experienced. The benefit from seeking medical 
care is an improvement in health while the associated cost is the reduction in the 
consumption of other goods. 
Individuals have to decide not only whether to seek care but also what type of 
care. Each individual is faced with a set of alternative providers (including self-care) 
that offers an expected improvement in health for a price. The expected improvement 
in health (efficacy of health services) depends on the providers skills, individual 
characteristics ( e.g., health status ) and other factors. The price of each provider 
includes both monetary outlays and access costs such as the opportunity of travel time 
and waiting time. Taking account of this information and their incomes, individuals 
choose the alternative that yields the highest utility. 
Formally, let the expected utility conditional on receiving care from provider 
j, be given by: 
(1) U = U(H· C-) J J' J 
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where Hj is the expected health status after receiving treatment from provider j, and C1 
is consumption net of the cost of obtaining care from provider j, including access costs. 
The quality of provider j's medical care is the expected improvement (marginal 
product) in health when the individual seeks care over the health improvements gained 
if the individual does not seek medical care or treated himself. Let~ be the expected 
health status without professional medical care or self-treatment. Then, the quality of 
provider j's care is Qj= H/H0 , which yields an expected health care production 
function of the form 
(2) H- = Q-H J J 0 
The quality parameter depends on provider characteristics, and individual characteristics 
such as education, type of illness and its severity. 
Let Pj be provider j's price and Y be income, then: 
Substitution of (3) into (1) yields: 
The unconditional maximization problem is : 
A.2. Empirical Specification 
The solution to the maximization problem in equation (5) yields a system of 
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demand functions, whose forms are probabilities that the alternatives are chosen given 
that an individual experiences an illness. 
Gertler's demand model showed that if health is a normal good, then the 
demand for health increases with income. In a discrete choice situation, this implies 
that as income increases individuals are more likely to choose higher quality/higher 
price options. A necessary condition for normality is that as income increases the 
marginal rate of substitution of consumption for health diminishes, holding health 
constant. 
Gertler and his colleagues pointed out that to allow health to be a normal good, 
and therefore, to influence the choice, the functional form of the conditional utility 
function should not impose a constant rate of marginal rate of substitution. An example 
of such functional form is the semi-translog, where health and access costs enter in log 
form and consumption in both log and log squared form. 
Substitution of (2) and (4) and the health production function into a semi-
translog conditional utility function yields 
Note that neither Honor Qj in equation (6) are observed. The term aJIJ can be ignored 
since it appears in the utility function for all the choices and its value does not vary by 
alternative and therefore does not influence choice of alternative. 
To solve the unobservability of Qj, we specify a quality or marginal product 
function for each provider type. Let the expected quality by individual i from provider 
jbe 
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where X is a vector of the determinants of quality (measures of health status and 
education) and utility from quality, and tj is a random term. This error term 
represents un-observed individual characteristics (complexity of complaint) that may 
affect the provider's marginal productivities; and may be correlated across provider 
alternatives. 
Substitution of (7) into (6) gives the reduced form conditional utility function 
for provider j, 
(8) u. = v. +e.+ t. J J J J 
where 
Note that the intercept and coefficients on the characteristics X vary by alternatives, 
whereas the coefficients on the economic variables are constant across alternatives. 
A.3 The Demand Functions 
The demand function for an alternative is the probability that its utility is greater 
than from any other alternative. Most of the previous studies on the demand for 
medical care have assumed that this demand take on a multinomial logit form (MNL). 
McFadden (1981), however, argued that MNL suffers from the assumption of 
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independence of irrelevant alternatives. This assumption is equivalem to assuming that 
the stochastic portions of the conditional utility functions are uncorrelated across 
alternatives, and it imposes the restriction that the cross-price elasticities are the same 
across alternatives. To relax this restriction, and following McFadden, the demand 
function is specified as a nested multinomiallogit (NMNL). The NMNL allows for 
correlation across subgroups of alternatives and, therefore, nonconstant cross-price 
elasticities. Moreover, the NMNL allows the grouping of more similar alternatives so 
that the cross-price elasticities are more elastic within groups than across groups. 
Thus, the probability that provider j is chosen given a decision to seek care and 
the probability for self-care, is shown respectively: 
(9) 
(10) exp(V1/o) lli=(l-llo)----J-----------a 
[ ~ exp ( Vj I a) ] 
j=l 
where 0 is one minus the correlation of the j = I .. .J utilities or a measure of the 
similarity of grouped alternatives introduced by tj. 
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The log-likelihood function for this problem is: 
1 
lnL.=~D.lnTI .. 
I ~l) 
0 
The estimated demand functions can be used to assess the effect of user fees on 
demand, in terms of compensating variation estimates. Small and Rosen ( 1981) 
showed that the compensating variation is 
(11) 1 1 1 
CV=(-)[ln[exp(V c)+ ~exp(VY'] -ln[exp(V~) + ~exp(V1 ) 0]] 1 1 } 1 } 
where VJ and V/ are the initial and final values of the function, respectively. and where 
A is the marginal utility of income. shown as: 
au 1=-=a +2a (Y-P.-wT.) 5Y 1 2 J J 
The marginal utility of income is observed to be approximately constant across 
small variations in prices. However. for widely varying incomes. A may vary ~reatly 
across individuals within provider alternatives. 
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Appendix 4 
Hedonic Price Estimates for the 
Health Care Demand Model 
An indirect method of estimating prices can be made through hedonic pncmg 
estimation technique. The method is discussed in Gertler et al. ( 1987) and Ching ( 1995). The 
hedonic price estimation applied in this study follows the procedures in Ching. The equations 
are no longer repeated here. 
The concept of hedonic pricing refers to indirect estimates of prices where market data 
may not be complete or may be unavailable. Reported prices of medical care are not really 
prices but expenditures: prices multiplied by quantities ; therefore, the use of indirect prices 
can provide greater precision to the price estimates (Dor, et al., 1987). The hedonic price 
equation specifies price to be a function of age, gender, education, illness conditions, market 
structure and location variables. Market structure variables refer to the number of clinics and 
number of doctors, per 10,000 population in the village. Location factors distinguishes urban 
areas, as well as, the regions where the households belong. The prices following this 
functional form, and estimated using ordinary least squares regression, were applied to all 
individuals who reported consulting a provider. It was these prices which were used as 
regressors in the health care demand model. 
Moreover, prices also reflect market conditions; such that higher prices may be charged 
to higher income individuals or in more central areas. Hence, this provides a selection 
problem in which higher income individuals may choose higher priced providers or go to 
locations where higher prices may be charged. The issue itself remains to be empirically 
tested by the health care demand model. This selection problem was initially dealt with 
before hedonic prices can be estimated. 
The sample selection bias was corrected by estimating a reduced form multinomial 
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logit model of provider choice, from which a Heckman-selection (Heckman, 1976) term was 
derived for each individual. This selection term (lambda) was included as a regressor in the 
hedonic price regression. The results are shown in Table A4. 
Low coefficients and low t-values seem to characterise the hedonic price estimates. 
As Ching (1995) observed, these values were also low for Gertler et al (1987). Ching noted 
that econometric textbooks would not consider variables with small coefficients to be 
unimported; rather, they may reflect differences in variable units and their variances. 
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TableA4 
Hedonic Price Regressions 
Variables Description I Private Doctor Government Hospitals Government Clinics 
Coefficient T-Values Coefficient T-Values Coefficient T-values 
Constant 0.046 0.19 0.017 0.74 0.126 1.99 
lambda Selection Term 0.245 0.40 0.000 0.03 -0.006 -0.22 
Age Age: in years -0.001 -0.50 -0.025 -0.79 0.000 0.60 
Male Dummy Variable : 1 =Male 0.066 1.68 -0.025 -0.79 0.010 1.60 
Educ Education: in years 0.002 0.42 -0.025 -0.79 0.010 1.60 
Urban Dummy Variable: 1 =Urban 0.025 0.34 -0.025 -0.79 -0.001 -0.69 
(N I No. of Clinics \a Per 10,000 population per brngay 0.118 0.59 0.03 -0.79 -0.005 -0.59 
= 0\ No. of Doctors \a Per 10,000 population per brngay -0.002 -1.25 -0.025 -0.79 -0.000 -0.93 
Cardiovascular Dummy = 1 if complaint is so 0.400 4.74 -0.025 -0.79 0.005 -0.02 
Respiratory Dummy = 1 if complaint is so 0.063 1.63 -0.025 -0.79 0.001 0.83 
Infectious Dummy = 1 if complaint is so 0.044 0.85 -0.025 -0.79 -0.005 -0.49 
Reg2 Dummy = 1 for region where located 0.018 0.17 -0.025 -0.79 -0.017 -0.14 
Reg7 Dummy = 1 for region where located -0.129 -2.01 -0.025 -0.79 -0.008 -0.87 
Reg10 Dummy = 1 for region where located -0.096 -1.37 -0.025 -0.79 -0.001 -0.48 
prob(self care) Probability self care is sought -0.417 -0.35 -0.018 -0.29 -0.164 -1.48 
prob(gov't hospital) Probability gov't hospital is sought -0.515 -0.38 -0.025 -0.79 -0.032 -0.24 
prob(gov't clinic) Probability gov't clinic is sought -0.302 -0.23 -0.025 -0.79 0 -0.24 
a/ From pre-survey information, PIDS-DOH Data Sets 
Appendix S 
Estimation of Arc Price and Time Elasticities 
Elasticity refers to the percentage change in variable y with respect to 
a percentage change in variable X, and is generally shown in the following formula: 
ay 
E = Y ay X ax = ax * Y 
X 
The demand model used had prices (Pj) and income (Y) entering the demand 
functions in a non-linear fashion, it is hard to assess the direction and magnitude of 
their effects directly from the estimation results of the NMNL. To allow for the 
estimation of price elasticities, we estimate arc price elasticities of the demand for 
private doctors, public hospital and public clinics by income quartiles using sample 
enumeration as shown in Train, 1986. 
STEP 1. Estimate the model of provider choice using NMNL. 
STEP 2. Categorize sample by quartile and get the quartile means of all the right-
hand side variables used in STEP 1. 
STEP 3. Reestimate NMNL by quartile and get/compute cumulative probability 
of provider j. (j = private doctor, public hospital, public clinic) using 
the means of the quartile. 
STEP 4. Simulate a price P (time T) increase by increasing or adjusting P, (T,) 
by x%. [[NOTE: To be able to determine ~PJ ( ~ T,) to be used in the 
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STEP 5. 
initial simulation, print minimum, maximum and mean value of p (T. 
J J 
) ] Compute cumulative probability of choosing provider j. The 
estimated price elasticity is 
E = %APiobj 
%APiiceJ 
and the time elasticity is: 
E = %APIObj 
%ATimei 
that is, the percentage change in the cumulative probability of choosing 
provider j in STEPS 3 and 4 divided by the % change in the price 
(time) of provider j. This is the initial price adjustment. 
Repeat STEP 4 by simulating another round of price increases (time 
changes) from the initial level in STEP 4. Note that reference point or 
base is now the levels of demand and prices in STEP 4. 
NOTE: Assume no corresponding adjustment in the price and time price of other 
providers in response to a simulated price increase (time change) in provider j. 
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Appendix 6: Descriptive Statistics of Sampled Government Hospitals( used for regressions by ZingiJapan, 1994, pp.30-34) 
Variables Description Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Fee per Discharge Average fee per in-patient discharge 214.n 143.40 31.53 678.25 
Fee per Out-patient Visit Average revenue of hospital per out-patient visit 19.17 22.92 0.31 98.47 
Total Discharges Total in-patient discharges 3956.97 3992.36 578.00 16103.00 
Ln (Discharges) Natural Log of total in-patient discharges 7.88 0.88 6.36 9.69 
Out-patients Visits Total Out-patients visits 22600.48 2n26.58 786.00 104038.00 
Ln (Out-patient Visit) Natural log of out-patient visits 9.37 1.19 6.67 11.55 
·~ Doctors Fee Average fee of physicians in municipality where hospital 700.48 520.51 275.00 2183.90 
-
is located, weighted by type of hospital admissions 0 (e.g. charity, pay ward, semi-private,suite) 
Ln (Doctors Fee) Natural log of doctors fee 6.04 0.63 5.62 7.6 
Beds Total number of hospital beds 81.70 86.40 10.00 390.00 
Ln (Beds) Natural log of hospital beds 3.96 0.94 2.30 5.97 
Other Hospital Beds Total number of beds in other hospitals in the same municipality 543.67 1707.02 0.00 7689.00 
Sur[]ic;ll Patients Ratio of surgery department discharges to total discharges 0.09 0.06 0.00 0.26 
Subsidy pP r E3 Pd Day Average subsidy per bed day from government 442.25 190.76 22.21 847.39 
Provincial Out-patient Fee Average of out-patient fee per visit in province 75.96 81.09 7.21 43fl1 0 
(continued) 
Variables Description Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Insurance Support Average reimbursement from insurance schemes including 1666.34 4818.47 95.75 28189.75 
medicare per insured discharge 
Ln (Insurance Support) Natural log of insurance support 6.43 1.19 4.56 10.25 
Insured Patients Ratio of insured discharge to total discharges 0.18 0.13 0.01 0.56 
Wage Average wage per hospital personnel (monthly) 3545.68 916.77 801.74 5580.96 
Ln (Wage) Natural log of wage 8.31 0.36 6.69 8.63 
Ln (Out-patient Visit) Natural log of out-patient visits 8.43 0.94 6.56 10.46 
·~ 
-
- Total number of persons with health complaint in the province Illness Incidence 320.10 417.49 22.97 1359.90 
(in Thousand) 
Doctors Consultation Fee Average consultation fee charged by physicians in 52.37 22.79 20.00 114.50 
municipality where clinic is located 
Total Cost Total operating cost (in Thousand pesos) 12709.30 16450.00 1173.23 85630.30 
Ln (Cost) Natural log of total cost 15.80 1.08 13.98 18.27 
Equipment 1 if hospital has X-ray or Ultrasound or EEG machine 0.85 0.36 0.00 1.00 
or CT scan \MRI 
HousPhold Expenditures Average annual household expenditures in municipality 21315.14 15675.11 3122.60 57243.80 
Number of observations= 33 
Descriptive Statistics of Sampled Private Hospitals 
Variables Description Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Fee per Discharge Average fee per in-patient discharge 1692.38 2199.71 17.50 8333.61 
Fee per Out-patient Visit Average revenue of hospital per out -patient visit 128.43 90.03 1.81 309.12 
Total Discharges Total in-patient discharges 2796.06 3481.40 120.00 14356.00 
Ln (Discharges) Natural Log of total in-patient discharges 7.34 1.16 4.79 9.57 
Out-patients Visits Total Out-patients visits 6893.72 7045.29 703.00 35040.00 
Ln (Out-patient Visit) Natural log of out-patient visits 8.43 0.94 6.56 10.46 
·~ Doctors Fee Average fee of physicians in municipality where hospital 
-
1804.04 1096.16 367.55 3946.82 
t-..J is located, weighted by type of hospital admissions 
(e.g. charity, pay ward, semi-private,suite) 
Ln (Doctors Fee) Natural log of doctors fee 7.30 0.67 5.91 8.28 
Beds Total number of hospital beds 50.22 58.66 7.00 246.00 
Ln (Beds) Natural log of hospital beds 3.50 0.87 1.95 5.51 
01her Hospital Beds Total number of beds in other hospitals in the same municipality 1951.88 2610.29 0.00 8057.00 
Insurance Support Average reimbursement from insurance schemes including 1486.59 2076.16 6.10 9845.51 
Medicare per insured discharge 
Ln (Insurance Support) Natural log of insurance support 6.33 1.73 1.81 9.19 
lnsurP<j Patients Ratio of insured discharge to total discharges 0.48 0.30 0.09 1.00 
(continued) 
Variables Description Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Surgical Patients Ratio of surgery department discharges to total discharges 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.25 
Wage Average wage per hospital personnel (monthly) 2710.52 808.80 830.56 4176.05 
Ln (Wage) Natural log of wage 7.85 0.37 6.72 8.34 
Subsidy per Bed Day Average subsidy per bed day from government 1.08 4.35 0.00 20.60 
Ln (Subsidy per Bed Day) Natural log of subsidy per bed day 6.33 1.73 1.81 9.19 
Illness Incidence Total number of persons with health complaint in the province 698.72 571.45 92.33 13.00 
·~ (in Thousand) 
-·~ 
Ln (Illness Incidence) Natural log of illness incidence 12.97 1.09 11.43 14.12 
Provincial Out-patient Fee Average of out-patient fee per visit in province 125.37 120.68 35.07 438.10 
Doc1ors Consultation Fee Average consultation fee charged by physicians in 74.20 21.93 37.50 114.50 
municipality where clinic is located 
Equipment 1 if hospital has X-ray or Ultrasound or EEG machine 0.81 0.40 0.00 1.00 
or CT scan \MAl 
Totiil Cos1 Total operating cost (in Thousand pesos) 7181.40 1n36.90 61.41 96417.50 
Ln (Cost) Natural log of total cost 14.40 1.63 11.03 18.38 
Household ExpPndrturPs Average annual household expenditures in municipality 34997.72 15705.93 5024.89 57243.81 
Number of observations = 32 
